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The Life of Language: 
Saussure and Evolution 
If we are to discover the true nature of language we must learn what it has in common with all other 
semiological systems. 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1974, p. 16)  
Introduction  
 
The stimulus for this thesis came from a quite unexpected source. Originally I 
embarked on a comparative study of the two philosophers primarily responsible for the 
divergence of the Continental and Anglo-American traditions of language based 
philosophy: Ferdinand de Saussure and Gottlob Frege. But when I began a careful 
reading of Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics (1974 – the Course) I was struck by 
the extent to which his synchronic theory of language appeared to reflect an awareness of 
linguistic evolution as analogous to biological evolution. That seemed to me to be 
particularly interesting for two reasons. First, I was aware of the empirical success that 
linguists and biologists have had in the late twentieth century in exploiting this analogy, 
particularly in tracing the geographical origins of ethnic groups (Cavalli-Sforza, 2000). 
Second, Saussure is usually identified with a view of language as something essentially 
arbitrary and conventional – something essentially human (Saussure, 1974, p. 16). By 
that account linguistic evolution would seem to have little in common with natural 
evolutionary processes. Yet far from rejecting the analogy, Saussure seemed to be taking 
a position within it, promoting a view of linguistic evolution that was akin to a 
contemporary Darwinian understanding, as opposed to a more archaic view, of biological 
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evolution (Saussure, 1974, p. 4). The questions then arose: to what extent is Saussure’s 
theory of language a theory that could underpin and explain the linguistic-biological 
analogy? To what extent should it be such a theory? And what does the linguistic-
biological analogy suggest about the philosophical appropriation of Saussure’s theory? 
These are the guiding questions of this thesis. The answers I advance make for what I 
hope is an interesting and even provocative re-reading of Saussure’s theory of language. 
 
Initially, I suggest, we need to recall that Saussure is attempting to theorise the 
forces that are universally and permanently at work in all languages and to deduce the general laws 
to which all specific historical phenomena can be reduced (1974, p. 6). In other words, historical 
linguistics – which Saussure also terms “diachronic” or “evolutionary” linguistics – forms 
the empirical basis for his synchronic theory of language. What Saussure finds in 
historical linguistics is what he calls a new class of phenomena (1974, p. 83). Here is 
something without any fixed units, identities or objects on which a science can be based. 
Instead, the signs or values that make up language manifest a material discontinuity in 
which change is potentially all pervasive and permanence results from sheer luck (1974, p. 
231).  There is, nevertheless, a discernible structure to the forces which produce language 
states. These are the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations that constitute the 
mechanism of language. There is also a framework within which that mechanism 
operates and which ensures its ceaseless evolution. This is the speech-language 
framework: the relation between the speech that lies within the system of language and 
the speech that lies outside it. Speakers straddle this framework by means of the 
unconscious comparisons they make between the collective storehouse of language where 
productive forms are arranged and the innovations that individual experience seems to 
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necessitate. Saussure makes a distinction between everything that participates in this 
framework – the inner organism (1974, p. 21) or evolving system of a language - and 
everything that is external to it. What we observe in considering the contemporary 
linguistic-biological analogy is that the analogy holds under just the conditions Saussure 
defines, with surprising accuracy, for internal linguistics. Broadly, so long as the 
interaction of language and speech is unhindered, language evolves in a manner 
analogous to the human genome.  
 
Saussure’s theory of language explains and supports the analogy with biological 
evolution, then, to this extent: it details a conception of language as an evolving system of 
values within a language–speech framework that is free of external imposition or 
interference. At the end of the thesis I suggest that there are strong hints that this common 
evolutionary framework offers a very promising way of re-conceiving key elements in 
our current metaphysical framework. In the earlier parts of the thesis I consider the way 
in which Saussure’s theory is also elaborated on quite another basis. That basis is the 
wholly arbitrary nature of the signifier (Saussure, 1974, p. 68). It is this unique feature of 
language – a feature not shared by other sign systems, especially natural sign systems – 
that is responsible, in Saussure’s view, for the manner and complexity of linguistic 
evolution (1974, p. 76). The arbitrariness of the bond between the signifier and the 
signified is what makes the sign labile, reasons Saussure - and every evolutionary change 
involves a shift in the relationship between the signifier and signified within the sign 
(1974, . To the extent that Saussure’s theory hangs on his doctrine of the arbitrary 
signifier, I suggest, it does not support the linguistic-biological analogy. 
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The analogy, therefore, drives a wedge between two forms of arbitrariness that are 
simultaneously at work in Saussure’s theory.  The first form could be called “system 
arbitrariness” or “material discontinuity”. The character of evolutionary change is such 
that it makes no difference what material medium a sign system uses so long as it 
functions on a dynamic of individual innovation and collective conservation – that is, the 
speech-language relationship. The signifier and signified are inseparable in the values 
produced by a system evolving in this way. The second form of arbitrariness could be 
called “signifier” arbitrariness and it is the familiar arbitrariness of names as opposed to 
objects. The signifier and the signified are essentially separable in the signs produced by 
arbitrary naming. There is a strong drive in Saussure’s thought to connect up these two 
conceptions of arbitrariness. I suggest that not only is signifier arbitrariness at odds with 
the linguistic-biological analogy but it contradicts Saussure’s critique of language as 
simple naming.  Relying solely on system arbitrariness removes many of the 
contradictions and aporia that arise from the inclusion of signifier arbitrariness in 
Saussure’s systematics of language. 
 
It could be argued, then, that there are a number of reasons why Saussure’s theory 
should support the linguistic-biological analogy: it is in line with the theory’s goal of 
describing the forces that are at work in language evolution; if the theory supports the 
linguistic-biological analogy then the analogy, in turn, provides empirical support for the 
theory; and, unhooking system arbitrariness from signifier arbitrariness frees Saussure’s 
theory from a number of contradictions under which it otherwise labours. But, I suggest, 
signifier arbitrariness is too strong an intuition to simply relegate to the sidelines. It needs 
to be accommodated within system arbitrariness and accordingly I argue that it can 
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usefully be re-articulated as “systematic latitude” – adapting and developing a concept we 
already find in Saussure’s linguistics. Once that is done, there is no structural division 
between the signifier and the signified cutting across the values produced by an evolving 
system of associative and oppositional relations.  This re-articulation of arbitrary naming 
promises, in turn, to loosen the subject-object opposition at the base of our metaphysical 
framework. It creates the possibility of a meiotic redistribution of key terms and relations 
associated with that opposition on the axis of the common evolutionary framework i.e. 
the speech-language relation. This is the potential of the analogy for the philosophical 
appropriation of Saussure’s theory. 
 
In the first two chapters of the thesis I give an exposition of Saussure’s theory that 
provides a basis for an exploration of the linguistic-biological analogy. In particular I 
emphasise the relationship between the synchronic theory and evolutionary linguistics. 
For example, I examine the notion that language could be comprised of relations of 
difference as opposed to relations of similarity and association. Conversely, I question 
whether the language system could be a kind of limiting of difference precisely by 
relations of similarity and association. Both of these arguments are present in Saussure’s 
Course, although the former has proved by far the most popular tendency (Belsey, 2002; 
Culler, 1986). In giving an account of the theory that looks forward to an exploration of 
the linguistic-biological analogy, I emphasise the inseparability of relations of identity 
and difference in the evolving language system.  
 
I also note an inchoate theory of truth in Saussure’s linguistics. This is later 
combined with the more developed concept of systematic latitude set out in the fourth 
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chapter. The combination provides the basis for an account of the often very subtle 
relationship between systematic value and the apparently arbitrary naming by which we 
are free to elaborate systematic value. I use Frege’s problems of informative identity 
statements and intentional contexts to test this account (Frege, 1997). Perhaps we here 
encounter the palimpsest of the original project of this thesis. However, since these 
problems form part of Frege’s own critique of a simple naming theory of language I 
suggest that it is both appropriate and useful to use them to test this interpretation of 
Saussure’s theory. 
 
In the third chapter I explore the linguistic-biological analogy in more detail and 
show that it is a concept that is bound up from the outset with the development of 
historical linguistics. Saussure’s work can be situated firmly within this ongoing dialogue 
and the extent to which his theory supports the contemporary analogy defined. In the 
fourth chapter I consider the reasons why Saussure’s theory should support the analogy 
and the way in which this opens the possibility of a fuller philosophical appropriation of 
his theory. Ultimately, I argue, that appropriation has the potential to change our 
conceptions of the permanent and the universal as such. 
 
The format of the thesis follows the American Psychological Association style, 
except that I have had to adopt a different protocol for quotations which here appear two 
points smaller than the normal text and in bold rather than in quotation marks. This 
departure is necessitated by the convention in Ballye and Sechahaye’s editing of the 
Course in General Linguistics which uses italics to identify names or signifiers and 
quotation marks for objects or signifieds. So, for example, Saussure refers to tree and 
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“tree” respectively. It is also helpful in distinguishing the large amounts of text that are 
quoted at some points. When I have already quoted from a source and am using a brief 
part of the quotation subsequently then this will appear in quotation marks in the normal 
way. Quotation marks also name expressions that come from the author of this thesis  - 
“material discontinuity”, for example – or from a writer nearby in context.  
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The Life of Language: 
Saussure and Evolution 
Chapter 1: Introducing Saussure 
 
Section 1: The creation of Saussure’s text  
  
• Saussure’s “Course in General Linguistics” (the Course) has an unusual 
provenance, being based largely on notes taken by students of a course of lectures 
Saussure gave in three alternate years between 1906 and 1911. 
 
• The Course differs in some respects from the lectures Saussure actually gave. 
Notably, in the original courses, the account of diachronic linguistics is a prelude 
to the synchronic theory of language, not a postscript to it.   
 
• The Course gives an account of the accepted views of the time as well as 
Saussure’s own views, without explicitly distinguishing between these.  
.  
No-one disputes the influence of Ferdinand de Saussure’s theory of language. It 
has proved extraordinarily fertile across a wide range of disciplines (Gadet, 1986). 
However, to adapt one of Saussure’s own dicta, (1974, p. 68),  it is often easier to assign 
a theory its proper place than to discover its truth. The unusual provenance of Saussure’s 
work does nothing to diminish this difficulty. The work in which the theory is contained, 
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the “Course in General Linguistics”, is a reconstruction, by his editors, Charles Bally and 
Albert Sechehaye, in collaboration with Albert Reidlinger, of a series of lectures given by 
Saussure toward the end of his career, between 1906 and 1911. Saussure himself 
produced no written account of his general linguistics. Indeed Saussure developed what 
may reasonably be described as a fear of writing, destroying his notes for these lectures 
and becoming unable to bring to publication any of his considerable number of writing 
projects (Culler, p. 23). Bally and Sechehaye’s reconstruction is based on the notes of 
students (including those of Charles Bally himself)  attending one or other of three series 
of lectures, together with some notes of Saussure’s recovered from his private papers, 
most notably his “Notes pour un article sur Whitney” of 1894 (Alter, 2005, p.250). The 
lectures make up the eponymous Course in General Linguistics that Saussure taught three 
times.  
 
The decisions made by the editors in synthesising the text of the Course have 
been the subject a good deal of dispute - at least since the publication of original students’ 
notes by Robert Godel in 1957 (Godel, 1957).  In his 1976 account of Saussure’s work, 
Jonathan Culler, for example - while acknowledging that the Course in its established 
form has already been immensely influential - suggests that it does not give enough 
weight to the primordial importance of the principle of the arbitrary nature of the sign 
(Culler, 1986, p. 26). Culler contends that the original notes show a greater emphasis on 
this principle. He bases his account on this principle, locating other key aspects of 
Saussure’s theory as consequences of it. This has the appeal of being a distinctively 
structural approach to Saussure’s work. In a recent article, entitled “Saussure’s unfinished 
semantics”, Simon Bouquet develops an account of Saussure’ preliminary semantics 
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based entirely on student notes of the lectures and on some other unpublished writings of 
the times (Sanders, 2004, p. 205 - p.218). He makes some  strong criticisms of the 
decisions of the editors, stating, for example, that the last sentence of the Course – the true 
and unique object of  linguistics  is language studied in and of itself (Saussure, 1974, p. 232)  - is as 
unfortunate as it is famous. (Sanders, 2004, p. 207) It is completely contradictory and nowhere to be 
found in Saussure’s lectures or writings (Sanders, 2004, p. 207), having been drawn instead from 
the work of the progenitor of comparative philology, Franz Bopp. Yet it is clear that the 
dispute that one has with the editors will depend on one’s interpretative interests. The 
echoes, in this phrase, of Saussure’s emphasis on what he calls internal linguistics (1974, p. 
20) and his frequent emphasis on the need to study language in itself (1974, p. 16) and to 
avoid external (1974, p. 113) aspects of language seem quite appropriate from the point of 
view of the reading advanced in this thesis, for example. It is also helpful to recall that 
this pivotal statement would, in the original sequence, appear at the end of the first 
section of Saussure’s course of lectures rather than at the end of the entire course. 
  
For, I suggest –  no doubt reflecting my own interpretative interests – that it is 
very important to note that the original courses of lectures, especially the third course, 
have a different order from that which they are given in the Course. The plan of Saussure’s 
third Course can be described as follows: from the diversity of languages to “language” (as opposed 
to “speech”) – and from language to linguistics. Bally and Sechehaye, however, begin with language 
and postpone languages and their diversity (parts 3,4 and 5) to the end. (Gadet, 1986, p. 22) Part 3 is 
headed “Diachronic Linguistics” and parts 4 and 5 also deal with historical linguistics. It 
may be said then that the sequence in the Course gives too much prominence to the 
structural, synchronic aspect of the theory before showing how this arises from 
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Saussure’s account of evolutionary or diachronic linguistics. Saussure’s account of 
evolutionary linguistics is, I suggest, the prologue to the synchronic theory, not a 
postscript to it.  
 
For the origins of Saussure’s theory of language lie in his understanding of 
diachronic or evolutionary linguistics. The theory is Saussure’s attempt to describe the 
enduring conditions that make language evolution possible – to determine the forces that are 
permanently and universally at work in all languages and to deduce the general laws to which all 
specific historical phenomena can be reduced (Saussure, 1974, p. 6). The fact that Saussure’s 
synchronic linguistics is concerned to describe the structure of language in a stable state 
does not mean that the subject of his study is not something living – an object constantly 
being transmitted and reproduced over time within a community of speakers. As Saussure 
says, there is really no such thing as absolute immobility ... evolution may vary in rapidity and 
intensity but this does not invalidate the principle (1974, p. 140). Synchronic linguistics does not 
describe any particular evolutionary trajectory - it does not give any history of the growth 
of a particular language as diachronic linguistics does. That does not mean, however, that 
it is not concerned with a living object as the product of an evolutionary process. We 
should not imagine that, I suggest, any more than we would now seek to understand a 
biological organism or system of organisms outside its evolutionary context. 
 
It is also important to note what may be called the “geometrical” character of 
Saussure’s theory – a feature which contributed to the difficulty he experienced in writing 
for publication. What makes the subject difficult, says Saussure, is that it can be approached 
from various directions, like certain geometrical theorems: everything is the corollary of everything 
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else in static linguistics. Whether one is talking of units, differences, oppositions etc., it all comes 
down to the same thing (Interview with Riedlinger, 1909, quoted in Gadet, 1986, p. 24). In a later 
interview he says: No one point of departure is more appropriate than another as a foundation for 
the demonstration (Note from proposed volume, 1894, quoted in Gadet, 1986, p. 25). I will be 
suggesting that this geometrical character also reflects the essential grounding of 
Saussure’s static linguistics in historical or evolutionary linguistics. The forces that create 
any stable language state are the same forces that cause it to change.  
 
It is also important to observe that the “Course in General Linguistics” is just that 
– a long Course of lectures teaching students about linguistics as such. It is a mixture of 
Saussure’s own views and the standard views of the time on the subject. No doubt this 
fact also emboldened the editors of the Course to add some of their own glosses. The 
teachings of the Neogrammarian school with which Saussure is most closely associated 
must be taken into account and, in particular, there is the widespread influence of the 
American linguist William Dwight Whitney. Whitney is probably the most important 
single source of ideas for the Neogrammarians as a group and he is particularly important 
for Saussure (Alter, 2005). The student lecture notes that form the basis of the text of the 
Course were supplemented by material from Saussure’s private papers and much of this 
is taken from “Notes pour un article sur Whitney”. This is a document of some thirty 
pages Saussure prepared in 1894 on the occasion of Whitney’s death, in which he first 
begins to expound his ideas on the broader questions of linguistics as such. It is not 
surprising, then, that when the American Leonard Bloomfield reviewed the second 
edition of Saussure’s Course in 1924 he remarked: Most of what the author says has long been 
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“in the air” and has been here and there fragmentarily expressed (Bloomfield, 1924, p. 318 in Falk, 
J.S., in Sanders, 2004, p. 108).  
 
Understanding that the Course is not original in any holistic sense certainly eases 
some of the contradictions in the text. It is not, I think, facile to attribute many statements 
in the Course to Whitney and to the accepted views of the time and others to Saussure’s 
distinctive theorizing. Often Saussure uses expressions which are taken almost verbatim 
from other sources and seem to aim at an accurate reflection of those sources. His 
differing statements on the role of signification alongside value or on the question of 
whether there was an implicit original contract between speakers, are good examples of 
contradictions that may be explained in this way. But perhaps the best illustration one can 
provide is the most central. Here is John Locke, inspired in turn by Plato’s dialogue 
Cratylus and a long subsequent tradition from Aristotle through St. Augustine (Joseph, J.E. 
in Sanders, 2004, p. 61).   Locke argues that certain words stand for certain ideas not by any 
natural connexion … for then there would be but one Language amongst all Men; but by a voluntary 
Imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the Mark of such an Idea (Locke, J., Book III, 
“Of Words,” in Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) in Alter, 2005, p. 54). The 1853 
edition of Websters American Dictionary of the English Language states: Language 
consists in the oral utterance of sounds which usage has made the representative of ideas. When two 
or more persons customarily annex the same sounds to the same ideas, the expression of these sounds 
by one person communicates his ideas to another (Alter, 2005, p. 74). There, in a nutshell, are 
many of the key elements of Saussure’s introductory exposition of the doctrine of the 
arbitrary nature of the sign in the Course. 
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Section 2: The science of linguistics  
 
• Saussure’s “Glance at the history of linguistics” (1974, p. 1) reflects his ongoing 
concern with the definition of linguistics as a science. 
 
• Following the debate between Dwight Whitney, representing a conventionalist 
tradition, and the continental natural-historical tradition, Saussure is able to take 
a more nuanced middle ground. 
 
• The primary problem, contends Saussure, is that a science must have a well 
defined object of study and linguistics has not yet identified such an object nor its 
method of study. 
 
Despite the “geometrical” character of Saussure’s thought, the desire to provide a 
narrative sequence is very strong in the demonstration of any theory, and no account, 
including this one, is immune to it. Accordingly, I would suggest that the Course’s 
beginning with A Glance at the History of Linguistics (Sausssure, 1974, p. 1) reflects a theme 
that is constant throughout the lectures: the definition of linguistics as a science. In fact 
for some thinkers most influenced by Saussure – Roland Barthes, for example – Saussure 
is as important a theorist of science as he is a theorist of language (Barthes, 1968). But in 
this respect also it is important to note that Saussure is continuing a tradition that was 
particularly strong in the period leading up to his work. Questions about the nature of 
language were inseparable from questions about the scientific character of linguistics and 
one concern constantly clouds – as well as informs - the other. If language can be 
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characterised as an independent natural organism then the study of language can assume 
legitimacy as a science alongside the natural sciences. Yet as its confidence grows, 
linguistics – or comparative philology as it was known earlier in the century - needs to 
assert its independent and unique characteristics and is more aptly defined as an historical 
science of voluntary human activity. This latter is the view successfully advocated by 
Whitney. By the time Saussure takes up the project of defining linguistics as a science 
there is the opportunity for a more nuanced middle ground - and this is the territory I will 
be exploring in more detail in the course of this thesis.  
 
From an individual point of view Saussure’s continuing preoccupation with the 
scientific character of his discipline is also not surprising. He was the son of an eminent 
naturalist and member of a family with a strong tradition of accomplishment in the 
natural sciences (Culler, 1986, p. 21). His younger brother, Renee, was also a linguist  
and during the years of the Course achieved renown as a leader of the Esperanto 
movement, a development in which Saussure often reflects an interest. His other younger 
brother, Leopold, was also interested in linguistics, linking it to the “scientific racism” of 
the time in a book published in 1899 (Joseph, J.E., in Sanders, 2004, p. 69).  As Joseph 
puts it: It is certainly interesting, and maybe significant , that Saussure’s theoretical path was cut 
between those of his two younger brothers, one caught up in a racist and the other in a rationalist 
misunderstanding of language … (in Sanders, 2004, p. 69).  
 
More broadly it may be remarked that Saussure’s birth in 1857 came one year 
after that of Sigmund Freud and one year before Emile Durkheim. It was also just two 
years before Darwin’s The Origin of the Species was first published in 1859. The affinity 
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of Saussure’s theory to the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein (both early and late) is often 
noted. However, one consequence of the unusual provenance of the Course is that he also 
resembles the Austrian philosopher in his silence regarding his theoretical influences – 
particularly with regard to his non-linguistic theoretical influences. One line of thought 
contends that Saussure was directly influenced by Durkheim and subsequently followed 
closely the debate surrounding Durkheim’s ideas. (Barthes, 1968, p. 23) Yet the 
widespread impact of the Darwinian conception of evolution on historical linguistics 
must have been particularly keenly felt by Saussure given the intellectual environment in 
his family. Overall, as Harris puts it, Saussure foresees “the possibility that disciplines such as 
psychology, physiology, sociology and anthropology might well sponsor forms of linguistic enquiry 
which would be potential rivals for recognition as the modern science of language (Harris, 1987, p. 
6.). 
  
The key problem, as Saussure sees it, for constituting linguistics as a science is that 
it has not yet sought out and identified the true nature of its object of study. If linguistics 
could do this then it could go on and develop a method. A key step in this process for 
Saussure is to set out a history of linguistics that will provide a launching pad for his own 
theory. The essential element with which he is concerned is the development of the 
conception of language or “langue”. It is this object that Saussure wants to generalize as 
the object of the science of linguistics. The difficulty for Saussure is that so far the 
various disciplines that might loosely be termed linguistics have taken all kinds of objects 
as their raw material and used all kinds of means to study them. In terms of the object of 
study, Saussure says: Other sciences work with objects that are given in advance and that can then 
be considered with different viewpoints; but not linguistics. Someone pronounces the French word nu 
“bare”: a superficial observer would be tempted to call the word a concrete linguistic object; but a 
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more careful examination would reveal successively three or four quite different things, depending 
on whether the word is considered as a sound, as the expression of an idea, as the equivalent of the 
Latin nudum, etc. Far from it being the object that antedates the view point, it would seem that it is 
the view point that creates the object (1974, p. 8). In terms of the method of study Saussure 
claims that in no other field have so many absurd notions, prejudices, mirages and fictions have 
sprung up (1974, p. 7). This latter difficulty has mainly to do, as we shall see, with the 
conception of language as an organism with its own life cycle.  
 
Section 3: A glance at the history of linguistics  
 
• Saussure gives an account of the history of linguistics which identifies three 
stages by which historical linguistics develops before finding its true and unique 
object, language studied in and of itself. 
 
• A key stage in that process is achieved for the Neogrammarians by the refutation 
of the “life cycle” thesis. This allows for the correct conception of the evolution of 
language.  
 
• Saussure will be concerned to distinguish that refutation, however, from a simple 
conventionalist position.  
 
By Saussure’s account the science that has been developed around the facts of 
language passed through three stages before finding its true and unique object (1974, p. 1). 
These stages are: Grammar (initiated by the Greeks); Philology (which may be traced in 
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its contemporary form to Friedrich Wolf in 1777) and Comparative Philology. 
Comparative Philology then gives way, in Saussure’s account, to the Neogrammarians, 
the to which Saussure is most closely tied. Comparative Philology began early in the 
nineteenth century when, as Saussure puts it, scholars discovered that languages can be 
compared with one another, to illuminate one language by means of another, to explain the forms of 
one through the forms of another (1974, p. 2).  This development was given a considerable 
boost by the discovery of Sanskrit. For example, a comparison of the paradigms of Latin genus 
and Greek genos reveals nothing. … But the picture changes as soon as we add the corresponding 
Sanskrit series. … Grammatically, then, the Sanskrit paradigm exemplifies the concept of a radical, a 
unit (ganas) that is quite definite and stable (1974, p. 2). 
 
However, says Saussure, the first mistake of the comparative philologists was also 
the source of all their other mistakes. They failed to give an account of the meaning of 
their comparisons or the significance of the relations they discovered (1974, p. 4).  This 
was a mistake because the comparisons should have been used to illuminate the history of 
language and thus provide some conclusion about language in general, language as such. 
It is a mistake that is compounded when historical conclusions are sought, says Saussure, 
- but by an excessively naturalistic method, as for example, whenever the comparative 
philologists looked upon the development of two languages as a naturalist might look upon the 
growth of two plants. For example, Schleicher, who always invites us to start from Proto-Indo-
European  and thus seems to be a confirmed historian, has no hesitancy in saying that Greek e and o 
are two grades (Stufen) of the vocalic system. This is because Sanskrit has a system of vocalic 
alternations that suggest that notion of grades. Schleicher supposed that each language has to pass 
through these grades separately and in exactly the same way, just as plants of the same species pass 
through the same developmental stages independently of one another (1974, p. 2).  
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What Saussure is targeting here is the “life cycle” thesis that assumed great 
importance in earlier 19th Century linguistics and continued in modified forms even after 
the middle of the century. The assumption is that languages go through a cycle of birth, 
rapid development that unfolds their latent form and then a prolonged period of 
subsequent decay. Bopp puts it this way: The grammatical forms and collective organism of the 
languages are the production of their earliest period of life, when they blossomed forth with the 
whole strength of youth, like blossoms and fruits from a young stalk (Alter, 2005, p. 217). In a less 
empurpled vein, Bopp asserts: Languages should be considered organic natural bodies which are 
formed according to fixed laws and which develop because they have an inner principle of life (Alter, 
2005, p. 125). As late as 1871 the linguist Curtius says: That the full forms are prior to the 
weaker forms is the basic, hardly disputable assumption underlying all of comparative grammar 
(Alter, 2005, p. 218). Getting historical linguistics quite literally pointed in the right 
direction – an evolutionary direction - was crucial for the Neogrammarians and we will 
look in more detail at how this was achieved in Chapter 3 of this thesis. We can note in 
passing, however, a few of the factors that contributed to the appeal of the life cycle 
doctrine.  
 
One is that there seemed to be an evidential basis. Looking at earlier versions of 
languages – Latin as compared to later romance languages, for example - there is a clear 
loss of much inflectional apparatus and an apparent decline from an original state of 
grammatical completeness. As Alter says: Few scholars realised at the time that these 
conclusions were based on limited evidence – those few famous writings that preserved the learned 
dialect rather than common speech (2005, p. 217).   
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A second factor is theological. We have noted that in viewing the growth of 
language as a natural process comparative philology could lay claim to being a natural 
science. But this lapsarian view of language also had an obvious theological appeal in 
suggesting that language could still be viewed as a divine gift bestowed uniquely on Man 
– as opposed to evolving through a Darwinian process. This could, in turn, be reinforced 
by appeal to a Kantian argument that abstract thought was a necessary pre-requisite of 
language and that mental categories of space and time must have preceded the 
development of language. Enlisting science against Darwinism in this way brought the 
linguist Max Muller, for example,  considerable fame on the Victorian lecture circuit in 
the early 1860s. (Alter, 2005, p. 63)  
 
So comparative philology first made language the object of study, but with some 
significant limitations: Not until around 1870 did scholars begin to seek out the principles that 
govern the life of languages. Then they began to see that similarities between languages are only one 
side of the linguistic phenomenon, that comparison is only a means or method of reconstructing the 
facts (Saussure, 1974, p.5). In the 1870s a number of scholars, including the mainly German 
Neogrammarians with whom Saussure most closely identified, succeeded in placing the 
results of comparative studies in their historical perspective and thus linking the facts in their 
natural order. Thanks to them, language is no longer looked on as an organism that develops 
independently but as a product of the collective mind of linguistic groups (Saussure, 1974, p.5).   
 
This last sentence sums up what Saussure wants to extract from the development 
of linguistics in the nineteenth century and use as the object for his theory of language. It 
is not that linguistics can’t be grasped as analogous to the biological study of organisms. 
On the contrary, Whitney’s seminal text of 1875, which Saussure credits (1974, p.5)  with 
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providing the decisive break with the life cycle thesis, is entitled “The Life and Growth of 
Languages.” Saussure too will continue to talk about the “grammatical organism” (1974, 
p. 21) and the life of languages. Rather, the distinction Saussure is concerned to make is 
very similar to one that had already been achieved within biology. That is the distinction 
between the individual developmental history of organisms and the population based 
evolution of organisms. The changes that occur in speech are not necessary 
developmental phases as Schleicher suggests but are random or fortuitous changes - what 
Saussure calls the chance products of the individual (1974, p. 165) - that have become part of 
the language of a community, just as random, genetic mutations that prove adaptive make 
their way into a collective gene pool. It is the historical study of language that shows 
language evolving in this way that Saussure wants to pick out as displaying the object of 
study of the new science. Likewise, as we will see, the arbitrary nature of the units of 
language is, in Saussure’s view, the condition of this evolution. The arbitrary nature of 
the sign makes it subject to a wide range of irrational, fortuitous, random and involuntary 
forces. (Saussure, 1974, p. 75) 
 
Section 4: The object of study for linguistics 
 
• “Langage” - or the totality of human speech - can be divided into “langue” or 
language and “parole” or speech. “Language” and “speech” are technical terms 
that Saussure makes clear that he alone defines. 
  
• Language is first of all the “associative bond” between a sound image and a 
concept.  
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• This bond is formed through the interaction of individuals with other individuals 
in a speaking circuit.  
 
• Having initially defined the object of linguistics as language studied in itself 
Saussure introduces his novel solution to the problem of the scientific character of 
linguistics by proposing a new science of the “life of signs in society”, in many 
respects synthesizing the naturalist and the conventionalist positions.   
 
From a brief history of linguistics Saussure goes on to discuss the object of 
linguistics – “langue” or “language” in Wade Baskin’s translation - in more detail. By 
language he means broadly “language” in the sense that we think of English, French, 
Sanskrit and Proto Indo-European as languages. But as the definition of language 
becomes more precise – particularly in opposition to the term “parole” or “speech” - 
Saussure makes it clear that he is not appealing to the uses of these words in any existing 
language but defining his own technical terms. He then first defines language in relation 
to what he calls “langage” – the totality of human speech or the heterogenous mass of speech 
facts (Saussure, 1974, p. 9). He begins by situating language within what he calls the 
speaking-circuit.  
 
The speaking circuit - illustrated with some rather quaint diagrams – is not usually 
the subject of much attention in accounts of Saussure’s theory. However it is a vital step 
in the progress from the broadest definition of language to a more precise and complex 
one. That is because it is the framework for what might be termed Saussure’s “semantic 
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immanence”. By this I mean, first of all, that for Saussure, the meaning of a name is not 
any particular thing in the world but a concept. We have seen that this follows very much 
the Lockean tradition, which in turn reflects the classical tradition: The Stoics … explicitly 
distinguished the semainon, the thing signifying, from the semainomenon, the thing signified and 
made clear that the latter was incorporeal and not to be confused with the existing thing (Joseph, in 
Sanders, 2004, p. 61.). The “signified”, as Saussure came to call it, can also be distinguished 
from a Kantian category. Saussure allied himself with Whitney against the mainly 
German school of linguistics who claimed that some capacity for abstract thought must 
be present before speech could develop (Alter, 2005, p. 127). It may also be distinguished 
from the particular designated by a “singular term” in the theories of Frege and then 
Russell. The signified is generally more abstract (1974, p.66), than the signifier, says 
Saussure. Nevertheless, both are psychological entities: We have seen in considering the 
speaking circuit (p. 11) that both terms involved in the linguistic sign are psychological and are 
united in the brain by an associative bond. This point must be emphasized. The linguistic sign unites, 
not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound image (Saussure, 1974,  p. 65 – p. 66).  
 
The speaking circuit itself is simple enough - a loop that must include at least two 
speakers – much as we talk colloquially about “being in the loop”. A sequence in the 
circuit can be imagined to begin with one speaker having the desire to communicate 
something. As Saussure puts it, a concept unlocks a sound image (1974, p.11).  This purely 
psychological phenomenon is followed by a physiological one in which the brain 
transmits an impulse corresponding to the sound image to the organs used in producing 
sounds. Then a physical process occurs as the sound waves travel from the mouth of the 
first speaker to the ear of the other speaker. The circuit then continues in the reverse order 
in the other speaker: from the ear to the brain, the physiological transmission of the 
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sound-image; in the brain, the psychological association of the image with the 
corresponding concept. Saussure notes: Among all the individuals that are linked together by 
speech, some sort of average will be set up: all will reproduce  - not exactly, of course, but 
approximately  - the same signs united with the same concepts (1974, p.15).  Language can be 
localised in the limited segment of the speaking circuit where an auditory image becomes associated 
with a concept (1974, p.14),  says Saussure. A little later he notes that the study of speech is then 
twofold: its basic part – having as its object language which is purely social and independent of the 
individual – is exclusively psychological; its secondary part – which has as its object the individual 
side of speech, i.e. speaking, including phonation – is psychophysical (1974, p.18).  Most simply, 
Saussure notes, language is speech less speaking. It is the whole set of linguistic habits that allow an 
individual to understand and be understood (1974, p. 77).    
 
Language, then, is distinguished from speaking as an individual psychophysical act 
– including all phonology, speech therapeutic concerns and the like – but language is still 
speech and it is still situated in the speaking circuit. When we say language is speech, we 
have of course to note that it is presented in an abstract, schematized form in the work of 
linguists – as a translation manual drawn from speech, typically in the encounter with a 
new speech as it lives in a community of speakers or a written record of such a speech. It 
is then presented as a manual of grammar, syntax and vocabulary. Saussure asks how the 
social crystallization of language comes about?  The answer is: Through the functioning of the 
receptive and co-ordinating faculties, impressions that are perceptibly the same for all are made on 
the minds of the speakers (1974, p. 13).   Associations of sound images and concepts that bear 
the stamp of collective approval are impressions that are deposited in the brain of each member of 
a community, almost like a dictionary of which identical copies have been distributed to each 
individual (1974, p. 19).  This last remark reflects what has become known as the 
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“Saussurean paradox” (Harris, 1987, p. 227). Language is, in its very essence, the 
property of a community of speakers – of an inter-subjective “circuit”. But it is stored in 
individuals and can only be accessed through individual versions. A matter of dispute in 
linguistics is just how idiosyncratic those individual versions might be. 
 
There are many, varying interpretations of the very influential distinction Saussure 
draws between language and speech. Each account will have its own implications. Before 
going on to consider how best to make the distinction I think it helps to note that at least 
part of this ambiguity has to do with the distinctive line Saussure advances in the debate 
over what kind of science linguistics is – whether natural or human. Bluntly, for 
Saussure, it is both. We must, he says, call in a new type of facts to illuminate the special nature 
of language.  A science that studies the life of signs in society is conceivable; it would be part of social 
psychology and consequently of general psychology (1974, p. 16).  So Saussure begins his account 
of semiology – which follows on from his initial definition of the object of linguistics as 
language - with the otherwise rather startling statement that language, once its boundaries 
have been marked off within the speech data, can be classified among human phenomena, whereas 
speech cannot (1974, p.15).  Most simply, perhaps, Saussure is marking off the purely 
physiological and psychophysical aspects of speech. But he is also reflecting a central 
theoretical concern that developed in 19th century linguistics – the role of the conscious 
human will in language. Simply, if language is a voluntary human activity then it would 
be thought to belong amongst the humanities or the social sciences. If it is involuntary 
then it can be thought of as a natural science. The latter view is expounded, for example, 
in an 1861 lecture by Max Muller which Saussure characterizes as a “brilliant” 
popularization of historical linguistics (1974, p. 3).  The following quotation gives the 
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flavour of Muller’s  argument: We can collect them [languages], we can classify them, we can 
reduce them to their constituent elements, and deduce from them some of the laws that determine 
their origin, govern their growth and necessitate their decay; we can treat them, in fact. in exactly 
the same spirit in which the geologist treats his stones and petrifactions – nay in some respects, in the 
same spirit in which the astronomer treats the stars of heaven or the botanist the flowers of the 
field.” (Muller, M., 1864, in Harris, 1987, p. 7).  On the other hand, as Joseph notes: In time a 
few linguists came to think that the organic metaphor had become so powerful (particularly in the 
wake of Darwin) that people were forgetting it was a metaphor at all. Resuscitating sign theory was a 
way to combat it. Saussure’s mentor Breal makes a statement precisely to this effect … ‘Our 
forefathers of the school of Condillac, those ideologists who for fifty years served as target to a 
certain school of criticism, were less far from the truth when they said, in simple and honest fashion, 
that words are signs. Where they went wrong was when they referred everything to a reasoning 
reason …. (Breal, 1900: 249 [1897: 227] in Sanders, 2004, p. 62). It is within this context that we 
find the solution that Saussure advocates early in the Course – linguistics is a science 
because it is a part of  “semiology” - a broader science of the life of signs within society. 
If he has succeeded in assigning linguistics a place among the sciences, says Saussure, it 
is because he has related it to semiology (1974, p. 16). But the study of semiology will 
miss the point so long as it focuses on the consciously willed or voluntary aspects of 
semiological systems, he contends. The essential mechanism of language is not “reasoning 
reason” but unconscious comparison (Saussure, 1974, p. 165).  The distinguishing characteristic 
of the sign – albeit the least obvious characteristic – is that it, in some way, it always eludes 
the individual or social will (Saussure, 1974, p. 17).  It is precisely this latter feature that 
semiological systems should have in common, says Sausssure – and if we are to discover the 
true nature of language we must learn what it has in common with all other semiological systems 
(Saussure, 1974, p. 17). Just what Saussure means by saying the sign eludes the will is 
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something that, as I have suggested, unfolds in his account of arbitrariness – an account 
that comes later in the Course. 
 
Section 5: The linguistics of language as opposed to speech 
  
• Language must be distinguished from speech. Arguably, speech includes the 
individual, active, transmissive aspect of the speaking circuit as opposed to the 
social, passive, receptive aspect of the circuit. The relationship between the two is 
complex, however, as both are situated within the speaking circuit.  
 
• Speech certainly includes any use of a term or any combination of terms by which 
the speaker expresses his or her own thought but which is yet to become a part of 
collective usage and so a part of language. Collective combinations or 
“syntagms” can include sentences and have a unitary, unanalyzed or clichéd 
character associated with wide circulation.  
 
• I note that there is an inchoate theory of truth within Saussure’s theory of 
language. The truth predicate appears to be a natural candidate for a “sign of 
collective usage” for sentences and other values.  
 
• The linguistics of language can be divided into internal and external linguistics – 
a distinction which assumes prime importance in relation to the linguistic-
biological analogy. 
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Having situated language within semiology, Saussure goes back to sharpen his 
definition of a linguistics of language, as opposed to a linguistics of speaking. I have 
already cited the distinction between the psychological and the psychophysical. The first 
purpose of the distinction between language and speech is to disentangle the problem [of the 
object of linguistics] from anything physiological. There then remains a purely psychological matter 
(Interview with Gautier, quoted in Gadet, 1986, p. 20).  But, then a  further distinction must be 
made within the psychological, as the following remarks makes clear. Speaking, on the 
contrary, is an individual act. It is willful and intellectual. Within the act, we should distinguish 
between (1) the combinations by which the speaker uses the language code for expressing his own 
thought; and (2) the psychophysical mechanism that allows him to exteriorize those combinations 
(Sausssure, 1974, p.14).  (1) is wholly psychological but is still a part of speech as opposed 
to language. Likewise, when Saussure says: In separating language from speaking we are at the 
same time separating: (1) what is social from what is individual; and (2) what is essential from what 
is accessory and more or less accidental (1974, p.14), we need to see that what is individual in 
(1) includes individual psychology – even if (2) the “accessory and more or less 
accidental” includes the physical articulation of sounds – and the very use of sound - as a 
signifier of concepts, as well as what Saussure elsewhere refers to as the chance products 
of the individual.   
  
But the inclusion of “combinations by which the speaker uses the language code 
for expressing his own thought” in speech as opposed to language raises some tricky 
questions. As we will see, associative and syntagmatic relations – where the latter 
includes all actual combinations of signs – are the essential relations that make up 
language. And syntagmatic relations are explicitly relations acquired in speaking or 
discourse (Saussure, 1974 p. 123). How can these two claims be reconciled?  Describing 
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syntagmatic relations, Saussure says: An objection might be raised at this point. The sentence is 
the ideal type of syntagm. But it belongs to speaking, not to language (see p.14). Does it not follow 
that the syntagm belongs to speaking? I do not think so. Speaking is characterized by freedom of 
combinations; one must therefore ask whether all syntagms are equally free (1974, p. 124). So 
syntagms originate in the free speech of individuals and become fixed when and as they 
are accepted into the collective language. The individual speaker then draws on that store 
of syntagms, by means of unconscious comparisons – before contributing a potentially 
new syntagm, usually generated by analogy with existing syntagms, to the store. It is just 
that the passage from speech to language is blurred. But we must realise that in the syntagm 
there is no clear cut boundary between the language fact, which is a sign of collective usage, and the 
fact that belongs to speaking and depends on individual freedom (Saussure, 1974, p. 125). Bouquet 
points out that in the original notes Saussure puts this problem even more strongly: It has 
to be said that in the field of syntax, a social fact and an individual fact, a putting into practice and a 
fixed association, get blended rather, end up more or less mixed up (Sanders, 2004, p.215).  There is 
certainly a question then of what counts as an individual innovation and how and when 
individual speech may be said to become a part of the collective pool.  
 
Yet, it is worth noting, that we may have precisely a “sign of collective usage” in 
the truth predicate. Is the difficulty around syntagms due to the fact that Saussure’s theory 
of language lacks a theory of truth – at least, a theory of the truth of sentences? Sentences 
like “God is good” or “If the weather is nice we will go out” are syntagms that are a part 
of language, says Saussure, because they are general types that are in turn supported in the 
language by concrete remembrances (1974, p. 125). These sentences that are syntagms are, in 
other words, what we call “truisms”. But why would we not add such a truism as “snow 
is white” to this list?  
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For there is this inchoate theory of truth in the Course in General Linguistics: the 
true as the truistic, and truth as a sort of ordinary language theoremhood. A developed 
theory of truth could play a crucial role in Saussure’s larger theory of language by 
describing the process by which original combinations of signs - and sentences in 
particular - are incorporated in language. In this way the theory would illuminate the 
speech-language nexus - what Saussure refers to as the “interdependence” of language 
and speech.  
 
Such a theory could, too, offer an explanation for many features of the functioning 
of the truth predicate. It could explain, for example, how characterizing a sentence as true 
does not alter it but only, in some way, re-presents it – a feature highlighted by 
disquotational theories of truth. The truth predicate may be said to mark the sentence’s 
entry into general circulation, its passage from speech – and from its place within 
“quotation” or “speech marks” - into language: …in the history of any innovation there are 
always two distinct moments: (1) when it sprang up in individual usage; and (2) when it became a 
fact of language, outwardly identical but adopted by the community. (Saussure, 1974, p. 89) Perhaps 
truth promotes speech to the status of language in just the way that Tarski’s equivalence 
thesis reflects, with speech on the left hand side of the equivalence and language – a kind 
of omniscient narrative voice or system – on the right hand side: “Snow is white” is true iff 
snow is white.  So a proposition becomes a truth - or a truth is demoted, by being 
considered false, to an historical utterance – in the passage from speech to language or 
back again.  
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As a “sign of collective usage” for values this theory of truth would be consistent 
across both the authenticity of objects and the veracity of propositions.  So an authentic 
coin, a true Scotsman or a real planet need to be comprehended in the theory as well as 
true propositions. The same applies to values that lie somewhere in between objects and 
propositions - a true name or genuine identity as opposed to a false name or fraudulent 
identity, for example – or expressions and phrases such as  “sitting in the sun”, “fish and 
chips”, “the thin end of the wedge”. These syntagms are all capable of being true or false, 
authentic or inauthentic. At the least, though, including some conception of truth of this 
kind in Saussure’s theory would mean that a sentence would not need to be so clichéd 
that, paradoxically, its original, literal meaning has been forgotten, before it could be a 
part of language.  
 
Section 6: Further ambiguities in the language - speech distinction  
 
• Another angle from which the distinction between language and speech appears 
less than clear cut is that of the speaker as amateur linguist – and the linguist as 
amateur speaker. 
 
• The dominant interpretation of Saussure’s distinction is, fairly clearly, the 
distinction between the underlying system that makes possible various types of 
behaviour and actual instances of such behaviour.   
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• I suggest, however, that we need to resist any tendency to give language a 
transcendent priority in any causal sense. Language is both the instrument and 
the product of speech. 
 
• Saussure also emphasises the difference between the internal and the external 
aspects of the language organism and his exclusive focus on the latter.  
 
Another angle from which the distinction between language and speech appears  
less than clear cut is that of the speaker as amateur linguist. Language, says Saussure, is 
constantly analyzing, decomposing and reinterpreting itself – and it is speakers who are 
performing these operations. We are all folk etymologists, for example, finding 
motivations for current meanings in earlier meanings. Newspaper columns and radio 
segments on language enjoy an enduring popularity and we are all keen amateur 
grammarians and administrators of analogical models. On the other hand, though, 
Saussure points to what he calls the over-complexity of the linguistics system which means 
that the very ones who use it daily are ignorant of it (1974, p. 73). But, says Saussure, the 
professional linguist is no more potent a speaker than the enthusiastic amateur:  We can 
conceive a change only through the intervention of specialists, grammarians, logicians etc. But 
experience shows that all such meddlings have failed (1974, p. 73). Of course language does 
change - or rather evolve – through speech and so Saussure’s position is, perhaps, best 
represented by his more cautious statements: … we never know exactly whether or not the 
awareness of speakers goes as far as the analyses of the grammarian (1974, p. 138).   
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Equally though, we must acknowledge that classifying the individual, executive 
side of speech alongside its purely psychophysical aspects, in opposition to language, has 
been the dominant interpretation of Saussure. In the work of Hjelmslev and others it 
becomes the distinction between competence and performance (Holdcroft, 1991, p. 44). 
This accords with Saussure’s referring to the executive side of language as speech and 
language as a product that is passively assimilated by the individual (1974, p. 13).   Culler likens 
the distinction between language and speech to the distinction between the Game of 
Chess and a particular game of chess: between the underlying system that makes possible 
various types of behaviour and actual instances of such behaviour (1986, p. 44). This view is also 
supported by Saussure’s remarks on analogy and the unconscious comparison that must 
occur before any new analogy can be introduced by an individual speaker. That requires 
access to the storehouse of language (1974, p. 165), he says, and in fact new forms always 
exist in potentia in the language. The speaker provides an awareness of the productive 
comparisons that already exist in language - and only the result of this awareness belongs to 
speaking (1974, p. 165).  A major part of the analogical phenomenon is therefore completed before 
the new form appears (1974, p. 165).     
 
Saussure’s best known critic on this point is Chomsky who argues that Saussure 
downplays the role of individual creativity in language to an excessive degree (Culler, 
1986 p. XXIII). But we can take a differing view of the role of the speaker without 
contradicting Saussure’s account of what actually occurs. Many productive speakers – 
creative writers, for example – will happily say that they are inspired by the language 
itself. Just wielding a pen may be likened, as the poet Kendrick Smithyman puts it, to 
being a “Dwarf with a Billiard Cue” (1978).  But we need only consider Shakespeare’s 
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contribution to English to observe how much just one speaker can contribute, regardless 
of what provokes him or her into doing so. However they arise, individual innovations in 
speech do make their way into the language and this is something Saussure notes at every 
turn. Indeed immediately following that last quotation, we find an interesting modulation 
in his position: Speech is continuously engaged in decomposing its units and this activity contains 
not only every possibility of effective talk but every possibility of analogical formation (Saussure, 
1974, p.166).   
 
So, while approving the individual-collective distinction as basic to the speech-
language distinction, we need to resist a tendency to give language a transcendent priority 
in any causal sense – to say that it “makes possible” speech, as Culler puts it. This gives 
an hermetic character to the linguistic system, a feature that emerged in Structuralist 
literary criticism, for example (Sturrock, (2003), p. 125). It also prompts the question of 
what makes the underlying system possible – which for Saussure, as we will see, is 
equivalent to asking what makes it evolve. The answer is, speaking: … speaking is what 
causes language to evolve: impressions gathered from listening to others modify our linguistic habits. 
Language and speaking are then interdependent; the former is both the instrument and the product 
of the latter (1974, p. 19).  If there is any priority, then, it belongs to the speaking circuit 
itself, in which both language and speech are situated.  
 
Once he has marked the boundary between the linguistics of language and the 
linguistics of speech Saussure goes on to consider the internal and external elements of 
language, beginning: My definition of language presupposes the exclusion of everything that is 
outside its organism or system (1974, p.20). To external linguistics belong the relationship 
between language and ethnology, language and political history, language and literature 
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and such questions as the geographical spreading of languages and their interpenetration.  
All these must be excluded from the study of language proper because they are 
contingent and non-systematic. If we arrange these facts according to a system it will be 
solely for the purpose of clarity. By contrast: In internal linguistics the picture differs 
completely. Just any arrangement will not do. Language is a system that has its own arrangement. 
Comparison with chess will bring out the point. In chess, what is external can be separated relatively 
easily from what is internal. The fact that the game passed from Persia to Europe is external; against 
that everything having to do with its system and rules is internal…. One must always distinguish 
between what is internal and what is external. … everything that changes the system in any way is 
internal (1974, p.22).  As I will show a little later in this thesis, everything that is external to 
the language system is also everything that negates the analogy between linguistic and 
biological evolution. This aspect of the definition of language will therefore be 
considered in more detail then.  
 
Section 7: The units of language  
 
• The sign is the unit of language – but saying just what a sign is in all cases proves 
more difficult than might have been expected.  
 
• The sign may be a sentence or a word but does not necessarily coincide with those 
things – it is best described as a “term” of a system. 
 
• The pervasive evolution of the linguistic system – the unlimited “variability” of 
the linguistic sign - means that the linguist must use the same method as the 
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scientist in other fields while knowing in advance that she will never arrive at the 
same concrete or material object of study. 
 
The object of study of linguistics is language, asserts Saussure. The next task is to 
identify the units that make up this object. At one level the answer is simple and has been 
stated from the outset – signs are the units of meaning. But what exactly is the sign in 
language as opposed to the sign found in other semiological systems? The problem 
Saussure faces is very similar to that encountered in defining language as the object of 
study of linguistics. He puts it this way: In most sciences the question of units never even arises: 
the units are delimited from the outset. In zoology, the animal immediately presents itself. Astronomy 
works with units that are separated in space, the stars. The chemist can study the nature and 
composition of postassium bichromate without doubting for an instant that this is a well defined 
object.  When a science has no concrete units that are immediately recognizable, it is because they 
are not necessary. In history for example, is the unit the individual, the era or the nation? We do not 
know. But what does it matter? We can study history without knowing the answer (1974, p. 107). 
 
However, just as Marx’s identification of economic classes as the units of history 
had a huge impact on his “science”, so Saussure’s identification of the sign as the unit of 
language has a huge impact on his conception of linguistics. For example, Saussure rules 
out the sentence as a basic linguistic unit. This is one source of what has become a 
fundamental division between the Continental and the Anglo-American philosophies of 
language. Since Frege postulated his context principle, the sentence has been the basic 
unit of meaning in Anglo-American philosophy. According to the context principle, a 
word has meaning only in the context of a sentence. The sentence based theory of 
meaning has dominated (although it has not been adopted by absolutely everyone) in the 
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analytic tradition. Witness, for example, the debate between truth-conditional theory of 
meaning and verificationism, which has occupied a good deal of recent analytic theory of 
language. On both these views, the sentence is the primary unit of meaning and word 
meanings are dealt with in terms of how they contribute to the truth or verification 
conditions of sentences. For Saussure, the problem of the definition of the sentence as a 
syntagm and hence as a part of language resurfaces: A rather widely held theory makes 
sentences the concrete units of language: we speak only in sentences and subsequently single out the 
words. But to what extent does the sentence belong to language? (see p. 124) If it belongs to speaking, 
the sentence cannot pass for the linguistic unit…(1974, p.106). 
 
A large part of the difficulty Saussure has in thinking of sentences as a part of 
language is that he associates the sentence with individual rather than collective usage. 
But Saussure finds that there is a further difficulty in treating the sentence as the basic 
linguistic unit: sentences are composed of words. He says:  In sentences, on the contrary, 
diversity is dominant and when we look for the link that bridges that diversity, again we find, 
without having looked for it, the word with its grammatical characteristics … (1974, p.106).  What is 
the problem with words being the units of meaning? The problem is twofold. First, they 
don’t resolve into concrete units. Are a noun and its plural the same word, for example, in 
two different grammatical forms? Perhaps. But they are also two different sound slices 
with two different meanings. So we face a dilemma, says Saussure. We can treat them as 
distinct words and preserve concreteness. But then we must ignore the obvious relation 
that binds together words like cheval and chevaux. (Saussure, 1974, p. 105)  On the other 
horn of the dilemma, we can recognize the relation between the two words and treat them 
as one word in two different forms - but then we must be satisfied with a form or 
abstraction as our unit of meaning rather than something concrete. 
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The second difficulty with words as the unit of meaning is that signs and words are 
not co-extensive. Signs are often smaller than words. The words painful and delightful, 
for example, can be seen as complex units: pain-ful and delight-ful. Conversely, signs are 
sometimes larger than words as with locutions like s’il vous plait. (Saussure, 1974, p. 
106)   
 
A third difficulty is that if words were the units of language then they would be able 
to be classified grammatically as parts of speech. But it seems at times, says Saussure, as 
if grammar were based on extra-linguistic principles applied to language like the lines of 
longitude and latitude applied to the earth’s surface. Saussure uses the example of bon 
marche meaning “cheap” as in  ces gants sont bon marche  “these gloves are cheap” 
(Saussure, 1974, p. 109).  From a logical viewpoint it functions as an adjective – but 
grammatically this is impossible. It does not function as an adjective (it is invariable, it 
never precedes its noun etc) – but, even more problematically, it is a group of words and 
a group of words cannot be one of the parts of speech. 
 
When he is being careful, then, Saussure speaks of “terms” instead of words as the 
basic unit of language. He says that the use of “term” in this way is preferable because as 
soon as we substitute term for word, this implies consideration of its relations with others. However,  
even considered more abstractly, these units resist delimitation as strongly as do words proper, 
making it extremely difficult to disentangle the interplay of units that are found in a sound chain 
(1974, p. 106).  The interplay of units is described by grammar, then, but not necessarily 
grammar in the usual linguistic sense. It is rather a grammar in the sense of an internal 
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logic. As Saussure puts it: Static linguistics or the description of a language-state is grammar in 
the very precise and moreover usual sense that the word has in the expressions “grammar of the 
Stock Exchange” etc. where it is a question of a complex and systematic object governing the 
interplay of coexisting values (1974, p.134). 
 
It is almost as if, then, a kind of sub-atomic uncertainty principle is at work. 
Language then has the strange, striking characteristic of not having entities that are perceptible from 
the outset and yet of not permitting us to doubt that they exist and that their functioning constitutes 
it. Doubtless we have here a trait that distinguishes it from all other semiological institutions (1974, 
p.107). The unit of meaning has no isolable, static character. It is always the nexus of a 
larger dynamic interplay, a point of convergence of linguistic forces. Consequently, 
evolution of the units of language is capable of intervening between the very letters or 
sound elements of a word to redefine its component parts, perhaps several times over in 
the course of time. Saussure provides a vivid demonstration of this process in the case of 
the word somnolent. Originally the two units in somnolent divided between the n and the 
o. They then divided between the o and the l,  then between the l and the e. At each point 
there are shifts in meaning. These redefinitions are due to the force of different analogies 
at work at each point. Originally the meaning of somnolent was “smelling of sleep” from 
olere, as in vin-olentus, “smelling of wine”. Accordingly the division falls between the n 
and the o. In later Latin the word was considered analogous to succu-lentus, with the 
suffix having a straightforward adjectival effect on the prefix somno or sleep. Somnolent 
means “sleepy”, just as succulent means “juicy”. Accordingly the division of units falls 
between the l and the o. In modern French the -ent ending is taken to be a present 
participle, in a construction analogous with a large number of verbs with an er ending, so 
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that there is now a verb – somnoler – to become sleepy. The division now is between the l 
and the e  (Saussure, 1974, p. 170 - p. 171).   
 
Indeed, Saussure goes so far as to suggest that the structure within which the sign is 
found can equally be seen as preceding the sign: Analogy is therefore proof positive that a 
formative element exists at a given moment as a significant unit (1974, p. 69). As Saussure 
emphasizes, language evolves by constantly reinterpreting and analysing its units, by 
decomposing and redistributing them. An essential stage in this process is always analogy 
– that is, some equation of two elements, some perception of sameness. It is that 
perception that yields new oppositions, new articulations. Indeed, analogical creation and 
the mechanism of speech have a common basis (1974, p. 172). The discussion of units goes on to 
include identities and realities in language, with some well known examples of linguistic 
identity to which we will refer a little later in the discussion of value. For the notion of 
linguistic value envelopes, as Saussure puts it (1974, p. 110), the notions of unit, concrete 
entity, and reality.   
 
Saussure concludes his discussion of the concrete entities of language with a 
telling observation: the linguist must use the same method as the natural scientist while 
knowing in advance that she will not arrive at the same concrete or material object of 
study. Saussure says: To be rid of illusions we must first be convinced that the concrete entities of 
language are not directly accessible. If we try to grasp them, we come into contact with the true facts. 
Starting from there we can set up all the classifications that linguistics needs for arranging all the 
facts at its disposal. On the other hand, to base the classifications on anything except concrete entities 
– to say, for example, that the parts of speech are the constituents of language simply because they 
correspond to categories of logic - is to forget that there are no linguistic facts apart from the phonic 
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substance cut into significant elements (1974, p. 110). In this paragraph Saussure dramatises his 
position as an inheritor of the Neogrammarian tradition who is yet acutely aware that 
language evolves under the influence of all the forces that can affect either sound or meaning 
(Saussure, 1974, p. 76). As a consequence, any fixed, intentional conception of units of 
language or parts of speech, of logic or grammar is also subject to evolutionary change. 
The only option then is an account of language as comprised of something entirely 
relative that Saussure calls “values”. These are the entities that we will explore in more 
detail in the second chapter of this thesis.  
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The Life of Language: 
Saussure and Evolution 
Chapter 2: From convention to system  
 
Section 1: The arbitrary nature of the sign  
 
• The signifier and the signified together comprise the sign. The signifier is 
arbitrary in the sense that it is unmotivated by the signified - it has no natural 
connection to it. 
 
• Signs gain their meaning through a rule of collective behaviour or convention. 
 
• Linguistic systems evolve in such a way as to render any similarity or difference 
between the signifier and signified – such as similarity of sound – purely 
coincidental. 
 
At the end of the previous chapter we had reached the point at which Saussure is 
poised to expound his doctrine of linguistic value. Before he does this, however, he has 
been careful to establish that it is a doctrine grounded in something more than the 
determinedly elusive character of the units of linguistic evolution. It is grounded, too, in 
the arbitrary nature of the sign. We have already seen when we considered the speaking 
circuit, that the sign … is a double entity, one formed by the associating of two terms … both 
terms involved in the linguistic sign are psychological and are united in the brain by an associative 
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bond (Saussure, 1974, p.65.). When introducing the arbitrary sign Saussure goes on to 
emphasize this point:  The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound 
image … I propose to retain the word “sign” to designate the whole and to replace concept and sound 
image respectively by signified and signifier. The last two terms have the advantage of indicating the 
opposition that separates them from each other and from the whole of which they are parts ... (1974,  
p.67). The signifier is not just a sound since it can be evoked mentally without any sound 
occurring, as when we read something written. Saussure uses the term “sound image” to 
emphasise this abstraction - but there is no doubt that the signifier is just as much a 
concept as the signified, if only because a phoneme can be the signified of a written 
signifier. This symmetry appears to be emphasized alongside the central role of the 
associative bond when Saussure says: The linguistic sign is then a two sided psychological 
entity… The two elements are intimately united, and each recalls the other. Whether we try and find 
the meaning of the Latin word arbor or the word that Latin uses to designate the concept “tree” it is 
clear that only the associations sanctioned by that language appear to us to conform to reality, and 
we disregard whatever others might be imagined (Saussure, 1974,  p.67). 
 
However, the central concept is this: The bond between the signifier and the signified is 
arbitrary. Since I mean by sign the whole that results from the associating of the signifier with the 
signified, I can simply say: the linguistic sign is arbitrary (Saussure, 1974, p.67). What does 
Saussure mean by “arbitrary”? Arbitrary has two basic meanings in Saussure’s 
exposition.  One is that it is unmotivated in the sense there is no inner relationship or natural 
connection between the signifier and the signified (Saussure, 1974, p.67). The second 
meaning of “arbitrary” for Saussure is also implied in the quotation above but is shown 
more clearly in what follows. It means collectively based or conventional or fixed by a rule 
(Sausssure, 1974, p.67).  This applies to semiology in general. In semiology in general one 
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might think that there will also be natural signs and modes of expression based entirely 
upon them, such as pantomime – or symbols, where, as Saussure puts it, there is the 
rudiment of a natural bond. An example Saussure gives is the use of a pair of scales to 
symbolize justice. But semiology’s main concern will still be the whole group of systems 
grounded on the arbitrariness of the sign. In fact every means of expression used in society is based, 
in principle, on collective behaviour or – what amounts to the same thing – on convention. Polite 
formulas, for instance, though often imbued with a certain natural expressiveness (as in the case of a 
Chinese who greets his emperor by bowing down to the ground nine times), are nonetheless fixed by 
rule; it is this rule and not the intrinsic value of the gestures that obliges one to use them. Signs that 
are wholly arbitrary realize better than the others the ideal of the semiological process; that is why 
language, the most complex and universal of all systems of expression, is also the most characteristic 
(Saussure, 1974,  p. 68). 
 
In language, Saussure argues that apparently onomatopoeic expressions or naturally 
expressive exclamations and interjections are actually conventional: the sound the French 
use to represent the sound of a barking dog is different from that which English uses, for 
example.  Or again: Words like French fouet ‘whip’ or glas ‘knell’ may strike certain ears with a 
suggestive sonority, but to see that they have not always had this property we need only examine 
their Latin forms (fouetis derived from fagus ‘beach-tree’, glas  from classicum ‘sound of a 
trumpet’). The quality of their present sounds, or rather the quality that is attributed to them, is a 
fortuitous result of phonetic evolution (Saussure, 1974, p.68). The evolution of languages is 
responsible for terms like ‘glas’ and ‘fouet’, not the nature of their signified. That 
evolution will follow laws derived from the arbitrary nature of the sign in general.  
 
Section 2: From Convention to System  
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• Saussure sees his distinctive contribution as a “systematics” of language as 
opposed to a conventionalist account  
 
• In marking this distinction we must distinguish first of all between simple system 
and complex, evolutionary system. 
 
• A textual slippage between these two appears at the very outset of the account of 
the arbitrary sign in the Course in General Linguistics.  
 
The arbitrary nature of the sign has, as Saussure puts it, “primordial importance”: 
No-one disputes the principle of the arbitrary nature of the sign, but it is often easier to discover a 
truth than to assign to it its proper place. This principle dominates all the linguistics of language; its 
consequences are numberless (Saussure, 1974, p.68). The most important part of any exposition 
of Saussure’ s theory of language, however, comes in describing how he levers off the 
extant conception of language as a conventional institution comprising arbitrary signs to 
his conception of linguistic value. This is the transition from simple, list-type naming - 
what Saussure often calls “nomenclaturism” - to complex, systematic definition.  It is also 
the movement from a conventionalist account of language to what we could call a 
systematic or post-conventionalist account. This is what Saussure sees as constituting his 
distinctive contribution.  
 
Saussure believed that the American linguist Dwight Whitney had placed linguistics 
on its true axis by identifying language as a genuine human institution that was arbitrary 
and conventional in all its parts (Saussure, 1974, p.76). But in Saussure’s view Whitney does 
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not go far enough. First he does not tie the arbitrariness of the sign to its unique lability. 
But he [Whitney] did not follow through and see that the arbitrariness of language radically 
separates it from other institutions. This is apparent from the way in which language evolves. 
Nothing could be more complex (Saussure, 1974, p.76).  Second, Whitney does not see that the 
arbitrariness of the sign and its complex evolution reflect its essentially systematic 
character: Whitney, whom I revere, never said a single word on the same subjects [concerning ‘a 
theoretical view of language’] which was not right; but, like all the others, he does not dream that 
language needs systematics (Cited by Falk J., in Sanders, 2004, p. 108).   
 
Of course, if Whitney did not make the transition from convention to system that is 
at least in part because such a transition is not entailed by the arbitrariness of names. On 
the contrary that arbitrariness is more likely to be associated with the isolability of signs 
and a pre-existing signified. As Whitney says in his seminal 1875 work, “The Life and 
Growth of Languages”: In common phrase, we first have our idea and then we get a name for it 
(Alter, 2005, p. 250). Yet many accounts of Saussure’s theory elide this very point, 
suggesting that the arbitrary nature of the bond between the signifier and the signified 
somehow in itself necessitates a system of signs – as if only a complex system can 
explain how the signifier and the signified are, as it were, held together. But we can 
imagine a system that comprises a simple, arbitrary one to one mapping in any order or 
arrangement. We can even, as Saussure puts it, conceive of the job of language as 
maintaining the parallelism (Saussure, 1974, p. 121) between the two planes of the signifier and 
the signified without supposing that the signs so formed constitute any complex, evolving 
system or network of terms and relations. In addition, we can imagine that names have a 
complex, contextual value or sense alongside their arbitrary naming. Such a theory of 
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language was developed at much the same time as Saussure’s by Gottlob Frege and 
expounded in his article “On Sense and Reference” (Frege, 1892).  
 
But whether or not there is any logical necessity to the transition from simple 
convention to complex, evolving system, it is undoubtedly the innovation that Saussure 
seeks to enact. Saussure ties the arbitrariness that Whitney championed to both the 
systematic character of language and the complexity of its evolution. It is that process 
which is at stake: Signs that are wholly arbitrary realize better than the others the ideal of the 
semiological process (Saussure, 1974, p.68).  
 
At a textual level, the transition from convention to system does not get off to a 
great start, however.  In the Course in General Linguistics, Saussure begins his account of 
the Nature of the Linguistic Sign with the following words: Some people regard language, 
when reduced to its elements, as a naming process only – a list of words, each corresponding to the 
thing that it names. For example:  
This conception is open to criticism at several points … (1974, p.65)  
It seems obvious that it is after the For example: that the subsequent exemplary 
illustrations of a tree and horse, listed alongside their corresponding names, should be 
inserted. These illustrations show the popular conception. But instead For example: is 
followed immediately, as we see above, by the continuation of the written text. That text 
goes on to outline Saussure’s critique of the popular conception of the naming process. It 
is only after that critique, in which Saussure introduces his own conception of the sign, 
that the illustration of simple naming appears – suggesting that it illustrates Saussure’s 
conception of the sign as well. The point is just that the truth which this rather naïve 
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approach (Saussure, 1974, p. 65) of simple naming brings us near – and the key element that 
Saussure wants to preserve in his own conception of the sign - is not illustrated by the 
parallel lists of a horse and a tree and their corresponding names, and especially not by 
those “etc” terms at the bottom of each column. It is illustrated by the later bisected ovoid 
form and reversible arrows showing that the linguistic unit is a double entity, one formed by the 
associating of two terms (Saussure, 1974, p.65) and the systematic relations those ovoid forms 
enter into. In the developed theory, as we will see, it is the relationships between the 
ovoid forms that assumes primacy and which motivates what is to be found within the 
ovoid forms.  
 
Simple naming includes, then, a simple list ontology and language conceived as a 
simple conventional system of names for that ontology. Simple naming includes any 
system in which objects and their names may be listed or “piled up” in any order – or 
where the arrangement of the elements is just for clarity of exposition rather than being 
intrinsic to them. Saussure says: We must not begin with the word, the term, in order to 
construct the system. This would be to suppose that the terms have an absolute value given in 
advance and that you only have to pile them up one on top of the other in order to reach the system 
(Saussure, 1911, lecture of 30 June).  Saussure’s emphasis on convention must be understood, 
then, with this crucial qualification in mind.  
 
Indeed, failing to understand that Saussure’s concept of complex system marks a 
decisive step on from conventionalism is the source of a lot of misunderstanding between 
Anglo-American and Continental theories of meaning. For if there is no dispute about the 
arbitrary sign, then there is equally little dispute about the conventional character of the 
The Life of Language: 
Saussure and Evolution   50 
 
 
system that is needed to support arbitrary naming. If the conventional character of 
language systems is supposed to be Saussure’s distinctive insight, then, from the point of 
view of Anglo-American theorists, it is an insight that appears to have little novelty or 
significance. On the other hand, we can see that ruling out a list or inventory type of 
ontology has considerable implications for traditional metaphysics as well as theories of 
language. For this approach to ontology is still dominant. It is, effectively, the assumption 
that an object is separable from the system of signifying properties and relations in which 
it is embedded. For Saussure language is not a simple system of names for pre-existing 
objects because the object is never found outside a complex linguistic system.  
 
Section 3: The complex system as a system of values  
 
• Difficulties in translation reflect the fact that signs are values in a complex 
evolving system in which units reciprocally delimit each other. 
 
• This reciprocal delimitation or articulation of units is often thought to be 
constituted by relations of difference enacted in a kind of arbitrary “decoupage” 
or “cutting out” of units of meaning.  
 
• There are a number of passages in the Course that appear to support the view 
that “the pairing of a certain number of acoustical signs with as many cuts made 
from the mass of thought engenders a system of values” but these need to be 
treated with the greatest care if we are not to take away only half of the story.  
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With the distinction between convention and system firmly in mind, we can 
describe in more detail what Saussure means by complex system. This complexity is 
expressed in the notion of linguistic value. Terms in language do not simply name things 
or express existing ideas. They have a value due to their place within a complex system 
of signs. Saussure says: The characteristic role of language with respect to thought is not to create 
a material phonic means for expressing ideas but to serve as a link between thought and sound under 
conditions that of necessity bring about the reciprocal delimitation of units (1974, p. 112) … 
Language in a manner of speaking is a type of algebra consisting solely of complex terms (1974, p.  
122). The content or value of a term is really only fixed by the concurrence of everything that 
exists outside it… Language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each term 
results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others (1974,  p. 115). 
 
One way we can tell that signs are terms with a value rather than simple names for 
pre-existing ideas is that terms do not have exact equivalents across languages - hence the 
difficulty we often have in translating from one language to another. If language were a 
simple naming process then there would be no exception to the situation illustrated by 
cases like boeuf and ox, in which the same signified, “ox”, has different signifiers on 
different sides of a geographical border. But we do not have to look far to find that this is 
not the case, says Saussure. The English word sheep does not have the same value as the 
French mouton just because the English sheep has another term alongside it - namely 
mutton - whereas mouton in French signifies both the living and the butchered animal. 
Much larger differences in value between languages exist that than this however. 
Different tenses, reflecting quite different conceptions of time, exist in different 
languages and may be quite irreconcilable.  
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It has to be noted that for Saussure, as we saw also for Locke, the very existence of 
different languages proves arbitrariness (1974, p.68) as in the case of boeuf and ox. So ease in 
translation proves arbitrariness  – difficulties in translation prove systematicity.  In what 
has turned out to be a potent pun on the term “articulate”  -  meaning both to speak and to 
differentiate in a sequence - Saussure contends that languages articulate thought in this 
way: In Latin, articulus means a member part or subdivision of a sequence. (1974, p.10) Language 
might be called the domain of articulations using the word as it was defined earlier. Each linguistic 
term is a member, an articulus, in which an idea is fixed in a sound and a sound becomes the sign of 
an idea (1974, p. 113). Language can also be compared with a sheet of paper; thought is the front and 
the sound the back; one cannot cut the front without cutting the back at the same time (1974, p. 113). 
The notion of articulation unites the actions of making a horizontal division and a vertical 
unity. The two come into being at the same time. Articulation is the reciprocal 
delimitation of units - and languages are constantly rearticulating their units as a change 
in one part of the system resonates through the other parts.  
 
But the cutting out or “decoupage” of meaning has to be carefully understood. It 
seems to go hand in hand with the notion of Saussure’s system as a system solely of 
differences. As Barthes puts it: The sound is considered immediately significant,  as if the act of 
speech itself delimited signs (Barthes, 1968, p. 34). Then, between these elements arbitrarily 
differentiated from each other by a cutting out process, we assume that there is a relation 
of arbitrary signification – particularly as suggested by that first illustration referred to 
above.  
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There are a number of passages in the Course that seem to further support this 
view. For example, when Saussure first states that the conception of simple naming is 
open to criticism at several points, the editors refer us directly to his account of linguistic 
value:  Psychologically our thought – apart from its expression in words – is only a shapeless and 
indistinct mass. Philosophers and linguists have always agreed in recognizing that without the help of 
signs we would be unable to make a clear-cut, consistent distinction between two ideas. Without 
language, thought is a vague uncharted nebula. There are no pre-existing ideas and nothing is 
distinct before the appearance of language (Saussure, 1974,  p. 111 – p. 112). Saussure goes on to 
explain how the signifier and signified come into being at the same time:  A linguistic 
system is nothing but a series of differences in sound combined with a series of differences in ideas; 
but the pairing of a certain number of acoustical signs with as many cuts made from the mass of 
thought engenders a system of values (1974,  p. 120).   
 
We can see how these passages could encourage the view that the articulation or 
cutting out of meaning itself entails a simple mapping of signifier and signified. The term 
“engendered” certainly suggests this view here. But when we read of  “the pairing of a 
certain number of  acoustical signs …” we need to hear the adjective “systematic” before 
the word “pairing”. The pairing in any language state is the product of a system of values, 
not the origin of it. Likewise the notion that sounds are immediately significant in 
language is basically antithetical to Saussure’s thesis that they are precisely mediated by 
the system in which they are found. 
 
Again, a simplistic view appears to be reinforced by the horizontal ladder type of 
diagram by which Saussure illustrates the delimitation of units of meaning in synchronic 
or static linguistics. (Saussure, 1974, p. 104) However, as soon as we include an evolutionary 
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perspective, Saussure shows the diagram complicating, with forked and angled mappings 
reflecting the evolutionary forces that constitute units of meaning (Saussure, 1974,  p. 179). 
In the same vein, it often seems as though Saussure endorses the conception of the 
linguistic system as a system solely of differences: Everything that has been said up to this 
point boils down to this: in language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference 
generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only 
differences without positive terms (Saussure, 1974, p. 120). A little before this passage Saussure 
notes that Arbitrary and differential are two correlative qualities (Saussure, 1974, p. 118).  But that 
“up to this point” is significant in the quotation above. This is not the whole story.  
 
Section 4: Opposition and association  
 
• Differences are the product of the linguistic system not the origin of it.  
 
• The systematic mechanism of language rests on the associative bond, including 
association by analogy, and works through paradigmatic and syntagmatic 
relations. 
 
• There are logical, as well as interpretative, reasons for rejecting the notion that 
cutting out is the actual mechanism which articulates and rearticulates units in a  
language system rather than the result of that mechanism. 
 
First, Saussure makes it clear that when we speak of differences this can only apply 
to the signifier or the signified considered apart from each other. We must first of all note 
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that in the system of values, the meaning as counterpart of the image and the meaning as 
counterpart of co-existing terms merge (Saussure, 1911, Chap. V).  Then, he says: Although both 
the signifier and the signified are purely differential and negative when considered separately, their 
combination is a positive fact (Saussure, 1974,  p. 120). 
 
Second, as I have argued above, differences are a product of the system, not the 
immediate cause of it: Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas 
nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that 
have issued from the system (Saussure, 1974, p. 120, my emphasis).  
 
Third, once we are considering the sign as a whole it is only appropriate to speak of 
oppositions rather than differences (Saussure, 1974, p. 121). And, more than this, oppositions 
depend on similarities: … one must also compare it [a word] with similar values, with other 
words that stand in opposition to it (Saussure, 1974,  p. 115). 
 
Simply, in this account of Saussure’s theory of language I want to emphasise that 
the arbitrary relation between the signifier and the signified – and equally between signs 
– is a mutable relation but it is not a relation of difference as such. Nor is it just a relation 
of opposition, as Saussure characterizes this relation when he is being more precise.  It is, 
fundamentally, an associative bond. It is a bond that can be - and often is - “loosened” 
under various evolutionary forces so that it is always susceptible to change. These forces 
include apparently arbitrary phonetic changes - or associations based on arbitrary 
phonetic similarities.  On the other hand, what holds these bonds in place is a larger 
system of associations and oppositions. The emphasis on difference – and even on 
oppositions – is only one phase in the unfolding of Saussure’s theory of language. In this 
The Life of Language: 
Saussure and Evolution   56 
 
 
phase Saussure is considering language apart from its functioning, apart from its 
mechanism – and this is a distinction that must be noted. Two signs, each having a signified 
and signifier, are not different but only distinct. Between them there is only opposition. The entire 
mechanism of language, with which we shall be concerned later, is based on oppositions of this kind 
and on the phonic and conceptual differences which they imply (Saussure, 1974, p. 121). When we 
do come to consider the mechanism of language – which is at once how language 
functions and how it evolves - we find that relations and differences between linguistic terms 
fall into two distinct groups, each of which generates a certain class of values (Saussure, 1974, p. 122).   
 
We find, in other words, that difference lies within syntagmatic and associative 
relations. And a little later: The set of phonic and conceptual differences that constitutes language 
results from two types of comparisons: the relations are sometimes associative, sometimes 
syntagmatic … this set of common relations constitutes language and governs its functioning  
(Saussure, 1974,  p. 122).  Then we come to the full blown account of linguistic system: Up to 
this point units have appeared as values, i.e. as elements of a system and we have given special 
consideration to their opposition; now we recognize the solidarities that bind them; they are 
associative and syntagmatic and they are what limits arbitrariness … (Saussure, 1974, p. 133).   
 
Yet even before these stages we must imagine that in the sequence of the original 
Course the emphasis on difference itself follows on from extensive discussions of 
analogy, agglutination and other “solidarities” considered as part of diachronic 
linguistics. So, even originally, the emphasis on relations of difference in Saussure’s 
synchronic linguistics stands in relief to that earlier discussion.  
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In summary, Saussure registers the fact that difference or opposition plays a key 
role in defining values and at times he suggests that difference on its own, as opposed to 
sameness, is responsible for structure. But it is difference alongside sameness or identity 
– a kind of originary being together of the two – that creates the point of convergence 
(Saussure, 1974, p. 126) that is a linguistic value. Delimitation is accomplished by the 
paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations that constitute the mechanism of language. This is 
the latent system that makes possible the oppositions necessary for the formation of the sign … in this 
process, which consists in eliminating mentally everything that does not help to bring out the desired 
differentiation at the desired point, associative groupings and syntagmatic patterns both play a role 
(Saussure, 1974, p. 130). The ultimate product of systematic associations appears as a 
“differentiation” for Saussure, or an “opposition”, because it has no inner substance or 
matter. It appears to be cut out, as he says in an interview, literally by a pair of scissors, snip, 
snip, snip (Interview with Gautier, 6 May, 1911, in Gadet, 1986, p. 20) because there is no pre-
existing object or positive content to limit this process of systematic definition. Division 
may occur anywhere. It is entirely determined by the system, from the outside in, as it 
were. Saussure marks this wholly different approach to individuation by his preference 
for the term “delimitation” for this process rather than “definition”.   
 
Apart from interpretative considerations, however, there are compelling logical 
reasons for thinking of associative relations as inseparable from oppositions in building 
linguistic systems. If “cutting out” were all that was involved in the linguistic system we 
would have a strangely two dimensional system – a sort of absolute, level playing field. 
We could not imagine any system of objects that includes a generic - as opposed to a 
specific - level. We could not have any taxonomy of objects. Similarly, pure relations of 
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difference would yield only an array of objects that could be arranged in any order with 
no object having any particular relation to any other. How, in that case, would  mutton 
come to be “alongside” sheep or one term come to be the “neighbour” of another, as 
Saussure puts it? David Holdcroft explores the logical possibilities and argues 
convincingly that: ... if Saussure’ s claim that signifieds are purely negative entities is true we have 
completely failed to capture any sense in which it is. Indeed I have argued that only differences which 
give rise to oppositions are relevant to the determination of a signified’s content, and that oppositions 
presuppose similarities. Moreover, it seems that some of the ways in which signifieds call for positive 
characterization do not in any natural sense involve oppositions … Holdcroft asks: … is Saussure’s 
system not then in ruins (Holdcroft, 1991, p. 129)?  He answers this challenge by arguing that 
Saussure’s system is not in ruins because it does not require the arbitrariness of 
systematic or structural relations. Rather it requires only the view that a value is 
determined by the relations that it enters into with other values in a system: … hence 
Lyons’ claim that the ‘defining characteristic of modern “structural” linguistics is as follows: 
linguistic units have no validity independently of their paradigmatic [=associative] and syntagmatic 
relations with other units’ (Holdcroft, 1991, p. 130). 
 
Section 5: Synchronic and Diachronic linguistics 
 
• Saussure distinguishes between diachronic linguistics - the study of language on 
the axis of successions over time – and synchronic linguistics - the study of 
language on the axis of simultaneities. 
 
• Saussure emphasizes the distinction of the synchronic viewpoint in order to open 
up space for his systematics of language. 
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• Given its lack of natural data or any material continuity language must be 
understood as a system of pure values functioning in accordance with the 
relations between its terms – their synchronic solidarity -  at any given moment in 
time.  
 
Following his distinction within the totality of human speech of language and 
speech Saussure is concerned to make a further important division within language. This 
is the distinction between diachronic and synchronic – or evolutionary and static -
linguistics. Saussure seeks to clarify the difference between these two approaches as an 
essential part of the definition of linguistics as a science before he can go on to describe 
in detail the syntagmatic and associative relations that constitute the system of language.  
 
Saussure says: But the thing which keeps language from being a simple convention that can 
be modified at the whim of interested parties is not its social nature; it is rather the action of time 
combined with the social force. If time is left out, the linguistic facts are incomplete and no conclusion 
is possible (Saussure, 1974, p. 78). The intervention of the factor of time creates two quite 
different - but complementary - orders of linguistic phenomena, argues Saussure, and a 
corresponding division within the science of linguistics. For two different axes can be 
distinguished:  
(1) the axis of simultaneities, which stands for the relations of co-existing things and from which 
the intervention of time is excluded; and  
(2) the axis of successions (Saussure, 1974, p. 80). 
The first axis concerns language states. The second axis concerns the evolution of 
language states over time. The first kind of linguistic science, concerned with the first 
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axis, the axis of simultaneities, may be termed “synchronic linguistics”.  Saussure also 
uses the term “idiosynchronic”, because language states can be distinguished down to the 
level of idiomatic usage: Synchronic study has as its object, not everything that is simultaneous 
but only the totality of facts corresponding to each language; separation will go as far as dialects and 
subdialects when necessary (Saussure, 1974, p. 90).  Saussure argues that for a science concerned 
with values the distinction is a practical necessity. Scholars must consider both co-ordinates and 
make a distinction between the system of values per se and the same values as they relate to time 
(1974, p. 80).  Saussure gives concise definitions of the two kinds of linguistics when he 
summarises his discussion of the terms toward the end of his account of synchrony and 
diachrony.  Synchronic linguistics will be concerned with the logical and psychological relations 
that bind together coexisting terms and form a system in the collective mind of speakers (Saussure, 
1974, p. 100). Diachronic linguistics, on the other hand, will study relations that bind together 
successive terms not perceived by the collective mind but substituted for each other without forming 
a system (Saussure, 1974, p. 100). 
 
The synchronic linguistics Saussure envisages has a certain place in the history of 
linguistics, a place that Saussure himself initiates from a broader Neogrammarian 
position in defining the space he wants for his systematics of language. The old 
grammarians worked synchronically but they saw the original synchronic structure or 
system as being, just by reason of its precedence, the true structure or system. The 
analogies that yielded changes in grammar were viewed as false analogies. The historical 
linguistics that developed rapidly in the nineteenth century, had by the time of the 
Neogrammarians, come to a more genuinely evolutionary and scientific view of linguistic 
change. In so doing, that linguistics “revealed a new class” of phenomena. In the return to 
synchrony, then, the consequences of that discovery must be incorporated. The old 
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grammar saw only the synchronic fact; [historical, diachronic] linguistics has revealed a new class of 
phenomena. But that is not enough; one must sense the opposition between the two classes of facts to 
draw out all its consequences (Saussure, 1974, p. 83).  
 
To incorporate diachronic linguistics – to draw out its consequences – requires the 
awareness of a certain opposition. What does Saussure mean by this? The consequence of 
diachronic linguistics Saussure has in mind is the potentially all pervasive nature of 
evolutionary change. The unlimited variability of language over time creates a causal 
break on the axis of successions. It makes language a system of pure values generated 
solely by the synchronic solidarity of signs, “the momentary arrangement of terms”. 
Saussure notes that some other sciences, such as economics, treat of values and so 
confront the disciplinary duality necessitated by “the intervention of the factor of time”.  
But, this distinction has to be heeded by the linguist above all others (i.e. other disciplines) for 
language is a system of pure values which are determined by nothing except the momentary 
arrangement of terms. A value – so long as it is somehow rooted in things and in their natural 
relations, as happens with economics (the value of a plot of ground, for instance, is related to its 
productivity) – can to some extent be traced in time if we remember that it depends at each moment 
on a system of co-existing values. Its link with things gives it, perforce, a natural basis and the 
judgments that we base on such values are therefore never completely arbitrary; their variability is 
limited. But we have just seen that natural data have no place in linguistics (Saussure, 1974, p. 80). 
 
It is in the exposition of the arbitrary nature of the sign that we “have just seen that 
natural data have no place in linguistics”. And that arbitrariness, must, I suggest, be 
understood from this angle, the angle of what we might call its “material discontinuity” 
over time. It is this that makes the linguistic sign wholly arbitrary and it is this way into 
the systematics of the sign that I want to emphasise in this account of Saussure’s theory. 
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Yes, we can observe arbitrariness in the conventional conception of simple naming. The 
arbitrariness of the relation between signifier and signified - in which there is “no natural 
connection” – is certainly one point of entry to the arbitrary nature of the sign. No doubt 
it is, too, part of what Saussure has in mind when he refers to the absence of natural data 
in language. In particular, we will see that this is because evolutionary change always 
involves a shift in meaning which, for Saussure, can be conceived as a shift in the 
relationship between the signifier and the signified. But I want to suggest that it is the 
character of evolutionary change as revealed by diachronic linguistics that is the real root 
by which Saussure’s “radical” arbitrariness enters the system. It is material discontinuity, 
the exhaustive nature of the potential transformations in the evolution of language that 
explodes the natural object of study and opens up the space of Saussure’s fully realized 
conception of linguistic system. That system is arbitrary in the sense that it is not 
predictable over time on the basis of any irreducible form or natural enduring element. 
No element is reserved from the random impact of the evolutionary process – there is no 
unit that may not be fractured for use in a different structure: ... we must defend our principle: 
there are no unchangeable characteristics. Permanence results from sheer luck; any characteristic 
that is preserved in time may also disappear with time (Saussure, 1974, p. 230). 
  
Section 5: The synchronic-diachronic distinction examined further. 
 
• Any language state will contain some evolutionary movement but that does not 
prevent a sharp distinction between the two methods of study. 
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•  Synchronic linguistics allows us to think about language in a manner that is 
appropriate to the ever fortuitous nature of its states. 
 
• A simple way of understanding the synchronic-diachronic opposition, then, is to 
observe that it is the difference between studying a single term and studying the 
“contract” between two or more terms of the kind that yields linguistic value. 
 
• It is the very nature of diachronic linguistics that necessitates the distinction and 
gives synchronic linguistics its character. There is a scientific unity between the 
two forms of linguistics – a unity with its empirical basis in diachronic linguistics. 
 
Synchronic linguistics studies language states – that is, states of linguistic evolution. 
The “momentary arrangement of elements” is a moment in an evolutionary process, not a 
fleeting interval. It is a period in which there are no significant evolutionary changes. The 
linguist discards unimportant changes in much the way that a mathematician discards 
infinitesimal quanta, says Saussure. The actual time period involved may vary between 
several centuries or a decade, depending on how much change takes place in a language. 
In any case it will be more of a chunk of time than a mere moment. It is similar, says 
Saussure, to the study of the structure of a plant stem. If we took a wafer thin cross 
section for study without having some idea of the longitudinal structure – the tubes and 
fibres which are arranged in that section – it would make little sense to us. Saussure’s 
often quoted remarks at the beginning of his account of diachronic linguistics are 
relevant: There is really no such thing as absolute immobility. Every part of language is subjected to 
change. To each period there corresponds some appreciable evolution. Evolution may vary in 
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rapidity and intensity, but this does not invalidate the principle. The stream of language flows 
without interruption, whether its course is calm or torrential is of secondary importance (Saussure, 
1974, p. 140). So it is not that diachronic linguistics is excluded – both kinds of linguistics 
are needed. But the unprecedented character of the object of study necessitates a 
distinction between the two approaches at the descriptive level:  Again, the more complex 
and rigorously organized a system of values is, the more it is necessary, because of its very 
complexity, to study it according to both co-ordinates (Saussure, 1974, p. 80).  
 
As a part of the linguistics of language, diachronic linguistics takes language as its 
object. But at a sub-specific level, the diachronic may be distinguished from the 
synchronic by its association with speech. For language evolution is a phenomenon 
driven by speech. Nothing enters language without having been tested in speaking and every 
evolutionary phenomenon has its roots in the individual ... Before “honor” could become a rival 
strong enough to replace “honos”, one speaker had to coin the new word then others had to imitate 
and repeat it until it forced itself into standard usage (Saussure, 1974, p. 168). 
 
A change that becomes a part of a language state always begins unintentionally by a 
purely fortuitous mechanism. Speakers then take advantage of a difference to impregnate 
it with significance. At that point, the solidarity between elements of the language state – 
the complex equilibrium of terms that mutually condition each other (Saussure, 1974, p. 122) - is 
affected and the state as a whole changes.  It is as if one of the planets that revolve around the 
sun changed its dimensions and weight: this isolated event would entail general consequences and 
would throw the whole system out of equilibrium (Saussure, 1974, p. 85). Diachronic linguistics is 
capable of giving a detailed account of language evolution and its mechanisms. So, in 
introducing the diachronic-synchronic distinction Saussure further illuminates both the 
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language-speech distinction and the fundamental role of arbitrariness in the creation of 
linguistic value. His favoured examples are binary differences: The opposition of two terms 
is needed to express plurality: either foot;foots or foot:feet; both procedures are possible, but 
speakers passed from one to the other, so to speak, without having a hand in it. In a fortuitous state 
(foot:feet), speakers took advantage of an existing difference and made it signal a distinction between 
singular and plural; foot;feet is no better for this purpose than foot: foots. In each state the mind 
infiltrated a given substance and breathed life into it. Neither was the whole replaced, nor did one 
system engender another; one element in the first system was changed, and this change was enough 
to give rise to another system. (Saussure, 1974, p. 84 – p. 85)  
 
As we’ve noted,  this new perspective – the ever fortutitous nature of a state – is, as 
Saussure says, inspired by historical linguistics and is unknown to traditional grammar which 
could never acquire it by its own methods. Likewise, most philosophers of language are equally 
ignorant of it yet nothing is more important from the philosophical viewpoint (Saussure, 1974, p. 85). 
For Saussure, we take advantage of fortuitous comparisons, importations, mutations and 
the like in language but we don’t create these in order to express something external. A 
conventionalist view of language recognizes the arbitrariness of names and suggests that 
as a result some convention or contract between speakers must be necessary to ensure 
names refer to objects. In no way do diachronic facts aim to signal a value by means of another 
sign … A diachronic fact is an independent event; the particular synchronic consequences that may 
stem from it are wholly unrelated to it (Saussure, 1974, p. 84). In contrast to the false notion that we 
readily fashion for ourselves about it, language is not a mechanism created and arranged with a view 
to the concepts to be expressed. We see on the contrary that the state which resulted from the change 
was not destined to signal the meaning with which it was impregnated (Saussure, 1974, p. 85).  
A simple way of understanding the synchronic-diachronic opposition, then, is to 
observe that it is the difference between studying a single term and studying the 
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“contract” between two or more terms of the kind that yields linguistic value. The 
contract or convention involved is one between two terms – and the essence of the linguistic 
mechanism is the unconscious comparison of terms (Saussure, 1974, p. 165). Diachronic changes 
are wholly unintentional while the synchronic fact is always significant. It always calls forth two 
simultaneous terms. Not ‘Gaste’ alone but the opposition ‘Gast:Gaste’ expresses the plural. The 
diachronic fact is just the opposite: only one term is involved and for the new one to appear (Gaste), 
the old one (Gasti) must first give way to it (Saussure, 1974, p. 85).   
 
The difference between synchronic and diachronic linguistics is also closely related 
to the difference between internal and external linguistics. Both branches of linguistics 
can discover laws, but the difference between the two types of laws is crucial. Vowel 
shifts or consonantal changes over time, when they are regular, can be described by 
diachronic laws and may come about as a result of all sorts of external influences. 
Synchronic laws - such as those that express the relation between a word-unit and its 
accent or a word-unit and its ending - describe an internal relationship, a sort of contract 
between co-existing terms (Saussure, 1974, p. 92). 
 
At the factual level it is vital not to confuse the two approaches, says Saussure. But 
at the general level, the level of scientific law, what Saussure calls a panchronic viewpoint 
is possible and this is important for any philosophical study of his theory of language 
(1974, p. 95). Saussure has some interesting things to say about synchronic and diachronic 
laws in language. If a law has the two key features of being both imperative and general 
then diachronic laws are imperative in the sense that diachronic change cannot be stopped 
– but they are not general.  The change has a specific contingent – even random - form in 
each case. On the other hand, synchronic law describes a general arrangement of parts. 
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But that arrangement is not imperative, it could change at any time. It is imperative in the 
sense that it is imposed upon individual speakers – but in language no force guarantees the 
maintenance of a regularity when established on some point (Saussure, 1974, p. 92).   
 
Saussure goes on to say: But cannot the term (law) also be used in language as in the 
physical and natural sciences, i.e. in the sense of relations that are everywhere and forever verifiable? 
In a word, cannot language be studied from a panchronic viewpoint? Doubtless.  In linguistics as in 
chess there are rules that outlive all events.  But they are general principles existing independently of 
concrete facts (Saussure, 1974, p. 95).  I think we can go a little further and say that it is at the 
crossing, the intersection of the two axes that the general mechanism or functioning of 
language is located. The “momentary arrangement of terms” is just that – momentary. 
But it has a general structure which Saussure envisages quite literally being reproduced in 
each speaker’s mind, even if it is more or less unconsciously. That structure is 
syntagmatic and associative.  And it is through the expansion of that structure that the 
chance productions of speech which prove useful are included in language.  
 
Undoubtedly Saussure’s strong injunction not to confuse synchronic with 
diachronic linguistics has helped produce a tendency to read his synchronic linguistics 
apart from his diachronic linguistics. But as he says: This is really unnecessary; one truth does 
not exclude the other (Saussure,  1974, p. 96). In fact, as we’ve seen above, as a system of 
values, language must be studied according to both co-ordinates. Further, I think we need 
to see that it is the very nature of diachronic linguistics that necessitates the distinction 
and gives synchronic linguistics its character. That character is in some vital sense 
immaterial and the distinction is necessitated by material discontinuity. But this doesn’t 
mean there is not a scientific unity between the two forms of linguistics – a unity with its 
The Life of Language: 
Saussure and Evolution   68 
 
 
empirical basis in diachronic linguistics. It just means that it is not a unity based on 
material units. This is not easy to see because the material object as such - as the typical 
scientific object - does not admit of its own arbitrariness, its own lack of necessity. But in 
synchronic linguistics, I suggest, Saussure is trying to provide a linguistics that is a 
systematics of the evolutionary process – and he is doing so in the only way that is 
appropriate to the subject matter.  
 
Section 6: Paradigm and syntagm 
  
• A linguistic sign is a point of convergence of syntagmatic and paradigmatic 
associations.  
 
• Syntagmatic or linear combinations occur “in praesentia” in discourse and can 
be conceived as relations of opposition. Paradigmatic relations are constituted 
“in absentia” and can be thought of as associative relations. 
   
• These two are interdependent and  work together in the mechanism of language.  
 
The mechanism of language is constituted, says Saussure, of a latent system of 
unconscious comparisons. Comparisons are sets of terms that are, in our colloquial 
expression, “the same but different”. As we have seen, association or sameness is 
inseparable from opposition or difference because neither has logical priority. Terms 
must be brought alongside each other before they can be contrasted and defined most 
precisely by being what the others are not (Saussure,  1974, p. 117). On the other hand they must 
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be distinct before their association can be a meaningful activity. Within language we find 
a metonym of this relation in our use of the term “para” meaning both “with” and 
“against”. For example, a paramedic is most precisely what a medic is not, doing what a 
medic does not do – the converse is also true. But less precisely – at the next level of 
generality - a paramedic is doing the same work as a medic, with and alongside medics. 
That is, they can both be contrasted with hospital administrators. Hospital administrators 
are not, we would say, directly involved in the care of patients. But at the next level all 
three categories of worker may be thought to be involved precisely in caring for patients 
when we speak of them in opposition to the local body politicians who open and close 
hospitals, and set their funding and waiting lists.  
 
Again, we use a parachute against falling – but using a parachute is also the nearest 
thing to falling.  As Saussure puts it: For it is obvious that analysis, because it results from a set 
of comparisons, depends constantly on the associative environment of the term (Saussure, 1974, p. 
170). If the associative environment of a sign changes the sign itself changes.  This is 
reflected in Saussure’s account of the mechanism of language. There are two contrasting 
ways in which the sameness that yields difference is achieved. The first is in a sequential 
chain. This is the syntagm. In discourse, on the one hand, words acquire relations based on the 
linear nature of language because they are chained together (Saussure, 1974, p. 123). It consists of 
two or more consecutive units, including both complex words and groups of words: 
compounds, derivatives, phrases, whole sentences. Syntagms form one complex unit that 
is more than the sum of its parts. As Barthes points out, the syntagm can be seen as the 
initial raw material of any analysis of a code or semiological system. (Barthes, 1968) It is 
the largest repeated and therefore recognizable unit in speech that must be then 
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decomposed into mutually delimiting units. Outside discourse, on the other hand, words 
acquire relations of a different kind. Those that have something in common are associated in the 
memory, resulting in groups marked by diverse relations (Saussure, 1974, p. 129). These are 
paradigms or associative groupings. They are one or more associative series comprising units 
that have an element in common with the syntagm (Saussure, 1974, p. 129). These are the 
associations that are “in absentia” in relation to discourse, that form an unspoken 
background to any syntagm. The common element in these groupings can vary from the 
meaning of the terms, as in groups of synonyms to inexact homonyms, based on phonic 
similarity. One example Saussure uses is the simple syntagm “de-faire” (to undo). The 
“de” element evokes decoller, deplacer, decoudre etc. The “faire” element recalls faire as 
such, refaire, contrefaire, etc. It is worth quoting Saussure at length, however to give a 
fuller picture: Through its grasp of the nature of the relations that bind the terms together, the 
mind creates as many associative series as there are diverse relations. For instance, in enseignment 
‘teaching’, enseigner ‘teach’, enseignons ‘we teach’ etc. one element, the radical, is common to every 
term; the same word may occur in a different series formed around  another common element, the 
suffix (cf. enseignment, armament, chagement, etc); or the association may spring from the analogy of 
the concepts signified (enseignment, instruction, apprentissage, education, etc); or again simply from 
the similarity of the sound images (enseignement and justement ‘precisely’). Thus there is at times a 
double similarity of meaning and form, at times only similarity of form or meaning. A word can 
always evoke everything that can be associated with it one way or another … we are unable to 
predict the number of words that the memory will suggest or the order in which they appear. A 
particular word is like the centre of a constellation; it is the point of convergence of an indefinite 
number of co-ordinated terms (Saussure, 1974, p. 126). 
 
Paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations work together simultaneously to create 
meaning. There is a bond of interdependence; they mutually condition each other. In fact, spatial 
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(linear, syntagmatic) coordinations help to create asssociative co-ordinations which are in turn 
necessary for analysis of the parts of the syntagm (Saussure, 1974, p. 123). We can imagine this 
happening in a fairly straightforward manner: the syntagm, “nous marchons aujourd’hui” 
provides the subject, the first person plural pronoun “nous”. That selects “marchons” 
from the paradigm “marche, marches, marche, marchons, marchez, marchent”. That 
agreement of the verb stops us hearing the “ons” sound as an “en” and analyzing the 
syntagm incorrectly. In some cases it is difficult to analyse the ribbon of sound because 
the paradigms are not distinctive enough. Saussure uses the example of “Si je l’apprends” 
(If I learn it). This has the same phonological profile as “Si je la prends” (If I take it). In 
these cases a larger syntagm – that is,  more context – will be required.  
 
All this is happening in an interplay that resembles the operation of a machine, says 
Saussure. Indeed, the meaning of a term and its function are identified in the system 
(Saussure, 1974, p. 161). If we look up a word in a dictionary we find first of all its part 
of speech and its closest synonyms. We might find its etymology and derivation.  Then 
we will be given a citation, a syntagm to finally sharpen the definition. All these relations 
go to define a term and its meaning says Saussure. That dictionary definition is, however,  
but the tip of an iceberg of latent paradigms brought to a certain point of convergence by 
the syntagm. We are seeing one instance and one instant of a system.  
 
Section 7: The interaction of analogy with paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations  
 
• Although the traditional divisions of grammar may be useful in practice, they do 
not correspond to natural distinctions, says Saussure. Grammar should be 
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constructed around the natural co-ordinates of syntagmatic and paradigmatic 
relations. 
 
• Analogy interacts with paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations. Signs are best 
conceived as syntagms, as decomposable combinations of signs which are 
productive of new forms through syntagmatic solidarity i.e. relations of analogy. 
 
• Saussure ties the productivity of terms through analogy to their complexity or 
decomposability – apparently forgetting his assertion that there are no simple 
terms in language only complex ones. He appears, in particular, to forget the 
linear or discursive relations in which terms are delimited. 
 
But we must note that there is a good deal more to associative and syntagmatic 
relations than traditional grammar and syntax respectively, although those are certainly 
included. In short, although the traditional divisions of grammar may be useful in practice, they do 
not correspond to natural distinctions. To build a grammar, we must look for a different and higher 
principle … only the distinction established above between syntagmatic and associative relations can 
provide a classification that is not imposed from the outside ... the whole subject matter of grammar 
should be arranged along its two natural co-ordinates (Saussure,  1974, p. 137).  In particular 
Saussure is struck by what he calls “syntagmatic solidarities”. For, there is another, 
complementary mechanism at work in language, one which we might characterize as the 
relation between elements that are “different but the same”. This mechanism has a 
number of forms, the most important of which are analogy and agglutination. Changes in 
interpretation, no matter how they start always become apparent through the existence of analogical 
forms, (1974, p. 170) says Saussure. These two processes work together. Differences that are 
The Life of Language: 
Saussure and Evolution   73 
 
 
the same create the potential for new samenesses that are different and vice versa. 
Saussure devotes a good deal of time to discussing the role of analogy in evolution, 
including the way in which it counteracts the disruptive effect of phonetic change. I will 
describe analogy in more detail in the next chapter. At this point I want to highlight its 
interaction with syntagmatic and paradigmatic comparisons. In this regard Saussure 
provides the following image – vividly evocative of cultural traditions more generally, as 
well as of language. But one thing in particular interests the linguist. In the enormous mass of 
analogical phenomena built up through centuries of evolution, almost all elements are preserved; 
they are only distributed differently. Analogical innovations are more apparent than real. Language 
is a garment covered in patches cut from its own cloth (Saussure, 1974, p. 172). 
 
We have seen a number of examples that Saussure cites of analogy in action, but to 
improvise an example we may take the term “aggro”. “Aggression” is analogous to 
“aggravation” by way of the first four letters and to “anger” by way of the first and third 
letters. As Saussure says at several points, analogy with respect to meaning is also 
required - whether or not we think of that as a “false analogy” because “aggravation”, 
strictly speaking, has nothing to do with anger or aggression. But in many contextual or 
syntagmatic usages aggression and anger are associated with the worsening or 
aggravation of a situation. So a new sign “aggro”, both an adjective and a noun, with new 
shades of meaning, evolves:  a person is “so aggro”, there is “too much aggro” in a given 
situation, particularly when the person involved may also be addressed as “bro”. This is 
the evolutionary force of time in action – the chance resemblance of phonemes combines 
with some equally contingent coincidence of meaning. 
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Saussure advises that Analogy supposes a model and its regular imitation. An analogical 
form is a form made on the model of one or more other forms in accordance with a definite rule. 
(Saussure,  1974, p. 161)  Syntagms provide the rules for selecting terms from within 
paradigms. But there is another element of analogy at work that results in different 
models – three different syntagm models in the case of “somnolent” - being selected on 
an unpredictable basis from the larger mass of signs. These activate different paradigms 
in accordance with their different divisions or analyses of “the original”. We need to note, 
too, that all the terms in associative or paradigmatic groupings can be thought of as 
analogs. They just take different elements of the term as the element in common with the 
term – that is, as the positive analogy.  
 
Syntamatic solidarity is so important partly because most terms, says Saussure are 
syntagms. They are analysable and therefore capable of being decomposed in an entirely 
unpredictable way. There are exceptions: To be sure, language has independent units that have 
syntagmatic relations with neither their parts nor other units. Sentence equivalents like yes, no, 
thanks etc are good examples. But this exceptional fact does not compromise the general principle. 
As a rule we do not communicate through isolated signs but rather through groups of signs, through 
organized masses that are themselves signs. In language everything boils down to differences but also 
to groupings (Saussure, 1974, p. 128). There is a contradiction here, though, with what 
Saussure says elsewhere about simple terms. For simple terms can only be used in 
syntagmatic contexts. Saussure points out that the sign “sun” has different values in 
different languages - in some languages one cannot sit “in” the sun for example. In 
another example, the expression “Gentlemen!” may be used by him several times in the 
course of a lecture with several different meanings. That can be due to the sound of the 
voice, its intonations, he says. But any specific intonation is just an element in another set 
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of associations and analogies, interacting with the linear chain of sounds and signs. It is 
perfectly admissible to the system. And in any case there are syntagms that fall within 
Saussure’s narrower definition, combinations that will incorporate isolated signs into 
something that is more than the sum of their parts: “Thanks but no thanks”, “yes and no”, 
etc.  
 
It is also important to consider the sign as originally a syntagm insofar as it is 
comprised of an opposition of signifier and signified. That composition of a sign tells us, 
says Saussure, that change is potentially all pervasive. It can intervene in any sign and 
always results in what Saussure describes as a shift in the signifier-signified relation. No 
sign is indivisible – the delimitation of signs is not technically their individuation because 
there is no indivisible object for Saussure: A word is apprehended simultaneously as a unit and 
as a syntagm, and is preserved to the extent that its elements do not change (Saussure,  1974,  p. 172).  
 
At times, however, Saussure seems to forget the broader systematic nature of signs 
and display a curiously limited conception of linear or discursive context. The irony in 
this is that, as I will argue later, if we consider a sign or object in isolation we effectively 
take its systematic definition or delimitation for granted. It becomes unquestioned and 
unconscious. Saussure’s project is to make that system of unconscious comparisons 
conscious. Yet the linear combination of signs – the syntagm – has almost to be reified, 
for Saussure, to be admissible to language. It has to be alienated from the individual 
speaker and have a concrete, unified character. Consequently there sometimes seems to 
be too little appreciation, as has been often remarked, of how speech realizes the potential 
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of language, how it selects from its potential combinations and focuses speakers on 
specific signifieds.  
 
The issue goes a little further for Saussure as we will see when we come to consider 
absolute and relative arbitrariness. For compound, decomposable terms are more 
productive in an evolutionary sense:  Words can be rated for capacity to engender other words 
to the extent that they themselves are decomposable. Simple words are, by definition, unproductive 
… Each language then has both productive and sterile words in varying proportions. This takes us 
back to the distinction between “lexicological” and “grammatical languages” languages (see p. 133). 
In Chinese, most words are not decomposable; in an artificial language, however, almost all words 
are. An Esperantist has unlimited freedom to build new words on a given root (Saussure, 1974, p. 
166). Words are productive through analogy and syntagmatic solidarity. But those 
relations of identity can only be partial – if they were complete, the need for the 
differentiation of signs would not be met. This, at least, is how Saussure appears to 
reason. So Saussure concludes that it can only be the parts of words that are used to make 
others by analogy - and hence, words are potentially productive of other words to the 
extent to which they are decomposable into parts. Some words are perhaps more isolated 
and unproductive than others depending on how simple and unanalysable they are: … the 
only forms left untouched by analogy are of course isolated words like proper nouns, especially place 
names (Saussure, 1974, p. 173). 
 
The problem is that we can’t tell in advance how or where a term will be re-
delimited or rearticulated. It doesn’t have any inherent boundary, any necessary 
delimitation. An example is “Mt Cook”, the highest mountain in New Zealand, a place 
name that doesn’t look promising in terms of productivity. Yet now it is Aoraki/MtCook 
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– a new name and a new value – but also one that will provide a form for other such 
names.  
 
Thinking of terms more broadly – including terms in discursive contexts - allows us 
to see that analogy also works with terms as a whole, whether they are simple or 
complex. Terms may be productive of other terms whether that is visible in the words or 
not. Pre-existing signs may be placed in a new discursive system. The atrium of our heart, 
for example, is also the spacious entrance chamber of a Roman house. The ventricle to 
which it is joined is literally a little belly, a diminutive version of an element in an earlier 
– but somehow no less foreign - anatomy. There is a certain shock in discovering analogy 
at this level. Who would have thought the human body was so originally synthetic? Yet 
the heart gained these associations when it ceased to be just a core or centre of the body 
and was rearticulated as part of a circulatory system. And we see again in this example 
that relations of association and analogy – sameness and identity – are essential to 
differentiate objects. Likewise, the evolving, reciprocal delimitation of units yields ever 
more and more specific values – more complex points of convergence of various co-
ordinations.  
 
Section 8: Absolute and relative arbitrariness 
 
• In some ways, relative arbitrariness appears as the culmination of Saussure’s 
account of linguistic system - but it also appears to invoke a number of significant 
contradictions.  
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• What Saussure wants to articulate, I suggest, is system arbitrariness: Signs 
cohere – that coherence is arbitrary in the sense that it has no external basis. Its 
logic is always immanent to the system.  
 
• Relative arbitrariness, however, does show that there is a complex interplay 
between the arbitrary and the systematic in Saussure’s conception of language as 
an evolving system. 
 
In some ways, relative arbitrariness appears as the culmination of Saussure’s 
account of linguistic system: Everything that relates to language as a system must, I am 
convinced, be approached from this viewpoint, which has scarcely received the attention of linguists: 
the limiting of arbitrariness (1974, p. 133). Broadly speaking, syntagmatic and associative 
relations limit arbitrariness because they bind a sign, however arbitrary the signifier may 
seem in relation to its signified, into a complex of relations in which that sign is rational 
and necessary – in which it resists, as Saussure says, arbitrary substitution. Syntagmatic 
and associative relations are the structures and the structural rules, respectively, by which 
a language functions and which yield its relations of difference and analogy: Motivation is 
explained by the principles stated in Section 2. The notion of relative motivation implies: (1) analysis 
of a given term, hence a syntagmatic relation; and (2) the summoning of one or more terms, hence an 
associative relation. It is the mechanism through which any term whatever lends itself to the 
expression of an idea, and it is no more than that (Saussure, 1974, p. 132). That last phrase is 
curious. The mechanism by which a term lends itself to the expression of an idea seems 
to be just about all we would want to describe in a theory of language. These relations 
“govern the functioning” of language – and meaning and function are apprehended as identical 
within the linguistic system (Saussure,  1974,  p. 161).  
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But there are also a number of contradictions in Saussure’ s account of relative 
motivation that mean the conception as a whole requires very careful handling. When, for 
example, Saussure says: There is no language in which nothing is motivated and our definition 
makes it impossible to conceive of a language in which everything is motivated. Between the two 
extremes – a minimum of organization and a minimum of arbitrariness - we find all possible varieties 
(1974, p. 133), he seems to mean that at the most basic level all languages as systems are 
motivated because even basic oppositions are systematic. It is just that some may be more 
elaborated – i.e. analysable - than others.  But Saussure also seems to say that some 
individual signs are motivated and others are not: At any rate, even in the most favourable 
cases motivation is never absolute. Not only are the elements of the motivated sign themselves 
unmotivated (cf. dix and neuf  in dix-neuf) but the value of the whole term is never equal to the sum 
value of its parts. Teach + er is not equal to teach X er … Dix-neuf  is supported associatively by dix-
huit, soixant-dix etc. and syntagmatically by its elements dix and neuf. (1974, p. 132) It is hard not 
see this latter view as inconsistent to the point of being anomalous. Just because dix is not 
part of a syntagm it doesn’t mean that it is not fixed by “the concurrence of everything 
around it”. It may be less systematically elaborated than dix huit – but it can’t be 
absolutely arbitrary in the manner of a simple name. It must at least be a part of a binary 
opposition since we would have to suppose that dix on its own “is radically incapable of 
coming to consciousness”. In fact we would think it was “supported associatively” by a 
number of paradigms - the set of natural numbers, for example. In the section preceding 
we have considered a number of Saussure’s injunctions against the isolated sign – but we 
have also noted a certain limitation in his conception of context. In this case again it 
seems that he sees dix as not being part of a syntagm. There is a further puzzling feature 
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in this passage: by Saussure’s argument the complexity of the constitution of signs like 
teacher or dix-huit is not an argument for their arbitrariness but against it.  
 
With these points in mind, it is not surprising that for a commentator like Roy 
Harris, the concept of relative arbitrariness is simply a muddle (1987, p. 132).  Indeed Harris 
reacts in vivid terms to the whole suggestion of relative arbitrariness: Here Saussurean 
synchronic theory lies agonizing on a bed of nails of its own manufacture. Having accepted 
arbitrariness as a ‘first principle’ Saussure is at loss to explain why the principle fails to capture the 
most significant and characteristic properties of linguistic structure (Harris, 1987, p. 132). We have 
seen, of course, that arbitrariness as difference – difference as such – cannot account for 
any structural or systematic properties. But Harris suggests further that Saussure has 
confused questions of arbitrariness with questions of systematicity. For Harris, if dix is arbitrary 
then dix-neuf  is no less arbitrary. He applies the principle to Saussure’ s commercial 
analogy for language: … the fact that the price of a loaf of bread is arbitrarily fixed at five francs 
does not mean that charging two and half francs for half a loaf is only relatively arbitrary. This is 
simply a gross non-sequitur. Both prices are equally arbitrary and that arbitrariness has nothing to 
do with the systematicity that relates them (1987, p. 132). 
 
Harris certainly has a point. It really doesn’t seem helpful to make a division 
between signs within any given system. The properties of a sign within a system are 
systematic properties. The sign does not also have isolable properties - at least not within 
the system.  To the extent that it does have isolable properties it is simply not a part of the 
system under consideration.  As Saussure says: To consider a term as simply the union of a 
certain sound with a certain concept is grossly misleading. To define it in this way would isolate the 
term from its system; it would mean assuming that one can start from the terms and construct the 
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system by adding them together when, on the contrary, it is from the interdependent whole that one 
must start and through analysis obtain its elements (1974, p. 113). This, as I argue in the fourth 
chapter of this thesis, is the key aspect of Saussure’s theory which the linguistic-
biological analogy exposes: the arbitrariness of signs considered in isolation – signifier 
arbitrariness - is incompatible with the systematic character of signs. Signifier 
arbitrariness implies some opposition of signifier and signified that transcends any system 
of oppositions and associations. Harris is suggesting that Saussure could still maintain 
signifier arbitrariness on a of bi-planar basis, as the distinction between the orders of the 
signifier and the signified.  But Saussure also conceives of linguistic value, like the 
economic system, as a system for equating things of different orders – labor and wages in one and a 
signified and signifier in the other (Saussure, 1974, p. 79).  So there is bound to be confusion so 
long as Saussure maintains a concept of signifier arbitrariness. What I will suggest 
Saussure needs to do is maintain the immanence – the systematic character - of all 
linguistic relations. Signs in a system cohere. That is what being in a system means. They 
stand or fall together. But – and this is what is so difficult to theorise - the basis of their 
coherence, including the material medium of the system, is arbitrary. It could be 
anything. It is immanent to the system. The grammar of the stock exchange is not the 
simple logic of division, for example, that makes half a loaf of bread half the price of a 
whole loaf. The logic of the system – its exchanges of agreed equal value between 
speakers – is immanent to the system and varies and evolves by the mechanism of 
language that Saussure describes. Signifier arbitrariness seems to Saussure to subvert any 
fixed structure of reference and cause semantic variation and evolution. The problem is 
that it also reasserts a trans-systematic structure of reference. In the concept of relative 
arbitrariness this structure is identified with systematicity itself: A language constitutes a 
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system. In this one respect (as we shall see later) language is not completely arbitrary but is ruled to 
some extent by logic; (Saussure, 1974, p. 133).  But having developed his conception of 
linguistic value, Saussure cannot now refer simply to logic itself, or to the principle of order 
and regularity introduced by the mind into the disordered mass of signs (1974, p. 133). 
 
However, what we can observe in the doctrine of relative arbitrariness is that 
Saussure’s conception of language as an evolving system involves a complex interplay 
between the arbitrary and the systematic. The former is associated with the individual, the 
innovative and the differential – the latter with the collective, the regular and the equal. If 
the mechanism of language were entirely rational, it could be studied independently. Since the 
mechanism of language is but a partial correction of a system that is by nature chaotic, however, we 
adopt the viewpoint imposed by the very nature of language and study it as it limits arbitrariness 
(Saussure, 1974, p. 133). The interaction between the arbitrary and the systematic maintains 
the energy – dare one say, the vitality – of the whole. Within a language all evolutionary 
movement may be characterized by continual passage from motivation to arbitrariness and from 
arbitrariness to motivation; this see-saw motion often results in a perceptible change in the 
proportions of the two classes of signs (Saussure, 1974, p. 133).   In this conception the arbitrary 
has come to stand opposite the rational in place of the natural or necessary. That shift is 
subversive. In place of a pre-existing natural object we encounter the irrational or chaotic 
– including those “shapeless masses” of thought and sound - from which values are 
created.    
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The Life of Language: 
Saussure and Evolution 
Chapter 3: Exploring the linguistic-biological analogy 
  
Section 1:  Introducing the analogy 
  
• Mathematical theories developed to describe biological variation in space can be 
used to describe variation in language evolution. 
 
• This is surprising since the arbitrariness of the sign - and the role of human 
agency in language which that implies - would lead us to expect that Saussure’s 
theory would reflect only a  superficial correspondence between linguistic and 
biological evolution 
  
• Equally surprising is that Saussure’s theory of language appears to offer some 
explanation in terms of the internal mechanism of language for this analogy. 
 
• A number of points of analogy have already emerged from the exposition of 
Saussure’s theory in the previous two chapters and these are listed as a prelude to 
a deeper exploration of the analogy. 
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The stimulus for this thesis came from reading Saussure’s Course in General 
Linguistics and being struck by the extent to which his synchronic theory appeared to 
reflect an awareness of linguistic evolution as analogous to biological evolution. That was 
striking to me because I was aware of the success that linguists and biologists have had 
more recently in exploiting this analogy. The questions then arose: to what extent is 
Saussure’s theory of language a theory that could underpin and explain the linguistic-
biological analogy? To what extent should it be such a theory? And what does the 
linguistic-biological analogy suggest about the philosophical appropriation of Saussure’s 
theory? These are the guiding questions of this thesis. 
 
One of the pioneers in the application of biological models to linguistic evolution, 
Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, describes the process in this way: Theories of biological variation 
in space, developed in the middle of the twentieth century by several different mathematicians, 
resulted in very similar models. They have the generic name of “isolation by distance” and show that 
genes vary randomly in geographic space, following exact rules derived from statistics and 
probability. The most significant regularity is the relation between genetic distance (calculated from 
averaging a number of genes) and geographic distance. We have seen that genetic distance increases 
regularly (but always more slowly) as geographic distance increases until it reaches a maximum. The 
shape of the theoretical and empirical curves is determined by two measurable variables: the 
mutation rate, which increases genetic differences between two places, and the rate of genetic 
exchange between neighbours due to migration, which tends to increase genetic similarity between 
them – so these forces are opposed, to a certain extent and balance each other. 
 
The same mathematical theory can be applied to linguistic evolution: the equivalent of mutation 
(which produces new forms of genes, or alleles) is innovation, which in linguistics is the generation of 
new sound, meaning or grammar. Migration propagates these changes in space. William Wang and I 
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have applied this genetic theory of isolation-by-distance to linguistic variation in Micronesia (Cavalli-
Sforza, 2000, p. 196). 
 
Cavalli-Sforza is phlegmatic about this analogy. The explanation, he says, is quite 
simple: How is it possible for these two very different systems to follow parallel evolutionary 
trajectories, or to “co-evolve”? The explanation is quite simple. Two isolated populations 
differentiate both genetically and linguistically.  Isolation, which could result from geographical, 
ecological, or social barriers, reduces the likelihood of marriages between populations, and as a 
result, reciprocally isolated populations will evolve independently and gradually become different. 
Genetic differentiation of reciprocally isolated populations occurs slowly but regularly over time. We 
can expect the same thing to happen with languages: isolation diminishes cultural exchange and the 
two languages will drift apart (2000, p. 150). 
 
By this account, linguistic exchange and evolution are a subset of cultural exchange 
and evolution: sexual intercourse goes along with cultural intercourse. Are the guiding 
questions for this thesis otiose then? Or does Cavalli-Sforza’s account leave the question 
of the underlying, internal mechanism of language evolution and its analogy with 
biological evolution unanswered? I think the answer is that the analogy at the mechanistic 
level - the “inner organism” of language - is indeed yet to be explored. Further, I think 
this exploration is worth undertaking because the popular expectation is not exactly as 
Cavalli-Sforza represents it. It may be obvious that as populations drift apart genetically 
they will drift apart linguistically. It is rather startling, however, to learn that mutation in 
genes is, in some sense, mathematically equivalent to innovation in language. That is 
because we think of language as an arbitrary product of our conscious intention which 
transcends natural processes. Biological evolution, on the other hand, is a natural process 
which we are, or have been, powerless to control. Based on this conventional - and 
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conventionalist - understanding of language we would expect the two forms of evolution 
to differ at any but the most superficial level.  
 
Reading Saussure, then, and noting first of all how often the term “arbitrary” is used 
as a synonym for “random”, “fortuitous” (1974, p. )or “unmotivated” (1974, p. 69) – and 
how often language is said to escape the will of both the individual and the community 
(1974, p. 17) – suggests that in this theory we may find some explanation for the 
unexpected depth of the linguistic-biological analogy. It may be, of course, that as a result 
of exploring these questions further we find suggestions about the mechanisms of 
biological evolution as well - but that is something that lies beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Learning more about the analogy may, however, provide new perspectives on the 
broader philosophical appropriation of Saussure’s theory.   
 
One virtue of these guiding questions is that we soon find that they are a good way 
of revisiting the challenge Saussure poses for himself.  There is, first of all, the 
semiological ideal: If we are to discover the true nature of language we must learn what it has in 
common with all other semiological systems (1974, p. 17).  Saussure was not able to think of  
biological evolution as a genetic phenomenon and so he would not, we might suppose, be 
as inclined as we are now to think of  it as a semiological phenomenon. Indeed we have 
now, in Biosemiotics, a  biology that interprets living systems as sign systems (Emmeche, Kull, 
Stjernfelt 2002: 26).  More fundamentally, though, the scope of linguistics should be, says 
Saussure,  a) To describe and trace the history of all observable languages, which amounts to 
tracing the history of families of languages and reconstructing as far as possible the mother language 
of each family. b) To determine the forces that are permanently and universally at work in all 
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languages, and to deduce the general laws to which all specific historical phenomena can be reduced. 
c) To delimit and define itself. (1974, p. 6) 
 
Saussure’s theory deals with b) and c) of these aims: to theorise the common and 
enduring features of the evolution of language; and, to define language as a scientific 
object and linguistics as a scientific enterprise. As we have noted in the first part of the 
thesis and see again in this formulation, historical linguistics is intertwined from the very 
outset with natural scientific and especially biological theories. Here, for example, the 
history of languages is thought by Saussure to be primarily phylogenetic – having to do, 
that is, with family trees of languages.  
 
In the first two chapters of this thesis I have attempted to introduce and expound 
Saussure’s theory in a way which I hope is both reasonably comprehensive but which 
also bears the first of our guiding questions in mind. The elements of positive analogy 
between linguistic and biological evolution that emerge in that exposition are already so 
numerous that it is a little risky to attempt a comprehensive summary. Before focusing in 
more detail on the analogy, however, the main points might be listed as follows: 
 
a) Language is a population-based phenomenon. 
b) Language is an holistic system like an organism.  
c) Languages, like species, don’t grow through a life cycle but rather evolve 
continuously.  
d) The development of languages like species can be traced through family trees to 
ever more common origins.  
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e) The linguistic system is comprised of heritable units called signs.  
f) The sign is exposed to alteration because it perpetuates itself (1974, p. 74).  
g) Changes in signs are arbitrary in the sense of being chance products and fortuitous 
innovations.  
h) Change enters the system by way of the individual.  
i) Changes in signs may only be initiated by individual speakers but survive or 
perish according to whether or not they are adopted by the group and in this way 
become a part of the system. 
j) Change is potentially all pervasive.  
k) The system escapes the will of both the individual and the collective.  
l) For both systems, meaning is function   
 
In this chapter I want to explore the analogy between biological and linguistic 
evolution in more depth - both historically and in its contemporary usage - and examine 
how Saussure situates his own work in relation to it. Then I think we can go on in the 
next chapter to better answer our second and third guiding questions. 
 
Section 2: A metaphor with a long history 
 
• The linguistic-biological analogy can be traced to the beginning of the 
comparative philology tradition in the late eighteenth century.  
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• In its earlier stages the argument was used to argue for the natural scientific 
character of linguistics because its development appeared to escape human 
volition. 
 
• Soon after the publication of the Origin of the Species, Muller modifies this view, 
arguing that language development combines in one the two opposite elements of 
necessity and free will.  
 
The analogy can be traced to the beginning of the comparative philology tradition. 
At this stage it was mainly focused on the question of common origin but we will see 
how it remained essential in the development of the Neogrammarian position.  
 
The analogy was first prompted by the theory advanced in 1786 by the English 
judge Sir William Jones – and subsequently developed by the German Franz Bopp 
(Saussure, 1974, p. 2) -  that Sanskrit, Greek and Latin, and possibly Celtic and Gothic 
(the ancestor of Germanic languages) appeared to have a common origin (Cavalli-Sforza, 
2000, p. 166). In perhaps its earliest expression, Friedrich Schlegel in 1808 called on 
philologists to study the inner structure of languages or comparative grammar, which will give us 
altogether new insights into the genealogy of languages, in a manner similar to that in which 
comparative anatomy has shed light on the higher natural history (Alter, 2005 p.124). Schlegel 
noted that the affinity of Sanskrit with ancient Greek and Latin consists not only in a great 
number of [word-] roots which it shared with them, but it extends to the innermost structure and 
grammar. The agreement is accordingly not one of chance, which might be explained by mixture, but 
rather an essential one which points to common descent from an ancestral tongue (Alter, 2005 p.125). 
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Stephen Alter notes that what Schlegel called “mixture” of languages resulted from 
contingent historical processes such as migrations, conquests and culture contact and mainly 
produced similar vocabularies. Parallel grammars, on the other hand, pointed to an inherited 
genealogical connection. By focusing on comparative grammar, the researcher filtered out mere 
accidental factors and tested whether a given sets of languages had a common ancestor (2005, p.125). 
By 1861 Max Muller was able to take this natural – historical tradition of language theory 
a step further. Muller sought to argue that philology was a science because it was a 
natural science. The criterion of demarcation Muller used between natural and historical 
science still has intuitive appeal today. It accounts, I think, for what we find startling in 
the precise level of analogy that has been exploited in contemporary science. That 
criterion was the mode of causality that normally operates amongst its phenomena … the natural 
sciences have nothing to do with the products of human volition (Alter, 2005, p.127). Muller argues 
that language is not the product of human volition and so its study belongs among the 
family of natural sciences. Changes in language occur gradually but irresistibly, and, what is 
most important, they are completely beyond the reach or control of the free will of man … Though 
the individual seems to be the prime agent in producing new words and new grammatical forms, he is 
so only after his individuality has been merged in the common action of the family, tribe or nation to 
which he belongs  (Alter, 2005,  p.127). 
 
Muller highlights this paradox: The process by which language is settled and unsettled 
combines in one the two opposite elements of necessity and free will (Alter, 2005 p.128).  Then, in a 
second series of lectures, in 1862, having digested Darwin’s Origin of the Species, he 
produces a surprising solution to this contradiction: We want an idea that is to exclude caprice 
as well as necessity  - that is to include individual exertion as well as general co-operation – an idea 
applicable neither to the unconscious building of bees nor to the conscious architecture of human 
beings, yet combining within itself both these operations and raising them to a new and higher 
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conception … It is the idea of natural Selection … (Alter, 2005 p.128). It appears that this was the 
earliest application, even if only rhetorical in character, of a Darwinian concept to a 
socio-cultural phenomenon (Alter, 2005, p.128). 
 
It is not quite accurate, then, for Saussure to say that a crucial feature of language, 
though the one that is least remarked, is that it escapes both the individual and collective 
will (1974, p. 17). It was much remarked, at least in the period when Saussure was 
growing up and before he became precociously active as a linguist. By emphasizing this 
feature himself Saussure aligns himself in an important way with the natural-historical 
tradition. But Saussure’s position in relation to philologists such as Muller and Auguste 
Schleicher, who both appeared to embrace Darwinian evolution, is nuanced in an 
unexpected way. That is because of the persistence of the life cycle thesis – and various 
associated notions - alongside the more progressive tendencies of these theorists. For the 
Neogrammarians, who provide the primary basis for Saussure’s theoretical work, the 
priority had been to establish a more fundamental, genuinely evolutionary, perspective. 
That is provided by the work of Dwight Whitney and others and involves two central 
theses. These are: uniformitarianism and analogy as a creative force. 
 
Section 3:  Uniformitarianism and analogy as a creative force 
 
• Establishing a genuine evolutionary perspective in historical linguistics requires 
the rejection of the life cycle thesis and the incorporation of two alternative 
theses: uniformitarianism (which includes an assumption of gradualism) and 
analogy as a creative force. 
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• Saussure’s theory registers the full force of these theses. His theory gives a 
central role to analogy, for example, saying it occupies a preponderant place in 
the theory of evolution.  
 
• His careful account of the analogical process leaves room for a mechanism of 
selection – based, for example, on a rule of economy. This possibility is not 
developed however.  
 
• There is a double movement in analogy. It is responsible equally for the 
conservation of terms as for their transformation. 
 
 
The life–cycle thesis, as I have said, was the view that some prehistoric or primeval 
period of growth in languages precedes their subsequent decay. Grammatical fullness is 
to be found only in the earliest periods of a language. Decay then follows naturally but 
inevitably by means of phonetic and grammatical change – “lazy” speech, for example - 
that disrupts regularity in the language.  The uniformitarian principle articulated by 
Whitney was first popularized by the geologist Charles Lyell. The subtitle to his 
Principles of Geology (1830 – 33) is indicative: “An Attempt to Explain the Former 
Changes of the Earth’s Surface by Reference to Causes Now in Operation” (Alter 2005, 
p. 89).  Whitney put it this way in his lectures: It is but shallow philology, as it is shallow 
geology, which explains past changes by catastophes and cataclysms (Alter, 2005 p. 89). 
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Whitney’s view is that current processes can be projected back to the earliest  times, 
making it unnecessary to invoke unknown causes: The nature  and uses of speech, and the 
forces which act upon it and produce its changes, cannot but have been essentially the same during 
all the periods of its history, amid all its changing circumstances, in all its varying phases; (Alter, 
2005 p.219). As Saussure puts it: There had to be a reaction against the aberrations of the old 
school, and the appropriate slogan was this: Observe what happens in the everyday speech of 
present-day languages and attribute to older periods no process, no phenomenon that is not 
observable today (1974, p.184).  Whitney acknowledged that the Indo-European languages had 
lost much of their inflectional apparatus since the time of ancient Sanskrit, Greek and 
Latin. Even so, he found the larger trend to have been one of increasing complexification. 
As we noted earlier in the thesis, this understanding develops alongside the attention in 
linguistics to the full range of speech phenomena rather than just to literary texts. As 
Saussure says: People attach even more importance to the written image of a vocal sign than to the 
sign itself. A similar mistake would be in thinking that more can be learned about someone by 
looking at his photograph than by viewing him directly (1974, p. 24). Simply: Language is 
constantly evolving, whereas writing tends to remain stable (1974, p. 27).  
  
In some ways, perhaps, Saussure embraces uniformitarianism to an even greater 
extent than Whitney.  For Saussure it is matter of principle that originary conditions are 
always present. In the chapter entitled Immutability and Mutability of the Sign (1974, p. 71) he 
argues against Whitney and the conventionalist view by emphasizing that language is 
always the heritage of the preceding period and that, despite the arbitrariness of the sign, 
there can have been no simple convention or contract by which names were assigned to 
things or concepts to sound images: The so-called primitive contract merges with what happens 
every day. There is no moment at which genesis differs characteristically from the life of language, 
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and the essential thing is to have understood the latter (Saussure, n.12 in Gadet 1986, p. 36).  In the 
Course Saussure puts the matter in this way: That is why the question of the origin of speech is 
not so important as it is generally assumed to be. The question is not even worth asking; the only real 
object of linguistics is the normal regular life of an existing idiom. A particular language state is 
always the product of historical forces … (1974, p. 120).  
 
Whitney, on the other hand, had engaged with Darwin on the question of the 
genesis of language itself. He expresses some sympathy for Darwin’s views that the 
imitation of animal cries as warnings or to attract mates might have formed a proto-
language before these became conventionalized. Saussure’s statements above seem to 
rule out this kind of theory, as does Saussure’s tendency to think of signifier arbitrariness 
as essential to linguistic evolution. Evolution is an origin but not in the sense of being a 
starting point on a linear timeline – it is a present condition that illuminates the structure 
of linguistic phenomena: The form of a word at a particular moment stands for a moment in its 
enforced evolution (1974, p. 31). 
  
Gradualism is also an essential element of the uniformitarian thesis. The realisation 
in the mid 1850s that human pre-history stretched back much further than previously 
thought allows Whitney and thence Saussure to suppose that changes occurred gradually 
over very long periods of time. This strengthens the analogy with geological change and 
biological evolution. For change to be uniform it must be gradual and that in turn requires 
plenty of time. When Saussure refers to time as a force in language evolution, then, he is 
imagining this gradualist, uniform force. As Alter notes the revolution in ethnographic time 
which Whitney registered so fully supplied the theory of essential continuity (“without a break, being 
of one piece”) on which Neogrammarian doctrine would be based and on which historical linguistics 
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has been based ever since (2005, p. 219).  The analogy with biological evolution is perhaps 
increasingly striking from a contemporary perspective as the gaps in the fossil record to 
which Darwin referred are filled in. Indeed it can be argued that these gaps are now most 
notable by their absence, with an abundance of transitional forms available for all the 
major lines of descent (Prothero, 2008).  
 
The doctrine of uniformitarianism, then, is crucial in paving the way for a 
description of language evolution as having a steady, uniform path of gradual 
development - thus securing a crucial component of the analogy. The other critical 
element in the development of the Neogrammarian position is the revision of the role of 
analogy.  Saussure’s own account is perhaps the clearest: The first linguists did not 
understand the nature of the phenomenon of analogy, which they called “false analogy”.  They 
thought that in inventing honor, Latin “had made a mistake” concerning the prototype honos. For 
them, everything that deviated from the original state was an irregularity, a distortion of an ideal 
form. The fact is that, through an illusion characteristic of their time, they saw in the original state of 
the language something superior and perfect, with the result that they did not even ask themselves 
whether this state had been preceded by another. Every liberty with respect to this state was then an 
anomaly. The Neogrammarian school was the first to assign analogy to its proper place by showing 
that it is, along with phonetic changes, the prime force in the evolution of languages, the procedure 
through which languages pass from one state of organization to another  (1974, p. 162). 
 
The Neogrammarian argued that the sound laws that seemed to govern phonetic 
change were, by definition, exceptionless. Exceptions to such rules actually follow an 
additional rule of their own – namely analogical regularity (Alter, 2005, p. 220). Saussure 
teaches: That phonetic evolution is a disturbing force is now obvious. Wherever it does not create 
alternations, it helps to loosen the grammatical bonds between words; the total number of forms is 
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uselessly increased; the linguistic mechanism is obscured and complicated to the extent that 
irregularities born of phonetic changes win out over the forms grouped under general patterns; in 
other words, to the extent that absolute arbitrariness wins out over relative arbitrariness. 
Fortunately analogy counterbalances the effect of phonetic transformations. To analogy are due all 
normal, non phonetic modifications of the external side of words (1974, P. 161). As Whitney puts it 
in “The Life and Growth of Languages”: When phonetic corruption has disguised too much or 
has swept away the characteristics of a form, so that it becomes an exceptional or anomalous case, 
there is an inclination to remodel it on a prevailing norm. The great mass of cases exerts an 
assimilative influence upon the smaller (Alter, 2005, p. 222).  
 
Saussure emphasizes that the process has three stages. First, the analogical 
innovation must be created. Second, it coexists with its rival. Third it eliminates its rival. 
Many innovations do not make it to the second stage – the typical example is the 
regularities that children produce on learning the rule but not the exception: the 
comparative “badder” in place of “worse”, for example. Analogical innovation is a 
process Saussure calls “paraplasm” and can be contrasted with “metaplasm”. He brings 
out this contrast by noting that: the analogical fact is a play with a cast of three: (1) the 
traditional, legitimate heir (e.g. honos) (2) the rival (honor); and (3) a collective character made up of 
the forms that created the rival (honorem, orator, oratorem, etc).  Honorem itself came into being 
by the phonetic process of rhotacisation by which the intervocalic r replaced the s in 
honosem. In a sense that creates two roots, honor and honos: After that the radical had a 
double form. This duality was eliminated by the new form honor, created on the pattern of orator: 
ortatorem (Saussure, 1974, p. 161). Saussure is at pains to separate out the stages of analogical 
change and allow for the co-existence of the two forms in language: One might readily 
suppose that honor is a modification, a “metaplasm” of honos  and say that it drew most of its 
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substance from honos. But the only form that has no part in the production of honor is this very 
honos (1974, p. 163)!  
 
It is because of this process that, he says: … it is evident that analogy by itself could not 
be a force in evolution, and the constant substitution of new forms for old ones is one of the most 
striking features in the transformation of languages. Each time a new formation becomes definitely 
installed and eliminates its rival, something is actually created and something else abandoned, with 
the result that analogy occupies a preponderant place in the theory of evolution. This is the point that 
I should like to emphasise (1974, p. 169). This last passage is certainly a little opaque. The 
point Saussure wishes to emphasise has, I think, a number of elements.  One is that 
analogy, as he says, depends on the models provided by the larger system, not just 
individual invention. In this respect, it is one more lesson in the need to separate language from 
speaking (1974, p. 165).  Another element, though, is that some form of selection takes place. 
This is in addition to the analogical creation process. So analogy has a preponderant place 
in evolution in enabling the transition from one language state to another but this is not 
accomplished by the creation of new forms alone. There is a process of selection  
involved as well. 
 
Here then we seem to find another more detailed point of analogy. The question 
then arises, if there is selection, what is the criterion at work? Whitney had no doubt as to 
the answer, at least in terms of phonetic change. It is, he says a case of mental economy: an 
avoidance of the effort of memory involved in remembering exceptions and observing them 
accurately in practice (Alter, 2005, p. 221). Alter notes that although confident that the least-effort 
principle furnished the motive underlying almost all forms of language change, Whitney conceded 
that “the details of this working are … not a little obscure” (2005, p.221). Saussure certainly 
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favours Whitney’s theory over explanations based on racial factors or those of soil and 
climate (Saussure, 1974, p. 149). But the difficulty Saussure identifies with the law of 
least is that we can scarcely determine what is most difficult for each language to pronounce (1974, 
p. 149) Dipthongs sometimes become monopthongs, for example – but the reverse also 
seems to occur, perhaps because dipthongs help differentiate elements. The law of least 
effort would require extensive study, Saussure concludes. It would be necessary to consider 
simultaneously the physiological viewpoint (the question of articulation) and the psychological 
viewpoint (the question  of attention) (1974, p. 149). 
 
It is important to note the central role analogy plays, in Saussure’s view, in the 
evolution of language. Four fifths of French is Proto-Indo-European, he says, if we think of the 
substance that constitutes sentences but the words that have been transmitted without analogical 
change would occupy less than the space of one page (1974, p. 172). More than this, though, the 
stability of certain forms – their conservation - is just as much the work of analogy as 
their transformation. The most systematically integrated forms are those that are most 
analogically productive – and these forms are themselves reciprocally produced by their 
products. Saussure uses the example of agunt which survived almost intact from 
prehistoric period through Latin to the beginning of the romance period. The form did not 
change because ag- and -unt regularly appeared in other series and the support of these forms 
preserved agunt (1974, p. 172). Unity and divisibility are somehow combined in the sign: A 
word is apprehended simultaneously as a unit and a syntagm (1974, p. 172).  The sign is  
simultaneously synthesized as a unit and dispersed through the system.  
In summary then, we see that the Neogrammarians were very much opposed, as 
Saussure reflects, to the idea that language was a thing that leads a life of its own outside of and 
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above human beings (Brugmann, in Alter, 2005, p.224). As Saussure says: Language was 
considered a specific sphere, a fourth natural kingdom; this led to methods of reasoning that would 
have caused astonishment in other sciences (1974, p. 4). But this critique is directed specifically 
at the life cycle thesis and in support of its replacement by the doctrines of 
uniformitarianism and analogy as a creative force. Saussure, in particular, has no desire to 
throw the biological baby out with the vitalist bathwater. It is necessary, he says to 
maintain a metaphorical middle ground. When we consider his extraordinary vision of 
analogy as both a transformational and a conservative force – of a stability that is no less 
vibrant than change – we can see why he might take this view. Referring to the advent of 
the Neogrammarian school of linguistics on which his own work is based, Saussure says: 
One no longer dared say, “Language does this or that” or “life of language” since language is not an 
entity and exists only within speakers. One must not go too far, however, and a compromise is in 
order. Certain metaphors are indispensible. To require that only words that correspond to the facts 
of speech be used is to pretend that these facts no longer perplex us. This is by no means true, and in 
some instances I shall not hesitate to use one of the expressions condemned at that time (1974, p. 5, 
footnote).   
 
Section 4: Further points of analogy 
 
• The order of the Course hides the importance of Saussure’s engagement with 
contemporary accounts of common ancestry and family trees of languages – the 
most obvious point of analogy between linguistic and biological evolution. 
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• Saussure’s position rests on a deeper commitment to evolutionary change – one  
that allows for no enduring material element that could be immune to such 
change. 
 
• The question then arises whether this understanding of linguistic evolution could 
be a closer match to the processes of biological evolution as we now understand 
them. There are certainly reasons for thinking it is.  
 
• Apart from supporting similar forms of origin and descent this understanding of 
linguistic evolution also, for example, provides for  a more specific and suggestive 
analogy between master genes and word roots.  
 
I’ve suggested that one way in which Saussure’s position in relation to the 
biological “metaphor” or analogy is obscured in favour of a conventionalist view of 
language is the order in which the original editors, Ballye and Sechehaye, have arranged 
the book of Saussure’s Course of lectures. The sequence of Saussure’s teaching is stated 
in the quotation given at the start of this chapter and reflected in the order of lectures in 
the original third Course in general linguistics. It seems that in the third Course of 
lectures, the conception of the arbitrary nature of the sign that is central to the discussion 
of language and linguistic value is introduced following a lengthy and comprehensive 
consideration of all the random and sometimes fortuitous forms of change that occur in 
the evolution of languages, including a whole chapter devoted to the diversification of 
languages over geographical space and time.  
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Indeed Saussure’s most forceful exposition of what I am calling “system 
arbitrariness” - the potentially all pervasive character of evolutionary change - occurs in 
what is now the last chapter of the Course. This chapter – Chapter V of Part V - is one 
that the editors say they have taken from elsewhere because, while it is not concerned 
with retrospective linguistics, (the subject of the remainder of Part V), it forms an apt 
conclusion to the book. In fact, the chapter does seem to have to do with retrospective 
linguistics – but, more importantly, it forms an apt introduction, from the evolutionary 
point of view, to Saussure’s theory of language. Underlying the whole of Part V is this 
question: how can evolutionary deductions – what we might call retrospective predictions 
- be made from arbitrary systems and what are the limits of that process?  
 
The fundamental problem, identified in Chapter V, is the all pervasive character 
of change … no family of languages rightly belongs once and for all to a particular linguistic type. 
To ask the type to which a group of languages belongs is to forget that languages evolve; the 
implication is that there is an element of stability in evolution. How is it possible to impose limitations 
on an activity that has none? (1974, p. 229). The chapter identifies a principle of evolution: 
When we assume that there are permanent traits which neither time nor space can change in any 
way we clash head-on with the fundamental principles of evolutionary linguistics. No characteristic 
has a right to permanent existence; it persists only through sheer luck (1974, p. 229)  …any 
characteristic that is preserved in time may also disappear with time (1974, p. 230).  He also notes 
that a trait of the prototype may not appear in some of the derived languages. The reverse is equally 
true. It is not unusual even to find that the common traits of all the representatives of a family do not 
appear in the original idiom (1974, p. 230).  Saussure is seeking to rebut simplistic conceptions 
of phylogenetic inheritance in language. He concludes in the last paragraph of the 
chapter: We now realize that Schleicher was wrong in looking upon language as an organic thing 
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with its own law of evolution but we continue, without suspecting it, to try to make language organic 
in another sense by assuming that the “genius” of a race or ethnic group tends constantly to lead 
language along certain fixed routes (1974, p. 231-232). Saussure is concerned to avoid any 
superficial linguistic–biological analogy - particularly those associated with 19th Century 
‘scientific racism’ of the kind espoused by his older brother Leopold (Joseph, J., in 
Sanders, 2004, p. 69) – but to do so from the basis of a deeper commitment to the 
evolutionary character of language. That permits the inclusion of no essential element or 
“genius”. That, in turn, is connected to the conception of internal linguistics and the 
exclusion of any external factor in evolution. This is the fundamental idea of this course: the 
true and unique object of linguistics is language studied in and of itself (Saussure, 1974, p. 232). This 
concluding statement echoes the same proposition from very near the beginning of the 
book in which Saussure asks what the object of linguistics might be. It can be seen either 
as a bookend, as did Saussure’s editors (Bouquet, S., in Sanders, 2004, p.207), or as an 
earlier stage in a sequence of thought.  
 
The question arises, then, whether this deeper understanding of linguistic 
evolution is likely to be a closer match to the processes of biological evolution as we now 
understand them. There are certainly reasons for thinking it is. Part 5, for example, argues 
that diachronic linguistics does not proceed in one direction only through time. A key 
point in this discussion is that while the common original language, Proto-Indo-European  
- the mother language of Greek, Latin and Sanskrit - was able to be reconstructed 
retrospectively from Sanskrit, Sanskrit did not develop earlier chronologically than Greek 
or Latin. It developed later but preserved certain original forms of the mother language 
that were lost in the subsequent evolution of Greek and Latin. Because it was the oldest 
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document of Proto-Indo-European, they promoted Sanskrit to the rank of prototype. To imagine that 
Proto-Indo-European engendered Sanskrit, Greek, Slavic, Celtic, Italic etc is one thing; to substitute 
one of these languages for Proto-Indo-European is something else entirely. The glaring mistake of the 
earliest scholars had varied and far reaching consequences … (1974, p. 215). Here, then, is another 
more detailed point of analogy with one of the truisms of contemporary evolutionary 
theory as opposed to a Victorian understanding. The latter supposed a single linear 
process of evolution, a ‘great chain of being’ as it was often called. Tennyson, for 
example, abjured humanity to Move upward, working out the beast and let the ape and tiger die 
(Tennyson, 1849, p. 118). Now it is understood that the overall form of evolution is bush 
like, with earlier forms – including transitional forms – co-existing with later ones. This 
is something Saussure also contemplates at the level of linguistic analogy, as we have 
seen, with the later rival co-existing with the form it seeks to supplant. He also notes the 
persistence of vestigial characteristics in linguistic forms: elements that endure because 
they become peripheral to the current of evolutionary change (Saussure, 1974, p. 173). 
 
As we have noted, common origin is the most explicit point of analogy and this is 
the issue which Saussure tackles in Part V of the Course and Chapter V in particular. It 
dates at least from Schlegel. Darwin’s work sharpened awareness of the analogy amongst 
linguists – but he himself was also acutely aware of it. Cavalli-Sforza writes: In 1863 the 
German linguist August Schleicher published a tree showing the origins of the Indo-Europeans very 
much like the one we would draw today using modern methods. The ties between biology and 
linguistics were evident at once. Schleicher was certainly influenced by Charles Darwin’s use of trees 
to explain the theory of organismal evolution. In “On the Origin of Species” Darwin clearly stated 
that if we knew the tree of biological descent of the human groups, we could extract the tree relating 
languages (2000, p. 166).  Saussure was clearly aware, first of all, of theories of common 
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origin. At the age of fifteen, after he had learned Greek to add to his French, German, English 
and Latin, Saussure wrote an “Essay on Languages” in which he argued that all languages have their 
root in a system of two or three basic consonants.(Culler, 1986, p. 21) Saussure said of himself: 
The idea that with the help of one or two Sanskrit syllables – since that was the main idea of the 
[Pictet’s] book and of all contemporary linguistics – one could reconstruct the life of people who had 
disappeared, inflamed me with an enthusiasm unequalled in its naivete. (Davies, A.M., in Sanders, 
2004, p. 14).  In the mature theory, however, the pursuit of one common origin is 
abandoned. Historical linguistics has become a matter simply of tracing common origin 
as far as possible. As with many biologists, Saussure is relaxed on the question of 
whether there could be a single source of language: Besides diversity within related groups, 
then, there is absolute diversity – differences between languages that have no recognizable or 
demonstrable kinship … a good example is Chinese with respect to the Indo-European languages 
(1974, p. 192).  
 
Word roots, however, suggest a more subtle area of analogy with gene based 
evolution. Saussure says: The root is the irreducible element common to all words of the same 
family. (1974, P. 186) This element was also called the “material” as opposed to the 
“formal” element of word formation, the latter being inflections of various kinds 
including prefixes and suffixes such as verb and noun endings. Roots are, arguably, the 
oldest heritable units in a family of languages. Saussure continues: But any subjective and 
synchronic analysis separates material elements only by considering the share of meaning that 
matches each element and the root is in this respect the element in which the meaning common to all 
related words reaches the highest degree of abstraction and generality (1974, P. 186). This may be 
reflected within a root – the more reduced the radical is the greater the likelihood that its 
meaning will become abstract. Thus zeugmation suggests a little team, zeugma any team whatsoever 
and zeug – the indefinite notion of yoking or harnessing (1974, P. 186). This concept of 
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abstraction is certainly suggestive. Recent work mapping genes has identified very 
abstract and very ancient genes functioning at the highest level of commonality. These 
are “master genes”.  The so-called “Tinman” gene, for example, is responsible for the 
initial production of the heart in embryological development and is common to animals as 
diverse as humans, fish and fruit flies  (Zimmer, 2000).  The gene may have come from 
the first marine creature that modified a system for circulating water over gills. Now it is 
the necessary trigger for further specifications of the heart by clusters of genes that vary 
across these families of animal. What is intriguing about this point of analogy is the 
relativity of abstraction it suggests. The most basic element undergoes a kind of semantic 
ascent in evolution due to the subsequent specifications or inflections that attach to it. 
 
This kind of insight of Saussure’s into word roots comes from his insistence that 
grammatical elements can only be defined in evolutionary terms, as the ongoing result of 
changing paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, rather than by distinct grammatical 
structures. This is something we saw in his discussion of grammar in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis, where he pushes further into an evolutionary perspective than the 
Neogrammarians had done. Part of this insistence is, of course, Saussure’s view that no 
element is immutable, including the “material” element of any sign. Indeed, when he 
talks of “radical arbitrariness” we may hear in this term an evocation of the mutability of 
the root. There may be some that have not changed up to this point, says Saussure - word 
roots in the Semitic family of languages seem particularly stable, for example – but that 
does not mean they will not change in the future. In general, everything that time has done, 
time can undo (Saussure, 1974, p. 231).  
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Section 5: Saussure pushes deeper into the analogy 
 
• The wholly arbitrary nature of language and the lingustic sign does not, Saussure 
argues, result in language being best understood as a convention. 
 
• Rather, it distinguishes language from other conventional, social institutions that 
are all based in varying degrees on the natural relations of things (1974, p. 75) and is 
responsible for the manner and complexity of linguistic evolution. 
 
• Arbitrariness means that language changes, or rather evolves, under the influence 
of all the forces which can affect either sound or meanings. It exposes the 
linguistic sign to change because that change, whatever its origin, always result 
in a shift in the relationship between the signified and the signifier.   
 
There is no easy resolution, then for Saussure, between conventionalism and a more 
naturalistic approach. We have seen that Whitney helps Saussure repudiate the life cycle 
thesis. The story is a little more complicated than this however. For what came along with 
the life cycle thesis, especially as it was co-opted by theological interests, was the notion 
that the rapid early development of language in its Edenic phase is only explicable by the 
“natural significancy” of its terms (Alter, 2005, p. 59). That is why, despite having the 
authority of Webster’s dictionary definition behind him, Whitney had been forced to 
defend the arbitrary nature of the sign along with the other principles that were so 
influential in the establishment of the Neogrammarian school. Once again I am indebted 
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to Stephen Alter for this account: First writing on this subject in 1839, Gibbs said that this thesis 
[natural significancy] although neglected of late, was assuming its place once again as “one of the 
deepest and most important doctrines in philology … In order to explain the existence of language, it 
is not enough that man has the organ of speech, that he has sensations and ideas, and that he has a 
desire to communicate them to others; but it is also necessary that sounds should have a natural 
adaptedness to express the particular sensations and ideas (Alter, 2005, p. 59).  The doctrine can be 
traced back to Epicurus and re-emerges as late as the 1850s as a kind of audio-resonance 
theory, most notably in Muller’s work (Alter, 2005, p. 89).   Epicurus wrote: names … were 
not at first deliberately given to things, but men’s natures according to their different nationalities 
had their own peculiar feelings and received their peculiar impressions, and so each in their own way 
emitted air formed into shape by each of these feelings and impressions, according to the differences 
made in the different nations by the places of their abode as well. (Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus 75-6, 
trans. Bailey, 1926,  quoted by Joseph in Sanders, 2004, p.68) 
 
Saussure’s intuition is one that follows quite naturally from Whitney’s work: that 
the very arbitrariness of the sign is tied not to a simple contract or convention but to the 
evolution of language, when that evolution is rightly conceived. But Saussure wants to 
push further down this line of thought – and hence, I would suggest, go deeper into the 
linguistic biological analogy. In one chapter of the Course in particular, he wrestles with 
the tension inherent in connecting arbitrariness - associated with Whitney’s 
conventionalism - with historical evolution. This is the chapter of the Course entitled 
“Immutability and Mutability of the Sign”. It is here that we find the tribute to Whitney 
and his insistence on the arbitrary nature of the sign – together with the view that 
Whitney did not “follow through” on his insight. Saussure’s argument in this chapter is a 
complex one but might be outlined as follows:  
The Life of Language: 
Saussure and Evolution   108 
 
 
 
a. The signifier, though to all appearances freely chosen with respect to the idea that 
it represents, is fixed not free with respect to the linguistic community that uses it. 
 
b. That is not because the community by some simple contract or convention agrees 
on signifiers and imposes them as a law. It is, rather, because language is only 
ever experienced as an inheritance, as the product of historical forces – the deck is 
always already stacked.   
 
c. But that doesn’t get us very far as an explanation. Even inherited, traditional 
institutions can change radically, and language does not do that. What Whitney 
does not see is that the radically arbitrary nature of the particular social institution 
that is language separates that institution out from others. Other social institutions 
– even those as apparently arbitrary as fashion -  are all based in varying degrees on 
the natural relations of things (1974, P.75).  The arbitrariness of language is responsible 
for its characteristic evolution, both the mutability and immutability of signs. 
 
d. Signifier arbitrariness creates the continuous, gradual yet exhaustive nature of 
linguistic change. It exposes the sign to change because change, although it can 
originate through a myriad of forces that affect either sound or meaning, always 
results in a shift in the signifier-signified relation.  
 
e. This kind of arbitrariness is closely connected with time. The thing which keeps 
language from being a simple convention that can be modified at the whim of interested 
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parties is not its social nature. Rather it is the action of time combined with the social force 
(1974, P. 78). 
 
In the last part of the chapter, Saussure returns explicitly to the language-speech 
distinction he made in the introductory lectures. He illustrates this framework very simply 
with a circle for language connected to a square for the community of speakers or speech. 
He presents this diagram – essentially the conventionalist position - and then presents his 
own position by modifying the diagram by the addition of an arrow to represent time 
mediating between the two.  
 
The argument represents both a deeper positive analogy with biological evolution 
but also a certain negative analogy. It is an advance from conventionalism toward the 
linguistic-biological analogy because of its commitment to “the action of time” in 
combination with the social force and the way in which that works in the relation between 
speech and language. But the analogy is limited by the move Saussure makes in c. above 
to install signifier–signified arbitrariness at a deeper level of abstraction than evolutionary 
forces such as the syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations he describes as the mechanism 
of language. Signifier–signified arbitrariness allows for an explanation, he contends, of 
both mutability and immutability. The sign is immutable because it is arbitrary in the 
sense that there is no reasoned argument that can be adduced to persuade a community of 
speakers to change it. It is mutable because, conversely there is no reason why it should 
not change.  
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The problem is that this conception of arbitrariness as the separability of the 
signifier  assumes a pre-existing signified and a fixed structure of reference. If there is a 
pre-existing opposition between signifier and signified there must be a pre-existing 
delimitation of both the signified and the signifier. The premise of the arbitrary nature of 
the sign is inescapably a conventionalist premise. But Saussure wants to argue that it is 
the gap between the signifier and the signified that accounts for the mutable nature – 
more precisely, perhaps, the labile nature - of the sign. As it is a product of both the social 
force and time, no one can change anything in it and on the other hand the arbitrariness of its signs 
theoretically entails the freedom of establishing just any relationship between phonetic substance and 
ideas.  The result is that each of the two elements in the sign maintains its own life to a degree 
unknown elsewhere, and that language changes, or rather evolves, under the influence of all the 
forces which can affect either sound or meanings (1974, P. 76). All change, whatever its origin, 
results in a shift in the signifier-signified relation, i.e. a semantic change. This is given 
emphasis more than once. Regardless of what the forces of change are, whether in isolation or in 
combination they always result in a shift in the relationship between the signified and the signifier 
(1974, P. 74). Language is powerless to defend itself against the forces which from one moment to the 
next are shifting the relationship between the signified and the signifier. This is one of the 
consequences of the arbitrary nature of the sign (1974, P. 76). The question is whether the 
opposition of signifier and signified is itself evolving along with other relations of 
opposition and association – or whether it stands apart from those relations as the fixed, 
structural cause of their evolution. I will consider this question in more detail in the last 
chapter of this thesis. Whatever the mechanism involved, though, Saussure commits in 
this chapter to a much more systematic process of the evolution of signs than 
conventionalism would allow. To that extent he goes deeper into the linguistic-biological 
analogy.  
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Section 6: The missing unit  
 
• Saussure finds it very difficult to identify a unit of linguistic evolution and this 
may be considered both a point of analogy and of contrast.  
 
• Cavalli-Sforza is more certain on both sides of the analogy, comparing words 
with genes and noting a strong similarity in terms of “variability”. 
 
• Lexical diffusion aligns with Saussure’s conception of the creative role of analogy 
and Saussure’s account of this process is more supportive of the linguistic-
biological analogy than that of Cavalli- Sforza.  
 
Another point of analogy with biological evolution – and perhaps a point of contrast - 
is the difficulty in identifying any unit of evolution. Perhaps the best known confrontation 
with this question in biology is marked by Richard Dawkins’ discussion at the beginning 
of “The Selfish Gene” (Dawkins, 1976). Dawkins argues by a process of elimination that 
it can only be genes themselves that are the unit that is selected in evolution, a view 
which now enjoys widespread support (Cone, J.A., 2006).  Saussure experiences the same 
difficulty but, crucially, is unable to reach any resolution. First, the object that linguistics 
studies seems to be a function of the scientist’s viewpoint on speech rather than an object 
capable of determining that viewpoint. Second, having settled on language or languages 
as the object of linguistics, it is impossible to identify the unit within language 
undergoing evolutionary change. It could be words but it appears that it can also be 
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combinations of words or subsections of words. As I described in the first chapter, 
Saussure opts for a certain level of abstraction – preferring to speak wherever possible of 
the terms of language, since a term is what belongs to a system. 
 
But this does not seem to have allayed Saussure’s anxiety – and sometimes 
despair - at ever being able to demonstrate “what sort of object language is” (Culler, 
1986, p. 24)  Of course, Saussure is not able to consider any analogy with genes as the 
heritable unit of evolution since a genotypic model was not developed until the 1920s. 
Saussure could only have been familiar with Darwin’s pre-Mendellian, phenotypic model 
of inheritance: “pangenesis”. Pangenesis holds that body cells shed gemmules, which collect in the 
reproductive organs prior to fertilization. Thus every cell in the body has a 'vote' in the constitution 
of the offspring  (Pangenesis, Wikipedia, 2008). 
 
For Cavalli-Sforza the analogy is very much one that is constituted between 
words and genes. One way in which it applies at a more detailed level concerns their 
variability: I have already mentioned that there are some words that change very little over time 
and space, either in their phonology or meaning: they are especially useful for establishing 
relationships between languages that have been separated. Unfortunately, these words are rare. At 
the opposite extreme are the highly variable words, the ones that have a high mutation rate. Highly 
variable genes have a great number of alleles; similarly highly variable words have a great number of 
synonyms. They can be found in a thesaurus. For example, there are many synonyms for the word 
“drunk” … the same is true for the word “penis”. Studying the variation of words would certainly 
offer interesting psychological information (Cavalli-Sforza, 2000, p. 197).  It is not clear whether 
Saussure considers the variability of words but he does consider their productivity. That 
productivity occurs through analogy – and that is tied to decomposability. Words can be 
rated for capacity to engender other words to the extent to which they themselves are 
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decomposable… each language has both productive and sterile words in varying proportions … An 
Esperantist has unlimited freedom to build new words on a given root (Saussure, 1974, p. 166). 
Productive forms are “stored” within languages’ paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations.  
Following on from what we might call Saussure’s language-speech-time model we find a 
more analogous role for speech. Speech is the means of transmission and replication of 
the language within the community of speakers, as that community is defined 
geographically and as it continues over time. This means that: Speech is continuously 
engaged in decomposing its units and this activity contains not only every possibility of effective talk 
but every possibility of analogical formation (Saussure, 1974, p. 166). At the same time: Any 
[analogical] creation must be preceded by an unconscious comparison of the materials deposited in 
the storehouse of language where productive forms are arranged according to their  syntagmatic and 
associative relations (Saussure, 1974, p. 166). For Saussure terms can be preserved in one of 
two ways. Either the term is at the very centre of the evolutionary current and highly 
productive. Or, as in the case of a place-name, it is preserved because it is on the 
periphery of the language as an evolving entity. It is in the intermediate area between 
these two zones that terms are most subject to evolutionary transformation.  
 
What Saussure thinks of as the productivity of words may be closer to what 
Cavalli-Sforza calls “lexical diffusion”. But then we encounter a marked difference in 
interpretation, with Cavalli-Sforza appearing to reflect the influence of Chomsky’s theses 
of  the native and mental character of basic grammatical structure: We could not leave this 
subject without mentioning the most interesting aspect of linguistic evolution – lexical diffusion, 
whose importance was demonstrated by William Wang … Lexical diffusion does not refer to the way 
an innovation spreads from one person to another, but to the effect that the change in one word may 
have on the other words in one person’s vocabulary. This is especially important because it also tells 
us about the working of the brain which seems to operate from a set of rules. Although each language 
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preserves many grammatical, phonological and syntactical irregularities, there is a tendency for 
homogenization and extension of rules (Cavalli-Sforza, 2000, p. 203). Saussure’s approach seems 
more helpful in explaining the linguistic biological analogy:  We have seen (p.195) that the 
innovation was due to an accident which was not only material but also negative, the elimination of 
the a in betahus. Everything occurred outside the mind and in the realm of sound changes, which 
readily impose a tight yoke on thought and force it into the special way that the material state of 
signs opens to it. … language is not controlled directly by the mind of speakers  (1974, p. 228). We 
may also note that Cavalli-Sforza’s example in this case supports Saussure’s analysis of 
the complexity of the syntagmatic and paradigmatic forces whose build up results in 
analogical formations. It seems that it could not be as simple as Whitney suggests with 
regard to the assimilative effect of the majority of cases on the minority: English verbs are 
in the process of becoming more regular as time passes. Another example is the differentiation of 
verbs and nouns by the position of the accent: the word “present” is a noun if the accent is on the 
first syllable, and a verb if on the second syllable. In 1570 there were only three examples (outlaw, 
rebel, record). Between 1582 and 1934 they grew steadily from 8 to 150  (Cavalli Sforza, 2000, p. 
203).  
 
Cavalli-Sforza Sforza suggests, however, that with regard to the complexity in the 
transformation of linguistic terms we may be reaching the limit of the analogy with 
biological evolution: We must note a significant difference between biological and genetic 
mutation. A genetic mutant is generally very similar to the original gene since one gives rise to the 
other with only a small change. Words vary in more complicated ways. The same root can vary 
phonologically from language to language and it can also change meaning (2000, p. 197). The 
question remains, perhaps, as to whether this difference is due to the accelerated rate of 
linguistic transmission and hence the accelerated rate of linguistic evolution - rather than 
to a difference in mechanism.   
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Finally, it seems important to note a certain echo between the assumption 
articulated by Cavalli-Sforza that Linguistic evolution is a special type of cultural evolution 
(2000, p. 150) and Saussure’s desire to situate language within semiology, the broader 
study of the life of signs in society. This echo persists despite the fact that Cavalli-Sforza 
does not describe the relationship between linguistic and cultural evolution in any detail. 
The feeling of similarity persist, perhaps, because Saussure ties the perception of 
language as one of many semiological systems to internal linguistics, to the study of 
language in itself (1974,  p. 16). As we shall see below, for Saussure what belongs to 
internal linguistics is what tends to support the linguistic-biological analogy. 
 
Section 7: The negative analogy and the demarcation between internal and external 
linguistics 
 
• Saussure consistently characterizes the elements that negate the empirical 
application of the linguistic-biological analogy as external to language studied in 
and of itself. 
 
• Language in Saussure’s account has an “inner organism” capable of evolving 
independently of external factors which may, however, retard that evolution. 
 
• Anything that causes evolutionary change in language belongs to this inner 
organism, to internal linguistics. In effect, it is anything that arises from the free 
interaction of language and speech. This unhindered interaction of language and 
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speech is the empirical condition under which the linguistic-biological analogy 
holds.  
 
• The initial points of analogy identified at the start of this chapter are all 
consistent with the definition of internal linguistics.  
 
The first point of negative analogy is the most obvious and has been alluded to 
already: languages evolve much more quickly than genes: Genetic mutations are rare, and 
transmission from one individual to another occurs only from parent to child, while linguistic 
changes are much more frequent and can pass also between unrelated individuals. As a result 
languages change more quickly than genes. In effect, if a word can resist change for 1,000 years a 
gene can remain substantially unchanged for million and even billions of years (Cavalli- Sforza, 2000, 
p.150). For Cavalli-Sforza, linguistic evolution is a special type of cultural evolution 
because cultural transmission, replication and exchange – and their arbitrary 
imperfections - are the medium of linguistic evolution. This process, he says, is similar in 
many ways to the transmission and replication of disease organisms as modeled in 
epidemiology. This is due to the inclusion of horizontal as well as vertical, inter-
generational transmission. That, in turn, suggests that linguistic evolution will accelerate 
to a much greater rate than hitherto imagined due to the current development of 
information and communication technology.  
 
As we explore the negative analogy further, however, we find something startling. 
We find that Saussure has assigned the positive and negative analogy clear, separate 
categories. Those categories are the categories of internal and external linguistics 
respectively. Everything that is consistent with biological evolution belongs to “the inner 
The Life of Language: 
Saussure and Evolution   117 
 
 
organism” (Saussure, 1974, p. 21) or the internal elements of language and is studied by 
internal linguistics. That includes some diachronic elements and all synchronic elements. 
The proper objects of external linguistics, on the other hand, are those external forces and 
mechanisms that interfere, we might say, with the effects of  “time” or natural evolution 
on languages. In this sense, the internal/external opposition is prior to the 
diachronic/synchronic distinction.  For the internal elements of language are identified in 
turn with the unique and proper object of linguistics:  language studied in and of itself.   
 
Cavalli-Sforza Sforza writes: Nevertheless, there are several major sources of divergence 
between genetic and linguistic trees. One language can be replaced by another in a relatively short 
time. In Europe for example, Hungarian is spoken in the geographic centre of many Indo-European 
branches: Slavic, Germanic, and Romance; but it belongs to the Finno-Ugric branch of Uralic … at 
the end of the ninth century A.D., the nomadic Magyars left their land in Russia, crossed the 
Carpathians and invaded Hungary … the conquest resulted in a Magyar monarchy, which imposed 
its language on the local Romance speaking population. The number of conquerors was large but did 
not constitute the majority of the population  - perhaps less than 30% of the total. The genetic effect 
of this conquest was therefore modest …(2000, p. 151).  Language replacement through conquest 
is just one means by which linguistic and biological evolution can diverge. Cavalli-Sforza 
goes on to examine these in more detail – and Saussure also provides a parallel summary 
in his discussion of external linguistics, largely in terms of the relations between language 
and political history. For example: Great historical events like the Roman conquest have an 
incalculable influence on a host of linguistic facts. Colonisation, which is only one form that conquest 
may take, brings about change in idiom, by transporting it into different surroundings … The 
internal politics of states is no less important to the life of languages; certain governments (like the 
Swiss) allow the co-existence of several idioms; others (like the French) strive for  linguistic unity 
(1974, p. 20). Saussure also identifies as belonging to external linguistics … all the points 
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where linguistics borders on ethnology, all the relations that link the history of a language and the 
history of a race or civilization (1974, p. 20). 
 
In the broadest terms, I suggest, Saussure identifies external factors with the traits 
that attach language to the other social institutions – those that are more or less voluntary (1974, p. 
17). With regard to phonetic change in particular, the key problem that Saussure sees in 
what he classifies as external factors is that there is no apparent explanation for why they 
should act at one time rather than another. There is no account of what occurs to unleash a 
change whose general cause has existed for a long time. Climatic influence, racial predisposition, and 
the tendency toward least effort are all permanent or lasting. Why do they act sporadically, 
sometimes on one point of the phonological system and sometimes on another (Saussure, 1974, p. 
150)? Saussure distinguishes these factors from exchange between populations that can be 
classified as part of internal linguistics: Did earlier populations introduce some of their own 
articulatory habits into the new language on adopting it? This is admissible and quite natural. But if 
the imponderable forces of race etc. are called in anew, the pitfalls described earlier reappear 
(Saussure, 1974, p. 151). 
 
Again, in parallel with the points of negative analogy noted by Cavalli-Sforza, 
Saussure cites the relations between language and … all sorts of institutions (the Church, the 
school etc.) All these institutions in turn are closely tied to the literary development of a language, a 
general phenomenon that is all the more inseparable from political history (1974, p. 20). Saussure 
also consigns everything that relates to the geographical spreading of languages and 
dialectical splitting to the realm of the negative analogy. He says: Finally everything that 
relates to the geographical spreading of languages and dialectical splitting belongs to external 
linguistics. Doubtless the distinction between internal and external linguistics seems most paradoxical 
here, since the geographical phenomenon is so closely linked to the existence of any language; but 
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geographical spreading and dialectical splitting do not actually affect the inner organism of an idiom 
(1974, p. 22). 
 
A very close parallel develops as Saussure justifies this exclusion: Take as an example 
the borrowing of foreign words. We observe from the outset that borrowing is not a constant force in 
the life of a language… More important still, a loan word no longer counts as such whenever it is 
studied within a system; it exists only through its relation with, and opposition to, words associated 
with it, just like any other sign (1974, p. 21 – p. 22).  Likewise, Cavalli-Sforza: Even though the 
phenomenon of borrowing words from other languages, especially from neighbours, is well 
established the most studied evolutionary trees give the impression that a language changes in ways 
that are largely independent of changes taking place in other languages. This is a prerequisite for the 
applicability of tree analysis (2000, p. 194). Chapter V of the Introduction to the Course is 
entitled “Internal and External Elements of Language” and here Saussure marks out the 
positive and negative analogy at some length. Throughout the chapter, language as a 
system is equated with language as an organism – and indeed as a “living” organism as 
Saussure refers to it elsewhere. He begins the chapter: My definition of language presupposes 
the exclusion of everything outside its organism or system – in a word, of everything known as 
“external linguistics”.  Saussure asks: Some have maintained that the foregoing issues simply 
cannot be separated from the study of language proper… Just as the inner organism of a plant is 
modified by alien forces (terrain, climate, etc) does not the grammatical organism depend constantly 
on the external forces of linguistic change (1974, p.20)? He answers this question in the 
following way: I believe that the study of external linguistic phenomena is most fruitful; but to say 
that we cannot understand the internal linguistic organism without studying external phenomena is 
wrong (1974, p. 21). He concludes the discussion: One must always distinguish between what is 
internal and what is external. In each instance one can determine the nature of the phenomenon by 
applying this rule: everything that changes the system in any way is internal (1974, p. 22).  
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Saussure’s remarks on loan words provide the clue to what he means here, I think, 
by “changing the system”. It is a question of whether relations of opposition and 
association - syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations - change around any supposed 
innovation. That, in turn, is a question of whether the innovation can be analogical – 
whether the speaker taps into the constellation of signs around any given sign as “a build 
up of forces” for evolutionary change. A newly formed word like in-decorable already has a 
potential existence in language; all its elements are found in syntagms like décor-er ‘decorate’, décor-
ation ‘decoration’, pardon-able ‘pardonable’ … inconnu ‘unknown’, etc. and the final step of 
realizing it in speaking is a small matter in comparison with the build-up of forces that makes it 
possible  (1974, p. 166).  
 
Where there is such a change, a certain internal freedom is in play. External factors 
are those that, by definition, do not cause such change but can only inhibit it: Immobility  - 
the relative fixation of an idiom – may have an external cause (the influence of a court, school, an 
academy, writing, etc.) which in turn is positively favoured by social and political equilibrium. But if 
some external upheaval that has affected the equilibrium of the nation precipitates linguistic 
evolution, that is because language simply reverts back to its free state and follows its regular course. 
The immobility of Latin of the classical period is due to external facts; the changes that it later 
underwent, however, were self generated in the absence of certain external conditions (Saussure, 
1974, p. 150).  It seems that external factors can only stymie the process of evolutionary 
change, not participate in it. They impose limitations on “an activity that has none”. In 
effect that is to say that they don’t arise from the relation between a language and the 
population that supports it. They don’t arise from the free interaction – perhaps we should 
say “embodied” or even “voluntary” interaction - of language and speech. That relation 
seems to come about through the activities of speakers who are at once inside the 
language, familiar to an automatic or unconscious degree with its storehouse of forms, as 
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well as outside it at the very fringe of speech that exceeds language (Saussure, 1974, p. 
165). These are the conditions under which resonant innovations can be produced. Those 
conditions can be met by both native speakers and speakers from outside the language 
whose interaction with the language is genuinely creative – or procreative. It may be 
noted, too, that the initial points of analogy identified at the start of this chapter are all 
consistent with this definition of internal linguistics and the free interaction of language 
and speech.  
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The Life of Language: 
Saussure and Evolution 
Chapter 4: The philosophical appropriation of Saussure’s theory  
 
Section 1: The theory and the analogy  
 
• The conditions under which the linguistic-biological analogy holds are the 
conditions which Saussure says define internal as opposed to external linguistics: 
they provide for the free interplay, without external interference or imposition, of 
language and speech. 
 
• Saussure thus succeeds in outlining a common evolutionary framework for two 
apparently quite different semiological systems. There is, however, also a 
contrary tendency in his thought. This is exemplified in his view that language can 
be distinguished from other semiological systems by the wholly arbitrary nature 
of its signs.  
 
• There is a material or natural substratum to many sign systems, says Saussure. 
Language alone, because it has a signifier that has no natural connection to the 
signified, functions as a system of pure values.  
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In the previous chapter I explored the analogy between biological and linguistic 
evolution in more depth - both historically and in its contemporary form - and examined 
how Saussure’s work can be situated in relation to that analogy. The aim of this 
examination was to provide a more detailed and profound answer to the first of the 
guiding questions of this thesis: to what extent is Saussure’s theory of language a theory 
that underpins and explains the linguistic-biological analogy? Providing a deeper answer 
to that question enables us to provide an answer to the second of our guiding questions: to 
what extent should Saussure’s theory be one that explains and supports the analogy? That 
question is the particular subject of this chapter. The answer to this second question, 
though, continues to emerge very much in parallel to the answer to the first question. And 
it leads on to the third question with which we are concerned: a consideration of what the 
answers to these first two questions suggest about the philosophical appropriation of 
Saussure’s theory.  
 
What have we learned so far, then, about Saussure and evolution? As long as each 
system is allowed to evolve freely then the linguistic-biological analogy will hold, even 
to the extent that it can form the basis of successful empirical analysis and prediction. 
What does “evolve freely” mean? It means that there is free interaction between speech 
and language – between individual innovation and collective conservation – without 
external interference or imposition. These are the empirical conditions under which the 
analogy holds as described by Cavalli-Sforza and they are the same as those under which 
Saussure says we may observe the inner organism of language.  It may be that the rate of 
evolution differs in each system. But that difference appears to correspond to differing 
rates of transmission – that is, differing rates of interaction of speech and language. These 
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differences also occur within biology, between genomes, with viruses representing a 
certain limit of evolutionary acceleration. The language-speech framework – by which I 
mean the language-speech-time framework Saussure defines and illustrates 
diagrammatically in the Immutability and Mutability of the Sign (Saussure, 1974, p. 71) – 
is, then, a common evolutionary framework. This is, first of all, how Saussure’s theory  
explains the linguistic-biological analogy.  
   
The unfettered interplay of speech and language that forms the subject of internal 
linguistics can also be described as an ideal for Saussure. It is the condition of the fully 
semiological life (1974, p. 76) he envisages for Esperanto, for example. It is at once an 
evolutionary and a democratic ideal, consistent with such descendants of his theory as 
Jurgen Habermas’ conceptions of communicative rationality and democratic participation 
(Habermas, 1987). Saussure is concerned with what we might describe as a self 
transforming process enacted in the relationship between communities of speakers and 
their systems – between the speech that lies within the language system and the speech 
that lies beyond it. The fully semiological life is also though, as we will see below, a 
theoretical ideal that is not quite fully realized in the theory itself.  
 
For while Saussure succeeds in outlining a common framework for two apparently 
quite different semiological systems, there is, too, a contrary tendency in his thought. We 
have encountered this from a number of angles, the most acute of which has arisen in our 
discussion of his argument in the Immutability and Mutability of the Sign. This is 
Saussure’s view that language can be distinguished from other semiological systems by 
the arbitrariness of its signs – where arbitrariness means the lack of any natural 
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connection between the signifier and the signified. There is a material or natural 
substratum to many sign systems, says Saussure. In economics, for example, land has a 
natural value. Language alone, because it has a signifier that has no connection to the 
signified, functions as a system of pure values.  
 
There is a real ambivalence in Saussure’s teaching on this point. For it is precisely 
the arbitrariness of language that he contends makes it the most characteristic of all 
semiological systems. Signs that are wholly arbitrary realize better than the others the ideal of the 
semiological process; that is why language, the most complex and universal of all systems of 
expression, is also the most characteristic; in this sense linguistics can become the master-pattern for 
all branches of semiology although language is only one particular semiological system (Saussure, 
1974, p. 68).  That contention suggests that the particular arbitrary relation between the 
signifier and the signified in language just reflects a deeper arbitrariness – what I call 
“system arbitrariness” - shared by all systems. Language makes the material medium of 
any system visible, as Saussure puts it, as just a substance to be put to use (1974, p. 118).   
 
So there is this tension. On the one hand Saussure articulates the popular – indeed 
we could say culturally embedded – conception of language as a freely willed human 
construction. This view depends on the lack of natural connection between the signifier 
and the signified – the separability, let us say, of one from the other. As Muller 
highlighted, this view cannot explain how languages evolve in a manner that is analogous 
to natural forms of evolution. On the other hand, we have Saussure’s theory of systematic 
values in which the signifier and signified are inseparable. We would expect an account 
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of sign systems on this basis to be consistent across human-made and natural systems. 
Accordingly, this aspect of the theory is consistent with the linguistic-biological analogy. 
 
Section 2: Distinguishing between two forms of arbitrariness  
 
• I suggest that Saussure’s theory should support the linguistic-biological analogy. 
I therefore contend that we need to distinguish between two forms of arbitrariness 
– signifier arbitrariness and system arbitrariness or material discontinuity – that 
Saussure tends to conflate. 
 
• Despite appearances, signifier arbitrariness is consistently at odds with system 
arbitrariness. Signifier arbitrariness is defined by the lack of a natural connection 
between the signifier and the signified. System arbitrariness, by contrast, entails 
the inseparability of signifier and signified within the system. 
 
• More specifically, in opposing the natural significancy thesis, Saussure appears 
to assume the necessity of signifier difference when its possibility would suffice. It 
is only the necessity of signifier difference that is inconsistent with system 
arbitrariness and the linguistic-biological analogy. 
 
• Whitney’s insight that opposition plays a delimiting role within systems fuels 
Saussure’s desire to link the difference between signs in a system to the difference 
between the signifier and the signified in a sign. Nevertheless, there are 
compelling reasons to recall that the “decoupage” or the cutting out of signs is 
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solely the result of the evolving syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations that 
constitute the linguistic system.  
   
In considering the extent to which Saussure’s theory supports the linguistic-
biological analogy, then, we can say that the theory supports the analogy insofar as 
Saussure proposes that language is a system of pure values. But it does not support the 
analogy insofar as Saussure conceives of the purity of a system of values as measured by 
the arbitrariness of its names or signifiers rather than by the free interaction of language 
and speech. I want to argue that Saussure’s theory should support the analogy and so in 
what follows I will argue that we must distinguish between two forms of arbitrariness that 
Saussure consistently conflates. One is signifier arbitrariness. As Saussure puts it, the 
choice of a given slice of sound to name a given idea is completely arbitrary (1974, p. 113). It is the 
arbitrariness of the signifier as opposed to the signified. The other form of arbitrariness is 
what we might call “system arbitrariness”. This is the arbitrariness of the signifier and the 
signified together, of the whole sign. Saussure is invoking this system arbitrariness when 
he says, for example, that language only happens to use sound images as its medium - 
leaving aside some physiological questions, language could just as easily have developed 
as a system of manual signs.  
 
The distinction between the two forms of arbitrariness can certainly appear subtle – 
and connecting the two has proved a persuasive strategy for Saussure. Buried within their 
conflation, however, are some powerful contradictions. We can see this as soon as we 
begin to look more closely into each form of arbitrariness. 
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System arbitrariness is also what I have called “material discontinuity”. In 
Saussure’s view, historical linguistics reveals a new class of phenomena (1974, p. 231) without 
any fixed units, identities or objects on which a science can be based. Instead, these 
phenomena manifest a material discontinuity in which change is all pervasive and 
permanence results from sheer luck. (Saussure, 1974, p. 231) The material medium of a sign 
system is arbitrary in the sense of being irrelevant to its systematics because there are no 
material elements that transcend the mechanism of evolutionary change. To prove that 
language is a system of pure values, says Saussure, it is enough to consider the two elements 
involved in its functioning. Not only is thought before language a vague uncharted nebula but 
the phonic substance is neither more fixed nor more rigid than thought. It is equally plastic (1974, 
p. 112). For that reason, neither are thoughts given material form nor are sounds transformed into 
mental entities. The somewhat mysterious fact is rather that “thought-sound” implies division, and 
that language works out its units while taking shape between two shapeless masses (Saussure, 1974, 
p. 112). Saussure is saying that there is no indivisible material element - no element that 
cannot be “cut up” or “sliced” for redistribution - through the ongoing, evolutionary 
mechanism of language. There is nothing that pre-exists linguistic value or could form 
the base for it. This is system arbitrariness or material discontinuity. 
 
Now consider signifier arbitrariness – particularly the distinctive arbitrariness of the 
signifier as opposed to the signified that Saussure says we encounter in language. How 
can we recognize the lack of “natural connection” between the signifier and the signified 
if we don’t first of all suppose that there is some material basis to the signified, that it is 
in some way a natural object? The signified must have a nature in itself. It cannot be 
solely a product of relations of association and opposition, a value emanating from the 
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system (Saussure, 1974, p. 117). It must somehow be an isolable object, capable of being 
listed in an ontology in no particular order or arrangement. Otherwise the nature of the 
signified would just reflect the nature of its system – and that nature would always be 
shared by its systematic signifier.  
 
Likewise, Saussure could not assign different signs within the same system – or 
different systems of signs - differing degrees of arbitrariness if we did not assume pre-
existing natural objects as signifieds and some gap between these and their signifiers. 
This assumption is essential to signifier arbitrariness and to the conventional - and 
conventionalist - view of language.  
 
The separable signifier, then, assumes a separable signified, both laterally in 
relation to other signifieds and vertically in relation to its signifier. As Whitney says we 
have our idea and then we get a name for it (Alter, 2005, p. 72). But Saussure has this strong 
desire to connect up these two contradictory conceptions: signifier arbitrariness and all 
pervasive evolutionary change or system arbitrariness. The well known passages in which 
he rejects onomatapeia as an explanation for the origin of certain signs provide a further 
example. It is an accident of their evolution, says Saussure, that certain signifiers such as 
glas sound like their signifieds – in this case, the knell of a bell. Originally there was a 
separation of the signifier and the signified. Yet as Derrida argues (Derrida, 1974) there is 
a significant contradiction lurking here. The natural connection between the signifier and 
the signified in glas is said to be an evolutionary accident. But isn’t its origin as an 
arbitrary sign equally then an evolutionary accident? If arbitrariness is just the 
evolutionary, accidental character of the bond between signifier and signified, though, we 
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will be unable to discern by any essential feature of that bond whether any sign is 
arbitrary as opposed to natural. And if a natural connection in the signifier-signified 
relation is just as arbitrary as a lack of natural connection in the signifier-signified 
relation how can we appeal to signifier-signified difference as the source of arbitrariness 
in the system – or as the source of the distinctive evolution of the linguistic system, as 
Saussure wants to do?  
 
To put the issue another way, we may recall that Saussure is rebutting the natural 
significancy thesis.  That thesis assumes that there is a natural or necessary connection 
between the signifier and the signified. But, in logical terms, the negation of the necessity 
of sameness in the signifier-signified relation is not the necessity of difference in that 
relation: it is the possibility of difference in that relation. That possibility is consistent, in 
turn, with the possibility of sameness in that relation. Saussure does not need to argue that 
signifier–signified difference is the original – and originating – condition of the sign. And 
indeed he should not, if he is to adhere to the uniformitarian principle. The conditions at 
work in the past must be essentially the same as those at work in the present. The 
possibility of signifier-signified difference together with signifier-signified sameness is 
such a condition.  
 
Yet Saussure very often seems to hold to the view that signifier–signified difference 
is a necessary condition of linguistic systems. That is at odds with the all pervasive 
potential for change in linguistic systems, their purely contingent character. It is also at 
odds with any analogy between the evolution of linguistic systems and natural systems, 
including the linguistic-biological analogy. Simply, it is not signifiers or signs, 
The Life of Language: 
Saussure and Evolution   131 
 
 
considered in isolation, that are arbitrary. It is systems. The sign is evolving within a 
system that is evolving. It is the system’s paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations that are 
responsible for every aspect of the sign - all its relations of similarity and difference, its 
division from other units and the division of units within it. The evolution of those 
relations is entirely arbitrary in the sense that it has no perduring, necessary element.  
 
If this were not the case – if evolutionary change in language were not potentially 
all pervasive – then there might be some fixed external structure or criterion, 
transcending sign systems, by which we could judge whether isolated signs were wholly 
or partially arbitrary. As it is, the fact that signs exist only within arbitrary systems makes 
that judgement impossible. So while it seems natural to think of the arbitrariness of a 
system as being expressed in the arbitrariness or otherwise of the signs that make up that 
system, if we do this then, precisely, we elide the evolutionary mechanism of language. 
And, in doing that, we elide what language has in common with other sign systems.  
 
The conflation of signifier and system arbitrariness is also evident in Saussure’s 
argument in the Immutability and Mutability of Signs. It is a matter, says Saussure, of 
“following through” on Whitney’s principle of the arbitrary signifier and seeing that this 
distinguishes it from all other social institutions and is responsible for the manner and 
complexity of linguistic evolution. This is despite the fact that Saussure knows that 
semantic evolution is essential to linguistic evolution and Whitney is explicit that the 
signified or idea exists prior to its signifier. It is as if, for Saussure, the evolution of 
language depends on signifier arbitrariness and that sign systems would otherwise be 
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immobile. Needless to say, the linguistic-biological analogy directly challenges this 
assumption too.  
 
But Saussure also attempts to forge the connection between material discontinuity 
and necessary signifier arbitrariness from the other side of the pairing, from the side of 
material discontinuity. He is encouraged, no doubt, by some divergent views of 
Whitney’s on semantics. This can be seen in a particular passage in the Course. Alter tells 
us that Whitney, especially in his 1875 book “The Life and Growth of Languages”, offers 
a new interpretation of the familiar distinction between “material” and “formal” elements in 
language. In his first book he set forth the standard view that material elements (such as the full in 
fully) had descended from a language family’s root words and so had retained their independent 
significance. Formal elements, the theory ran, had emerged with the development of inflective 
grammar and expressed grammatical elaboration only; they had no independent meaning. Although 
he never abandoned this orthodox Boppian theory, Whitney introduced in his mid career writings 
the idea that the material and formal aspects of language actually exist in a reciprocal relationship on 
a strictly synchronic plane. He also expanded the realm of the “formal”, even to the point of implying 
that no truly independent “material” elements exist. He gave as examples paired terms such as 
brook:brooks and man:men. The semantic difference between the members of these pairs, he said, 
was generated  purely “by contrast”. Even the primary term, brook was itself “formed”, because it 
received its ability to express singleness of number “not by a [positive] sign, but by the absence of an 
otherwise necessary sign to the contrary (Alter 251-2).  
 
When we look at the corresponding passage in Saussure’s Course we find Saussure 
asserting a correlation between the arbitrariness of signifiers and the differential 
delimitation of signs. Since one vocal image is no better suited than the next to what it is 
commissioned to express, it is evident, even a priori, that a segment of language can never in the final 
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analysis be based on anything except its noncoincidence with the rest. Arbitrary and differential are 
two correlative qualities.   The alteration of linguistic signs clearly illustrates this. It is precisely 
because the terms a and b as such are radically incapable of coming to consciousness – one is always 
conscious of only the a/b difference that each term is free to change according to laws that are 
unrelated to its signifying function. No positive sign characterizes the genitive plural in Czech zen; 
still the two forms zena: zen function as well as earlier forms zena: zenb; zen has value only because 
it is different (1974, p. 118). 
 
Again, Saussure slides from the arbitrariness of the signifier – the vocal image – to 
the arbitrary segmentation of language, the delimitation of signs that include the 
signified. Terms evolve holistically through the syntagmatic and paradigmatic 
mechanism of language and they do this independently of their signified, says Saussure, 
because they are not motivated by their signified. Yet the point is that signifieds are 
inseparable from signifiers in this process. Signifieds evolve as well. That means that the 
concept of signifier arbitrariness is no longer applicable.   
 
But Saussure’s intuition is that if the absence of a sign can function as a sign – and 
if only oppositions are capable of coming to consciousness in language – then that seems 
at once to explain the absence of any continuous material element in the evolution of sign 
systems and to connect back to the opposition of signifier and signified. The system is 
one of differences – and it is that way because of the radical arbitrariness of the signifier. 
“Arbitrary and differential are two correlative qualities”. The gap between signs is the 
same gap as that between names and objects. The separation of the signifier from the 
signified is correlated with the delimiting difference or opposition between signs. Every 
evolutionary change in signs can be conceived as a shift in the relationship between the 
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signifier and the signified. Signifier arbitrariness is tied to material discontinuity – and by 
that means to the free evolution of sign systems, to internal as opposed to external 
linguistics. The three concepts are knotted together in this quotation, for example: Not only 
are the two domains that are linked by the linguistic fact shapeless and confused, but the choice of a 
given slice of sound to name a given idea is completely arbitrary. If this were not true the notion of 
value would be compromised because it would include an externally imposed element (Saussure, 
1974, p.  113). 
 
Yet once we incorporate this important insight of Whitney’s – that opposition is 
systematic – we have another reason to distinguish between signifier arbitrariness and 
system arbitrariness. The choice of one material medium as opposed to another for a 
system is arbitrary. The choice of one sound in opposition to another to name a given idea 
within the system is not entirely arbitrary just because opposition is systematic. The 
sound in question must be sufficiently similar to others to be a part of the system and 
sufficiently different to be non-coincident with other signs.  
 
Certainly it is tempting to equate the arbitrariness of sound as the medium for 
language with the arbitrariness of a particular sound in language as the medium for a 
particular idea. But particular sound-ideas are values that emanate from the medium. 
Saussure often fails to make this distinction partly, we could say, because he often fails to 
make the distinction between absolute and relative difference. The delimiting differences 
within the language system – more properly termed oppositions – that individuate values 
are not absolute but relative in the sense that they are held within associative relations. 
The absence of a mark in Saussure’s example functions on the basis of the sameness of 
every other feature of these two signs. Its significance depends on both aspects. These 
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associations between signs may be as broad as the similarity that makes a sound a part of 
a language rather than background noise. It may also be that a sign consists “most 
precisely” in being what other signs are not. Signs are defined most generally, we can 
say, by similarity or association – they are defined most specifically by opposition. In 
between they are defined by the alternation of association and opposition. At the most 
precise level the opposition must be between signs that are also most similar, as Saussure 
and Whitney’s examples of singular/plural oppositions shows. The rule of non 
coincidence or non contradiction they follow at the most precise level, is then, 
correspondingly strict. It is not difference as such, not absolute difference that carries 
significance.  To reach the level of precision at which a value is ultimately defined by 
opposition requires a complex interplay of syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations, 
relations of association and opposition - as illustrated by Saussure’s “somnolent” and  our 
“paramedic” examples in chapter 2.   
 
Semantic variation is proof, says Saussure, that instead of pre-existing ideas we find 
in language only values emanating from the system. Those values may well be partly 
delimited, in the manner we’ve described, not by their positive content but negatively by their 
relations with other terms of the system (Saussure, 1974, p. 117). But if the relation between 
signs is solely or absolutely differential - or if it is arbitrary in the sense that signifiers are 
thought to be arbitrary in opposition to their signifieds - then signs are also separable 
from each other. And if they are separable they are isolable and non-systematic. 
Saussure’s conception of decoupage or the cutting out of units of meaning runs the same 
risk. If this process is supposed to be absolute or arbitrary in the manner that the signifier 
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is arbitrary then we elide the mechanism of language and the systematic character of 
signs.  
 
Section 3: Why Saussure’s theory should support the analogy 
 
• Conflating signifier and system arbitrariness generates two opposing models of 
language. This is one good reason why Saussure’s theory should be interpreted so 
as to support the linguistic-biological analogy.  
 
• There are other reasons however, why signifier arbitrariness should be unhooked 
from system arbitrariness. 
 
• These include freeing the theory from the contradictions and aporia outlined in 
the immediately preceding section and the empirical support that the theory then 
gains from the analogy. It also opens the possibility of a fuller philosophical 
appropriation of Saussure’s theory.  
  
The linguistic-biological analogy directly challenges, then, this conflation between 
signifier and system arbitrariness in Saussure’s theory. This is reflected in the way that 
the conflation plays out in Saussure’s theory. It is responsible, for example, for 
Saussure’s conception of relative as opposed to absolute arbitrariness. In this conception, 
the systematic is partially superimposed on the arbitrary. Signs are originally isolated, 
absolutely arbitrary or differential – and language is by nature chaotic (Saussure, 1974, p. 131). 
The mind contrives to introduce a degree of rationality (Saussure, 1974, p. 131) in the form of a 
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system that limits or partially transforms this absolute arbitrariness. Relations within the 
system are purely those of similarity and analogy. Systematic signs are signs that are 
productive of other signs by these means. The system is distinctively evolutionary and 
diachronic. Signs that remain outside the system - or below it, as it were, as the system’s 
raw material – remain isolated, wholly arbitrary, unproductive (Saussure, 1974, p. 166). 
 
In fact, in pursuing the connection between signifier and system arbitrariness 
Saussure generates two opposing models of language. In one model, he describes a static 
or synchronic, crystalline structure of differences. In this structure, the arbitrariness 
between the signifier and the signified is responsible for both the mutability and 
immutability of signs. The real evolutionary mechanism – the mechanism of language 
that Saussure also describes - is elided. This tends to be the dominant reading of 
Saussure’s theory. The uniquely arbitrary character of the signifier in language is the 
ground on which synchronic linguistics is separated out from diachronic linguistics. 
  
In the other model - that of relative arbitrariness - the system is constituted solely by 
relations of similarity and analogy on a base of simply named objects. This system is 
essentially diachronic. In both scenarios Saussure fails to identify the ongoing 
evolutionary mechanism of language with its signifying structure. In that mechanism, 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations - sameness and difference - work together to 
create meaning. Indeed, it may be that what we are here calling “linguistic system” is just 
what Heidegger calls the “originary being together of identity and difference”, 
(Heidegger, 1969).  But instead, Saussure ends up advancing two models of language, 
one based on relations of difference and one based on relations of sameness or analogy.   
The Life of Language: 
Saussure and Evolution   138 
 
 
 
The linguistic-biological analogy drives a wedge, then, between the two senses of 
the arbitrary that we find in Saussure’s theory. Material discontinuity or system 
arbitrariness is consistent with the analogy – signifier arbitrariness contradicts it. If 
Saussure’s theory is to support the analogy – and vice versa - then system arbitrariness 
must be unhooked from signifier arbitrariness. As we saw above, “material discontinuity” 
also names the absence of what are technically called material as opposed to formal 
elements in language and the delimitation of signs by opposition. It is consistent with 
what Saussure is striving to capture when he declares that everything comes down to the 
fact that language is a form not a substance (1974, p. 113).  
 
On the other hand, in striving to unite signifier and system arbitrariness, Saussure’s 
theory ultimately splits into two contradictory models. That in itself is a good reason to 
say that Saussure’s theory should be one that supports the linguistic-biological analogy. 
At this point, though, we may take a step back and review a number of reasons why the 
theory should support the analogy.  
 
• First, system arbitrariness goes to the heart of what Saussure is trying to achieve 
in his theory – an account of the forces that are universally and permanently at 
work in language evolution. In accordance, in particular, with the uniformitarian 
thesis Saussure wants to identify the ongoing evolutionary mechanism of 
language with its signifying structure - to describe these as one and the same 
thing. 
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• Second, if Saussure’s theory is consistent with the linguistic–biological analogy 
then that analogy, in turn, provides considerable empirical support for his theory. 
 
• Third, the extent to which Saussure’s theory supports the analogy is the extent to 
which it is freed from the contradictions and aporia that flow from uniting 
signifier arbitrariness with material discontinuity. I have discussed some of these 
aporia above: the signifier is both separable and inseparable from the signified; 
the relation between the signifier and the signified is not necessarily differential 
just not necessarily the same; two contradictory models of system emerge, one 
based on relations of difference and the other on relations of sameness; “cutting 
out” is conceived as the mechanism rather than just an effect of language 
evolution. 
 
I hope that these three reasons have been explored to some extent already in this 
thesis. They certainly encourage us to go on and separate out signifier arbitrariness in 
Saussure’s theory and rely solely on system arbitrariness. But that also opens the 
possibility of a fuller philosophical appropriation of Saussure’s theory – and this is a 
fourth reason why Saussure’s theory should be read as a theory that underpins and 
explains the linguistic-biological analogy. In the following section I want to explore the 
possibility of such a fuller appropriation in more depth. Then I suggest that, crucially, this 
requires an alternative account of signifier arbitrariness – one that is consistent with, 
rather than contradicting, systematic value. 
  
The Life of Language: 
Saussure and Evolution   140 
 
 
Section 4: The fourth, philosophical, reason for separating out signifier 
arbitrariness.  
 
• The philosophical appropriation of Saussure’s theory is limited by the fact that 
simple arbitrary naming – and, therefore, pre-existing extra-linguistic objects –
appear to continue alongside systematic value. 
 
• A popular approach to locating simple, individual naming in relation to value - 
which consists in grafting simple naming onto the language-speech opposition – 
may be developed further by reference to Saussure’s conception of systematic 
latitude. 
  
• This may, as Laclau and Mouffe suggest, help explicate the seemingly intractable 
philosophical problem of the relationship between a material base and an  
ideological superstructure.  
 
The philosophical implications of Saussure’s theory all have to do with semantics: 
semantic variance over communities of speakers and semantic evolution over time within 
a community of speakers. Saussure foregrounds this phenomenon, first brought to light 
by historical linguistics, by making it a principle that the ideas or objects referred to in 
language do not exist prior to or outside the structure of reference in language. This 
semantic immanence or semantic relativism has a clear philosophical implication: it 
offers an alternative model of ontology. The limit we encounter in the philosophical 
appropriation of Saussure’s theory, however, is the co-existence of simple naming with 
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linguistic value. If the name or signifier is arbitrary as opposed to the object it names or 
signifies then that object must lie outside language as a system of signifiers. There must 
be an extra-linguistic world. The theory is not, we might say, “fully ontologised”.  It can 
always be relegated to the realm of “language” as opposed to “reality”.  
 
In the sections above I’ve highlighted some points at which we can see Saussure 
striving to connect these two concepts: the arbitrariness of names with system 
arbitrariness. I’ve also argued that his theory will not cohere on this basis. Indeed it 
divides into two contradictory models. The theory only hangs together if we can interpret 
Saussure’s talk of the choice of a given slice of sound to name a given idea (1974, p. 113) as 
referring simultaneously to the arbitrariness of the signified as well as of the signifier.  
 
This division in Saussure’s theory also arises from the fact that Saussure is 
attempting, in a quite single minded fashion, to establish a theory of linguistics not a 
philosophical semantics. As a consequence, the object to which he refers is very often a 
linguistic object, the object of study for linguistics. It is not any and every object - the 
“world” to which a philosophical semantics refers as it continues the broader 
philosophical project of metaphysical enquiry.  Likewise, the facts to which Saussure 
refers are “the facts of speech” - not all facts, not facts as such. This difference can be 
observed at many points. As we have noted, when Saussure describes the material 
discontinuity he finds in diachronic linguistics he contrasts this with systems of value that 
still have some material basis, such as economics. Likewise, language is thought to be the 
most exemplary of sign systems just because it doesn’t maintain a fixed material basis as 
other semiotic systems may do – as fashion does with regard to certain parameters set by 
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the human body, for example. Or, when discussing linguistic identity, Saussure cites 
objects like the 8.25pm Geneva-to-Paris train or a certain street: These, he says, can 
change in every material respect while remaining the same because their circumstantial or 
contextual definition – their delimitation - remains the same. These objects are contrasted 
by Saussure with an object such as his stolen suit which persists across different 
circumstances or contexts by virtue of a certain inert, material identity (Saussure, 1974, p. 
108 – p. 109) 
 
Again, the arbitrariness of signifiers is illustrated by the fact that the same object - a 
cattlebeast - has different names on different sides of a geographical border. But 
linguistic value is illustrated by the English word mutton because it names something 
different from the French word mouton. It is as if two different kinds of objects existed in 
the world – some with a kind of internal, inherent essence and others with a purely 
external, relative essence.   
 
So long as Saussure’s synchronic or structural linguistics is appropriated to the 
social sciences this issue can be parenthesized. For in the social sciences, it may be said, 
we are not studying a natural, material object but objects that are, broadly speaking, 
human values – despite a desire at times to include natural scientific objects within these 
social scientific accounts. In these areas Saussure’s influence has, of course, been 
profound. But a full philosophical appropriation requires a different approach. One way 
of dealing with the appeal to signifier-signified arbitrariness in Saussure’s theory is to 
accept that Saussure’s linguistics continues to maintain some element of simple naming 
or signification alongside value. It is certainly possible to justify readings that suggest 
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that value and signification co-exist peacefully. Saussure says of a word that: Being part of 
a system, it is endowed not only with signification but also and especially with a value, and this is 
something quite different. A few examples will show clearly that this is true. Modern French 
“mouton” can have the same signification as English “sheep” but not the same value and this for 
several reasons particularly because in speaking of a piece of meat ready to be served on the table, 
English uses mutton and not sheep (1974, p. 115). As Joseph notes: This discussion has troubled 
many commentators (for a selection, see the long note 231 of the de Mauro edition of the Cours) 
because when it comes to “meaning” (sens or signification), Saussure reverts to the ordinary way of 
talking about words and things that he has dismissed as “nomenclaturism” and that his whole 
concept of the signe linguistique aims to supersede (Sanders, 2004, p.  66). 
 
But if we maintain the co-existence of simple naming alongside linguistic value 
Saussure’s theory is not very different, as we will see, from Gottlob Frege’s theory of 
Sense and Reference (Frege, 1997). In Frege’s theory, sense - the mode of  determination 
of the  object of reference – co-exists with simple names and objects of reference. For 
many interpreters the problem is compounded if we think of the very doctrine of 
arbitrariness itself as depending on a nomenclaturist view of signification. Such a concern 
marks one major divergence in post-Saussurean linguistics, with the Russian linguist 
Roman Jakobson contending that the theory of arbitrariness is in blatant contradiction 
(Holdcroft, 1991, p. 52) to the conception of linguistic value. Saussure introduces the 
concept of arbitrariness by saying that: “the idea of ‘sister’ is not linked by any inner 
relationship to the succession of sounds s-o-r which serves as its signifier in French; that it could be 
represented equally by just any other sequence is proved by differences among languages and by the 
very existence of  different languages: the signified ‘ox’ has as its signifier ‘b-o-f’ on one side of the 
border and 0-k-s (ochs) on the other (1974, p. 68). Jakobson, quite reasonably, contends that 
what is good for the sheep should also be good for the ox: the scope of the word “boeuf” and 
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that of the word “Ochs” do not coincide. (Holdcroft, 1991, p. 52)  As a consequence Jakobson 
supports the view articulated by Benveniste: the connection between the signifier and the 
signified is not arbitrary; on the contrary it is necessary (Holdcroft, 1991, p. 52). 
 
Of course, the scope of these terms could coincide. They could be the same values 
just by coincidence or chance. We don’t have to maintain that there are no coincidences 
of value between systems to maintain that languages consist solely of systematic values. 
But differences in values between systems are certainly evidence of the systematic 
character of signs.  
 
A popular view attempts to reconcile signification and value by “grafting” them on 
to Saussure’s speech/language distinction. Signification, it is said, belongs to speech and 
value to language. (Holdcroft 1991, Joseph in Sanders, 2004, Culler, 1986). Joseph 
describes the strategy in this way: But as Burger (1961) concluded, the discussion makes sense if 
we graft the value/meaning distinction onto that between langue, the mental system and parole, what 
people actually do with language. ‘Meaning’ is then to be understood in the ordinary way, as the use 
we make of spoken words to denote things, actions, qualities and so on, whereas ‘value’ is what is 
intrinsic to mental signs that makes it possible to use spoken words in this way (Sanders p. 66).   This 
account seems quite implausible since it contradicts semantic variation and evolution and 
assumes pre-existing “things, actions, qualities and so on”. However associating simple 
naming with speech doe shave the appeal of suggesting that simple naming can be 
conceived originally as individual naming. It seems that an innovative individual speech 
act of naming could be thought of as signification, prior to its adoption or rejection by the 
group - prior to its becoming, or failing to become, a value within the system.  That leads 
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on to a more developed conception of systematic latitude as a way of comprehending 
arbitrary naming – a conception I outline below.  
 
A somewhat different approach is evident in a text such as Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantale Mouffe’s seminal apology for Post Marxism, “Post Marxism without 
Apologies” (Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C., 1990).  Here the authors contend that the object is 
discursively constituted in its being or essence (1990, p. 104) - but distinguish the being of an 
object from its existence. The existence of an object is a necessary pre-condition of its having a 
being but as a member of a certain community, I will never encounter the object in its naked 
existence – such a notion is a mere abstraction (1990, p. 104).  
 
Even if we don’t think of language as a system of naming, however, there are at 
least two problems that arise from any approach that maintains the co-existence of simple 
naming and systematic value. The first is that a philosophical appropriation of Saussure’s 
theory demands an account of language in relation to all kinds of object. We need one 
story about how language relates to the world and cannot leave one form of reference - or 
one kind of object of reference - outside that account. Objects such as Gross National 
Product or  Saussure’s stolen suit are signifieds like any other. They have an inseparable 
relation to their signifiers and form a sign – a linguistic value  - just as certainly as the 
signifieds of linguistics. If this were not the case the signifieds of linguistics would be 
pure values only in the sense that they are the object of this exclusive discipline. The 
question of their relation to any object outside linguistics – their semantic value – would 
remain unanswered. The signifieds of linguistics must be the signifieds of language. So, 
while it is Saussure’s disciplinary fervour that helps propel his theory toward its radical 
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conclusions, the sign – even as the object of study of linguistics - must be universal 
because it must be capable of including any object as its signified.   
 
The second problem is that, sooner or later, any political or social scientific theory 
circles back to its metaphysical base. For example, if we look again at Laclau and 
Mouffe’s article we see that Saussure’s theory seems to offer a solution to the vexed 
question of the relation between a material base and an ideological superstructure: One 
possible way of understanding this embeddedness of ideas in the material conditions of society would 
be in terms of signifying totalities. The ‘state’ or ‘ideas’ would not be self constituted identities but 
rather ‘differences’ in the Saussurean sense, whose only identity is established relationally with other 
differences such as ‘productive forces’, ‘relations of production’, etc. The ‘materialist’ advance of 
Marx would have been to show that the area of social differences which constitutes the signifying 
totalities is much wider and deeper than it had been supposed hitherto (1990, p. 110).    
 
But we have already seen that a purely differential linguistic system depends on 
yoking material discontinuity to signifier arbitrariness - and signifier arbitrariness pre-
supposes a natural, isolable signified. Likewise, we have seen above that the distinction 
between a material “existence” and a linguistic “being” or value is maintained in Laclau 
and Mouffe’s theory at a more abstract, fundamental level. So contemporary Critical 
Theory often evinces this dilemma: do we engage with a wholly articulable construct? Or 
does some natural, bare life remains below such structures, a material remainder? The 
difficulty associated with the first horn of this dilemma is that pure, differential values 
begin to feel weightless and arbitrary in a negative sense. The difficulty encountered on 
the second horn is that matter or existence includes something a-priori impenetrable and 
mysterious – a component in which systematic values seem bound to be stowed out of 
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sight. Either way, the tension between the original assumptions of signifier arbitrariness 
and the systematic role which Saussure seeks to assign it remains highly problematic – 
particularly in the elevation of difference as such to a structural principle.  
 
Section 5: Systematic latitude - an alternative to signifier arbitrariness 
 
• If we do not want signifier arbitrariness to contradict Saussure’s evolutionary 
systematics, we need to give an account of simple naming as an effect of system 
arbitrariness – effectively reversing Saussure’s strategy. 
 
• New signifiers can be added to pre-existing systematic values in a process that 
extends or elaborates those values so long as they do not contradict pre-existing 
values.  
 
• That is because systems of linguistic value have a limit which coincides with the 
limit of the interests of their community of speakers. From the point of the system 
further elaborations are arbitrary in that they only have to obey a rule of non- 
contradiction.  
 
If the co-existence of signification and linguistic value is not an option, then, what are 
we to do with simple naming? While the linguistic-biological analogy offers very strong 
encouragement to rely solely on systematic value, it does not address the content of what 
is, as we saw at the beginning of this thesis, a widespread and longstanding intuition. In 
particular, we would not want to re-enact the battle that Whitney fought on behalf of 
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signifier arbitrariness against the linguistic-biological analogy in the form of the doctrine 
of natural significancy and linguistic natural theology. In fact, we are accustomed to think 
of the gap between the name and the object as the gap between the subject and the object 
- and in this sense as the source of both human freedom and human limitation. As Frege 
put it: No-one can be forbidden from using any arbitrarily producible event or object as a sign for 
something else (1892, p. 152).  What we need, rather, is a satisfying account of signifier 
arbitrariness on the basis of system arbitrariness. We want to show signifier arbitrariness 
as an effect of material discontinuity, not the other way around – reversing, in some 
sense, Saussure’s strategy.  That, I think, is quite possible if we adapt one of Saussure’s 
own concepts to the task.   
 
For the systematic delimitation of objects leaves what Saussure calls a certain 
latitude between points of convergence  (1974, p. 119). Saussure highlights the latitude between 
these points with respect to the pronunciation of phonemes in speech and the form of 
letters in writing. Phonemes are above all else, opposing, relative and negative entities (1974, p. 
119). As long as one phoneme does not cross the boundary with another, individuals and 
groups have considerable freedom in their formation. This freedom is evidenced in 
idiolects and, to some extent, in dialects. Here I want to suggest that the same latitude 
accounts for simple naming. Systematic latitude could be the best explanation for a 
certain nominal discretion that speakers enjoy and the best way of resolving the issues 
around the apparent co-existence of systematic value with simple naming.  
 
First, we need to acknowledge that there are objects that are pre-existing in relation 
to acts of naming. That seems undeniable. Persons, pets, body parts - all can be “dubbed” 
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according to our fancy. The question is, are these pre-existing objects isolated or 
systematic? We assert that they are systematic. They are always already signs. And the 
nature of a sign is the nature of its system. But once the system has defined the object in 
accordance with its needs it then leaves plenty of latitude for further variation and 
elaboration, both by individuals or by groups. The system may require that Fido’s name 
is registered, for example – or that the name on our passport corresponds to that on our 
birth certificate. It is systematic to that extent, as the system brings out the desired 
differentiation at the desired point (Saussure, 1974, p. 132). But this leaves wide latitude as to 
what that name shall be. Indeed, whenever we think of simple arbitrary naming we do so 
by considering the signified in isolation – thereby, paradoxically, taking its systematic 
definition for granted. Once that definition is assumed, we are left with the latitude that 
remains, a certain broad nominal discretion.  
 
So it is with Saussure’s example of a substitute chess piece. The substitute for the 
original only has to be different from the other pieces says Saussure – it is necessary only 
that it not blur its identity with other pieces (1974, p. 110). But as we’ve seen earlier, this 
is only true once the substitute has had its systematic properties conferred upon it: that is, 
it is deemed capable of certain moves in relation to the other pieces. With respect to those 
systematic properties the original piece resists, as Saussure puts it, any arbitrary substitution 
(1974, p. 72). At the risk of mixing our ludic metaphors the substitute chess piece has to 
become part of the same stacked deck (1974, p. 71) in which the original participated. There 
then remains a certain latitude or margin of arbitrariness as to its other properties, a 
latitude whose boundaries are set by a weak rule of non-contradiction, of consistency or 
compatibility. It is only necessary that the substitute not be confused with other pieces 
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that have other systematic properties. In this sense the substitute piece must only be 
different. But it is equally vital to observe that the piece’s systematic properties are not 
themselves merely a result of this piece being different from the other chess pieces.  
 
Saussure’s innovation is to show that the object, before any apparently arbitrary 
name is conferred upon it, is defined in a purely contingent – and therefore arbitrary - 
system of associative and combinatorial relations. That system is the subject of an 
evolutionary continuity which has the potential to transform any and all aspects of the 
objects within it. Whatever name we use for an object such as rose it may indeed still 
possess its definitional properties, such as its sweet smell. But this definition is 
systematic. That is the most - and the least - that Saussure needs to claim. Indeed, in 
Juliet’s exclamation - that which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet 
(Shakespeare, 1597, Act 2, Scene 2, lines 44-45)  - all the systematic work is already done at 
another level. In using a rose as a signifier for Romeo, Juliet has taken him from a system 
of blood ties and arranged marriages into one of erotic desire and romantic aspiration. In 
saying deny thy father and refuse thy name (Shakespeare, 1597, Act 2, Scene 2, lines 33-34), she 
acknowledges that those two acts - obedience to the law of the father and attachment to 
the family name - are inseparable. “Romeo” as a linguistic value is a scion of the house of 
Montague, a young man with a certain destiny. Once we name him as a rose then we are 
free to call that rose whatever we want. But at the deeper level Juliet has dramatically 
exceeded the latitude allowed by the dominant system. Her substitution of the value 
“rose” for “Romeo” elicits a corresponding resistance.  
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Similarly, we can easily imagine objects without their names when we imagine 
them one by one, in isolation. But if we divest all objects of names then we lose the 
systematic definition of objects. We are confronted with an unmanageable disorder – 
something like the writhing, gravity-less reality Sartre describes his protagonist 
experiencing in his novel Nausea, when he loses all names (Sartre, 1949). In this sense, 
the freedom of naming is a latitude delimited by the system. 
 
The objects in question may, by chance, be quite stable parts of a system. They 
don’t have to be changing. Or change could affect just the periphery of an object. It is 
rather that evolutionary change makes the character of objects as values in a system 
visible - and the all pervasive nature of evolutionary change makes the character of 
objects as values in a pure system of values visible. The change in question may be quite 
dramatic, as is the case when the Morning Star and the Evening Star turn out to be one 
object, the planet Venus - or the planet Pluto not to be a planet at all. But the system 
delimits objects, as I’ve put it, from the outside in so that changes in definition may occur 
just at the edges of the object – and be very gradually evolving.  
 
Further, we must note that signs that appear discretionary may become essential as 
systems evolve and vice versa. The Higgs Boson seems at present to be a sign comprising 
a discretionary and a definitional element respectively. But there may turn out to be 
different types of Higgsian Boson  - or conversely the Higgs Boson could turn out to be a 
chimera and the Higgs element be lost altogether. 
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We do also need to correctly identify the system of delimitation of an object. Unless 
we realize that Juliet is using “Romeo” as a metonym for “Romeo Montague”, for 
example, then her challenge Wherefore art thou ‘Romeo’? (Shakespeare, 1597, p. 33) – her 
placing of speech marks around a linguistic value - lacks any force. More subtly, an 
irrational reaction by an individual to an event or object may suggest that it has 
significance in some inter-subjective system, preserved in that individual, that is not 
apparent to others in the community. Equally, an anomalous empirical value - the 
advance in the perihelion orbit of Mercury observed around the beginning of the 20th 
Century, for example - may suggest that the underlying system of values is not yet fully 
or correctly delimited.  
 
Sometimes the latitude at the limit of the system, formed by this rule, is quite 
specific and narrow. But it still appears as a margin of arbitrariness. A good example can 
be found in late 19th Century Germany. In this case, when the government conceived the 
project of further integrating the Jewish community into German society it provided lists 
of permitted units of meaning - “gold”,  “silver”, “braun”, “stein”, “berg” – to Jewish 
citizens which they were free to combine at will to form German names. These were 
names that would be consistent with – but did not infringe upon – the existing system of 
identities. 
 
The fundamental point is that systems are relative to communities of interest. It is 
not that simple naming exists on top of systematic value. Rather, it is the case that the 
interests of the community – and with these, the needs of the system – have a certain 
limit. From the point of view of those interests and their system what lies beyond that 
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limit need only comply with a weak rule of non contradiction. That rule defines the 
latitude allowed by the system – and that latitude may appear to the system as the 
arbitrariness of names. 
 
Again, Frege applies that principle of the freedom of naming I have quoted him 
describing earlier when he sets about inventing symbolic logic. This, as he sees it, is  
simply a system of names economical enough to bring complex relations between large 
units of meaning within the circle of the mind’s eye i.e. within the limits of our 
concentration within which they can be compared, connected and contrasted. But the key 
question with any such artificial language is whether it remains within the latitude of the 
system it seeks to compress -  or whether it generates a distinctive semantics. Is it 
consistent with – or does it contradict – the system it claims to translate? 
 
Names may be proscribed on the basis that they are blasphemous and this may vary 
between cultures. It is clearly considered blasphemous to use “Jesus” as a name for one’s 
children in Anglophone cultures but it is popular to do so in Hispanic cultures, for 
example. Of course, names that are not consistent or that contradict the systematic 
delimitation of the object named may deliberately be used by groups to challenge the 
existing system of values. Obvious examples are the use of terms like “gay” or “queer” 
by a minority group. This re-enacts Juliet’s strategy. The appeal to arbitrariness hides the 
project of transformation. The new name is not seen as arbitrary by the system to just the 
extent that the system resists its own transformation. But the arbitrariness of names – a 
certain margin of freedom – is itself a value within the system. So a small group can use 
one part of the system as the basis for a demand for consistency throughout the system 
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and, in so doing, punch above its weight. Language is supporting us against language, we 
could say.  
 
To summarise, re-articulating simple, arbitrary naming as systematic latitude 
involves the following elements: 
 
1. Linguistic systems are located within a speaking circuit and so are co-extensive 
with their community of speakers - which we may also think of as their 
community of interest. 
 
2. The degree of precision in the delimitation of values in a system is likewise 
defined by the interest of its community of speakers. 
 
3. Binary oppositions form the boundaries of systems - values are delimited most 
precisely by their binary opposition. This leaves a certain latitude for further 
delimitation by other communities of interest. That delimitation – in the first 
instance, by association – follows a rule of non-contradiction.  
 
4. Relative to the relevant system and community of interest, this further elaboration 
or delimitation has the character of arbitrary naming. 
 
5. Systems or values may be further elaborated or delimited on this basis to the level 
of an individual speaker.  
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6. Truth is an expression of systematic preference at the most precise level of 
systematic delimitation. 
 
With reference to this sixth point, I am invoking the inchoate Saussurean theory of truth 
briefly described in chapter 2.  
 
Section 6: Testing systematic latitude  
 
• We can test the six point proto-theory in a preliminary way by seeing how it 
explains two of Frege’s puzzles. For example, Frege’s identity problem can be 
accounted for by evolution in the systematic relations of sameness and difference 
that constitute objects. 
 
• Our inability to substitute co-referential names in opaque contexts can be also be 
explained - primarily by the co-extension of specific systems of value with specific 
speakers, something that, paradoxically, these contexts make transparent.   
 
• Subtleties, such as the way that values within a sentence may vary with their 
varying oppositional relations, are also able to be accounted for. 
 
There are some basic tests that can be applied to the six point proto-theory outlined 
above. In this section I want very briefly to outline how the adaptation of the concept of 
systematic latitude to simple naming might work in these test cases.  
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The tests I have in mind are those identified by Saussure’s contemporary Gottlob 
Frege, particularly in his article, On Sense and Reference (1997, p. 151). The similarities 
between Frege’s concept of sense and Saussure’s concept of linguistic value are notable. 
Perhaps they are most obvious in this formulation by Frege: The sense of a proper name is 
grasped by everybody who is sufficiently familiar with the language or totality of designations to 
which it belongs (1892, p. 153).  The differences between the theories revolve around the role 
of simple naming. If we think of Saussure’s theory as involving a peaceful co-existence 
of simple naming with value then there is in fact little difference between the two. In both 
theories, however, the relations between these three elements: the simple name; the sense 
or value associated with that name; and the object named, are highly problematic. What 
we are concerned with here is whether an account of simple naming as systematic latitude 
can deal in any plausible way with some of the challenges that Frege identifies for his 
theory. 
 
The first of these challenges is Frege’s identity problem. The problem goes like this: 
if the meaning of a name is just the object it names what do we learn from identity 
statements such as “The Morning Star is the Evening Star”? How do these seem to be 
“synthetic” or  informative about the world we live in – at least when we affirm them as 
true?  For it would seem that such a sentence could tell us only one of two things. First 
that the convention we follow in the use of names is that the “Evening Star” is 
interchangeable with the “Morning Star”. They can both be used to name the same thing. 
Alternatively the sentence could be telling us that the two objects named are the same, 
one thing. The problem is that in neither case does the sentence tell us anything new 
about the world. In the first case it tells us something about the conventions we use to 
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name the world. If it is true it will be so analytically – that is, by virtue of the meaning of 
the terms used. In the second case, if the meaning of names is the thing they name – and 
this sentence is true – then the thing these two names name must already be one thing. All 
the identity sentence can tell us is that the object named is identical with itself. That is 
also an analytic - not a synthetic – truth.  
 
How does Saussure’s theory – including the account of simple naming we have 
outlined above - deal with this challenge? The sentence tells us that two values that were 
previously opposed – the “Morning Star” and the “Evening Star” - are now identified. 
This can only be due to the evolution of the system in which these values are found. That 
evolution will involve a redistribution of the relations of sameness and difference – the 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations – that constitute values in the system. The 
informative identity sentence is not telling us, in this case at least, of an elaboration to the 
system that some individual or group is undertaking, within the scope of the latitude of 
the system, such that these names are interchangeable. Neither, on the other hand, is the 
sentence telling us that the Planet Venus – which happens to be the one object in question 
– is the same as itself. It was never simply the same as itself but was always constituted 
as a value within a system of sameness and opposition. It was never an isolated object. Its 
essence was always extended through the system – as was that of the Morning Star and 
the Evening Star. The Planet Venus is now a different value, as are the Morning Star and 
the Evening Star. If the sentence is true it is because we judge that these new values are 
parts of our overall, preferred system of values. 
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We might object the values of these names certainly appears to have changed – but 
doesn’t that just concern, as Frege would say, the cognitive value associated with the 
name? Their referent - the Planet Venus – continues to hurtle through space in just the 
way that it has in the past and will in the future. I think the answer to this objection is that 
things may indeed be said to exist prior to our knowledge of them. They cannot ever, 
though, be said to exist as absolute singular things whose definition had nothing to do, 
however simply, with any of the other things around them. No man is an island – no 
island is an island either. For Frege, the opposite is the case – the referent is precisely a 
particular, unique object named by a singular term.  Certainly, Saussure can allow that we 
observe isolated phenomena. But he can also point out that those observations have to be 
systematically reproducible before we begin to take them seriously and consider them a 
challenge to any existing system of objects.  
 
The second test of Frege’s that I want to consider concerns what Frege called 
subordinate clauses but which are now more often known as propositional attitudes,  
opaque contexts or intentional contexts. These are sentences of the kind: 1) Lois knows that 
Superman can fly.  They are so named because they tell us about Lois Lane’s attitude to the 
proposition Superman can fly. Or, similarly, they are opaque in that the relation between 
the name and its referent is obscured by the mediation of an intentional verb such as 
knowing, believing, seeing etc. The problem is that if the meaning of names is just their 
referent then the name Clark Kent, which has the same individual as its referent as 
Superman, should be substitutable in sentence 1) without that affecting its truth. However, 
says Frege, that does not seem to be the case in examples of this kind. Lois knows 
Superman can fly but it is not true to say that she knows Clark Kent can fly.   
The Life of Language: 
Saussure and Evolution   159 
 
 
 
Intuitions differ on this last point.  Scott Soames feels truth is preserved through 
such substitutions (Soames, 2002). Frege does not. In these cases, says Frege, what we 
normally think of as the cognitive value or sense associated with a name becomes its 
referent – partly just because it is the sense that determines the truth of a sentence of this 
kind and what determines the  truth of a sentence must be the referent. The sense of the 
name Superman is different for Lois from the sense of the name Clark Kent. As a 
consequence truth, is not preserved when one name is substituted for the other.  
 
The explanation provided by our proto-theory is clearly going to run along similar 
lines to Frege’s account. For in the proto-theory all objects are always in an intentional 
relationship to a community of speakers, down to the level of the individual speaker. In 
this sense, sentences of this kind may be seen as transparent contexts because they 
specify the speaker or community of speakers involved. By this means they specify the 
system in which the signified is found.  In normal contexts that system is opaque because 
it is unconsciously assumed – at the very moment that we take the referent to be an 
isolated object. The account offered by the proto-theory is very simple, then. In Lois’ 
system Clark Kent and Superman have different values. One value includes the ability to 
fly. The other does not. The two terms are not substitutible therefore, while preserving 
truth.  
 
As I’ve said, from the point of view of our proto-theory, in normal contexts the 
system involved is assumed. Soames’ account then depends simply on assuming that the 
system in which a sign has value is always the most
The Life of Language: 
Saussure and Evolution   160 
 
 
available. It ignores elaborations or partialisations of that system – and with it the 
pleasures of dramatic irony that drive the superman stories. 
 
An encouraging aspect of the proto-theory is that it seems to be able to account for 
examples in which both intuitions about the substitutability of co-referential expressions 
– the Soamesian and the Fregean - appear to be combined. Consider the sentence: 2) Lois 
knows Clark can fly but she doesn’t know he has x-ray vision. Let us suppose that this sentence 
is uttered by one of two interlocutors playing a supporting role in the Superman story. Is 
truth preserved in substituting Clark for Superman in this case? Is there, in other words, an 
appropriate latitude allowed by the system?  
 
Let us note to begin with that the latitude at the boundary of the system is defined 
by its ultimate binary opposition - and truth expresses the preference of the system at that 
level. If the ultimate opposition in this sentence is taken to be the opposition between two 
attributes possessed by a super being – the power of flight and x-ray vision - then the 
truth of the sentence will depend on Lois’s knowledge of those powers alone. Does she 
know that Superman can, if he wishes, see through her clothes? If not, the sentence is 
true. The interlocutors are then free to add their own conspiratorial nuance to the sentence 
by calling Superman Clark. The sentence will be true regardless of what name they give 
this super being because of the latitude the system’s ultimate opposition leaves. But if we 
judge the ultimate opposition in the system to lie between the values Clark and Superman -  
which values include their differing dress, comportment and public identity - then the 
sentence will be false. If, for example, the actor speaking the line emphasises or “hits” the 
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word Clark instead of the word fly, that will mark a different ultimate opposition – despite 
the apparent absence of the opposing sign Superman - and entail a different truth value.  
 
So the proto-theory promises to have explanatory power at the most subtle level at 
which interested individuals and communities of speakers interact. To sum up: there are 
objects that exist prior to being named – but they are systematically delimited objects.  
The apparently arbitrary character of names derives from the latitude that delimitation by 
opposition leaves. That latitude is a weak restriction of non-coincidence or non-
contradiction. To be true or authentic is to be a part of the system that is used as the 
criterion of truth or authenticity. 
 
Section 7: Metaphysical implications 
 
• The linguistic-biological analogy requires a re-articulation of signifier 
arbitrariness as systematic latitude and gives the speech-language framework – 
the evolutionary framework the two systems have in common – the central 
explanatory role. 
 
• Metaphysically, this common evolutionary framework can be seen as an 
alternative response to what Aristotle calls “substantial change”. It is an 
alternative to the material continuity Aristotle described, which ultimately secures 
the natural object opposite the human subject. 
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• If we pursue this alternative, the subject-object relation – which is 
paradigmatically aligned with the arbitrariness of the signifier-signified relation 
– gives way to a speech-language relation as our basic metaphysical framework. 
 
 
In the first part of this chapter I have argued that signifier arbitrariness needs to be 
strongly distinguished from material discontinuity. Signifier arbitrariness is not the reason 
that Language has the strange, striking characteristic of not having entities that are perceptible at 
the outset and yet of not permitting us to doubt that they exist and that their functioning constitutes 
it (Saussure, 1974, p. 107). And this feature – material discontinuity - is not a trait that 
distinguishes  language from all other semiological institutions (Saussure, 1974, p. 107).  It is a trait 
that unites semiological institutions so long as they are free to evolve. As we have seen 
with respect to language and at least one other semiological system in which signifier 
arbitrariness does not feature, these systems will evolve in similar ways so long as there 
is free interaction between language and speech. It is not that the sign is necessarily 
motivated in one system and necessarily unmotivated in the other. It is, rather, that the 
presence or absence of any specific motivation for a sign is irrelevant to its evolutionary 
systematics.  
 
In the second part of this chapter I have, therefore, argued that signifier arbitrariness 
needs to be removed from the mechanism of the system itself and relocated, as systematic 
latitude, at the interface of language and speech. It is here, at the edge of the system, that 
the freedom that Saussure envisages for the Esperantist is located - in the complex 
relationship between innovation and the system that both enables and limits that 
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innovation. It is in maintaining the play in this relationship that the linguistic-biological 
analogy is sustained. If Saussure can conceive of all evolutionary change in language as a 
shift in the relationship between signifier and signified it is just because the latitude at the 
boundary of the system which accounts for the appearance of signifier arbitrariness 
changes with any change in the system itself. By maintaining the free play in the 
relationship between language and speech, the semiological ideal – the life of language - 
becomes accessible to all sign systems.  
 
In the second part of this chapter I have also started to use what I have called the 
“inchoate theory of truth” that we find in Saussure - and this, too, is structured around the 
speech-language relationship. In fact, the fuller philosophical appropriation of Saussure’s 
theory appears to involve a kind of transition or translation of problems into a speech–
language framework as the means for their solution. One way of understanding this 
process – and perhaps all there is room to say further with regard to the way in which the 
linguistic-biological analogy opens the prospect of an alternative explanatory framework 
– is to point out that this common evolutionary framework is an alternative response to 
substantial change.  
 
That is, it is an alternative to the Aristotelan account of the object as an individual 
substance (Aristotle 1998). That substance reveals itself in an open space – it presences 
itself in a space of disclosure. Saussure’s object – the sign - is encountered within a 
system.  The Aristotelean substance has its origin in itself. The Saussurean value has its 
origin in an evolving system of sameness and difference. The Aristotelean substance has 
an internal essence, an enduring being in itself that can stand in opposition to its 
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accidental properties and ephemeral surroundings. The Saussurean object has an external 
essence that changes with changes in its surroundings. The Aristotelean substance is 
individual. The Saussurean value is infinitely divisible.   
 
The Aristotelean substance has an underlying material continuity that transcends 
changes in its essential nature. That material substratum secures the object – it holds the 
place of the object - opposite an intentional human subject that refers to such objects by 
arbitrary names. But diachronic linguistics and its “new class of phenomena” compels 
Saussure to think beyond this framework – to think of systematic, evolutionary continuity 
in place of material continuity. As we saw in Saussure’s example of the terms agunt and 
zeugma this systematic continuity includes not only the outward ripple of innovation and 
change but the inward ripple of conservation and stability that secures core, material  
elements – ancient elements - by mean of a present process. The object then ceases to 
have its ground or origin in its unique nature – and language ceases to be a question of 
how an autonomous human subject, undifferentiated as to being collective or individual, 
succeeds in referring to such objects over a relation of difference. Instead, language 
becomes the question of how objects are constituted as values by individuals and 
communities of speakers using interdependent, systematic relations of association and 
opposition, sameness and difference.  
 
Unhooking system arbitrariness – that is, the lack of a natural or material base to 
evolutionary change – from signifier arbitrariness allows the speech-language framework 
to slide into position as our most basic assumption in place of the subject–object 
framework. If we don’t think of the signifier-signified relation as necessarily a relation of 
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difference then we can conceive of speech – and speakers - as occupying a space of 
possibility in which they may, like our interlocutors in the Superman stories, be 
simultaneously within a specific communal system and outside it. The interaction 
between the individual will and the collective will is conceived as more fundamental -  
more original, we might say - than the opposition between a free human subject and a 
pre-determined natural object. I’ve argued that the freedom of arbitrary naming in fact 
reflects the changing boundary between the speech that lies within a particular linguistic 
system and the speech that lies beyond it. In that relation we find the means of 
innovation, elaboration, concentration and transformation. That, at least, is the 
evolutionary innovation that this analogy - the linguistic-biological analogy – suggests. 
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